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Abstract
Much writing in the field of strategic management remains an exercise in comparative 
statics. Cross sectional research methods are combined with the notion of stable 
equilibria to analyse the fit between the positioning or resource base of the firm and its 
performance However, the inadequacies of this tradition are increasingly being 
recognised even by the scholars who created it (Porter 1991). Strategy can no longer 
be conceived through the static language of states or positions and must be understood 
as an innovation contest where the bureaucratic and inflexible will not survive (Webb 
and Pettigrew 1999).
This study takes up the challenge to explore the dynamics of strategy development. 
The empirical focus of the paper is the UK insurance industry in the 1980s and 1990s, 
a period of considerable upheaval. By means of an innovative cross-correlational time 
series analysis, we are able to show the ebb and flow of strategic change in the 
industry and the patterns of initiation and imitation as certain firms lead in areas of 
strategy and others follow A comparative case study analysis enabled the micro 
processes and internal contexts of consistent early and late adopters of strategy to be 
investigated The findings of our case studies were interrogated and interpreted by 
developing theoretical ideas from three literatures which historically have not talked 
to one another These are the literatures on innovation, institutionalism and 
contextualism
The empirical results show firms pursuing multiple strategies at one point in time and 
altering the strategic agenda over time Our analysis of nine firms reveals the 
existence of leaders and laggards in the development of a variety of strategic 
initiatives The comparative case studies indicate that the ‘strategic agility’ of a firm 
depends both on management having the ability to act and the context in which such 
action occurs being receptive
x
Chapter I - Introduction
Chapter 1 
Introduction
As ever, the rhetoric of organisational change is ahead of our empirical 
understanding of actual change in firm strategy and structure We are variously 
informed about the consequences of hypercompetition (D’Aveni 1994), the rise o f 
'individualised' corporations (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1998) and the new rigours o f 
'competing on the edge of chaos' (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998) Behind such claims 
li® a new interest in the dynamics of organising and strategizing There is a 
recognition that strategy can no longer be conceived through the static language o f 
states or positions, but must now be understood as an innovation contest where the 
bureaucratic and inflexible will not survive (Webb and Pettigrew 1999).
Amongst those who champion the new dynamic view of the firm, there is the belief 
that managers are unable to influence, or even to comprehend, their rapidly changing 
environment (Stacey 1993 and Peters 1987, 1992). Hence, they urge for the adoption 
of flexible structures and systems which react to change automatically. This is a 
highly deterministic view - the actions of the manager being limited merely to 
making adjustments to the structure and systems Others (e g D’Aveni 1994) suggest 
a more proactive role for the manager in which he does have the ability to influence 
the environment in which the firm operates.
Despite these emerging dynamic views, much strategic management writing, like a 
good deal of the social sciences, is still an exercise in comparative statics Cross
1
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sectional research designs are combined with the static metaphors of contingency 
thinking to analyse the fit between the positioning and resource base of the firm and 
its performance in differing environments. The inadequacies of this tradition are now 
well recognised even by those scholars who created it (Porter 1991). Thus Rumelt et 
al (1991) ask for more dynamic explanations of strategy and Porter (1991) applauds 
research which utilises historical data to reveal the chains of causality that help to 
make up a more dynamic theory o f strategy development.
Recognition of the dynamic character of the content of strategy raises a number of 
important questions concerning the emergence, development and demise of types of 
strategy over time and the factors that trigger these changes. In particular, what are 
the characteristic patterns of strategy development that occur at both firm and 
industry level over time? Do firms pursue single dominating strategies at any point in 
time, or is the process of strategic evolution a pattern of changing emphases between 
different strategic initiatives and pathways? In any industry, are certain firms leaders 
and others followers in this process of strategy change? Is it possible that a firm 
could be an early adopter of a strategic initiative in one area of strategy but a later 
adopter in some other strategy area? If some firms are indeed consistent early or late 
adopters in an industry, why? What mixture of internal and external features of firm 
and industry conditions creates such industry leaders and laggards9 Does the early 
adoption of strategies depend on the firm quickly reacting or flexing to match change 
or does proactive management action play a role?
This study takes up the challenge to explore the dynamics of industry and firm 
strategy development The empirical focus of the paper is the UK insurance industry
2
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in the 1980s and 1990s. This was an era of considerable upheaval in an industry with 
a long history of tradition and continuity We explore patterns in the strategic 
development of nine of the largest firms in the UK insurance industry. Our analysis 
draws upon a combination of secondary and primary data By means of an innovative 
cross-correlational time series analysis, we are able to show the ebb and flow of 
strategic change in the industry and the patterns of initiation and imitation as certain 
firms lead areas o f strategy and others follow. The internal micro processes and 
contexts of two firms, one a consistent early adopter of strategy and one a consistent 
late adopter, were investigated using the comparative case study method
Outline of this Thesis
Chapter 2 presents and critiques the two main schools of strategy content -  the 
positioning school and the resource based view of the firm. Two main criticisms are 
described Firstly, these schools have tended to adopt a static view of strategy content 
due to their belief in the notion of stable equilibria and because of the methodologies 
they have utilised. Secondly, each school has tended to concentrate on a single level 
of analysis, e g. the firm, and to exclude, or even dismiss, the influence of factors at 
other levels We describe how three alternative literatures -  innovation (e g 
Damanpour 1991), institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and contextualism 
(Pettigrew and Whipp 1991) -  can be used to build a more dynamic and multilevel 
view of strategy content. These literatures also raise several issues about the patterns 
of strategy content that occur across an industry group and the firm level factors that 
influence these patterns. These issues led to the three main research questions that 
were investigated by this study:
3
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1. Do common strategies emerge and diffuse through an industry over time?
2. Are there consistent early and late adopters of common strategies or does the 
order of adoption depend on the nature of the strategy?
3. Why are certain firms consistent early or late adopters of common strategies? 
What factors influence a firm’s strategic agility?
Chapter 3 describes the methodology adopted for our empirical research A dual 
phase research strategy was used which incorporated the strengths of the comparative 
case study method and those of an innovative mapping and analysis technique. 
Strategy types were mapped through time for each of nine UK insurers to allow cross 
industry patterns to be detected A cross-correlation analysis technique was 
developed for this study which allowed the quantitative recognition of consistent 
early and late adopters of strategy The case study approach allowed the internal 
micro processes and contexts of these early and late adopters of strategy to be 
investigated. The chapter provides details of this unique approach and the steps that 
were taken to ensure validity
In Chapter 4 we begin our multi-level analysis of the UK insurance industry by 
analysing the macro and competitive environment faced by insurers in the 1980s and 
1990s We describe how this environment changed from one of protection and 
collaboration to one of hypercompetition (D’Aveni 1994). We show that some firms 
were able to cope with the environment better than others
4
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Chapter 5 focuses on the patterns of strategy development and diffusion among our 
sample of insurers. We describe how certain strategies emerged and spread to the rest 
of the sample. Through the use of the innovative cross correlation analysis we show 
that certain firms were consistent early adopters of strategy, while others were 
consistent late adopters.
The results of our comparative case study analysis are described in Chapters 6, 7 and 
8. Chapters 6 and 7 provide a narrative of the significant strategic and organisational 
issues within the two case study firms -  Prudential and Guardian Royal Exchange. 
Chapter 8, compares the two companies and describes the factors that our analysis 
identified as influencing strategic agility i.e. the speed with which a firm adopts new 
strategies.
The final chapter, Chapter 9, concludes this thesis Having summarised our findings 
we discuss the contributions made by this research to the study of strategy. We also 
comment on its limitations and suggest areas for future research to address these 
limitations and to further utilise the methodology described
5
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Chapter 2
Towards a Dynamic Perspective of the Content of Strategy
“All this is true, i f  time stood still”
Francis Bacon (1561 -  1621)
Introduction
Strategy researchers have frequently distinguished been the content, process and 
context of strategy (Pettigrew 1985, Mintzberg 1990 and De Witt and Meyer 1994). 
This fragmentation of the strategy field has led to the development of separate content 
and process research traditions. While this has proved analytically beneficial, several 
authors have argued that it ignores the fact that strategy process, content and context 
are strongly interrelated Hence, focusing on any one of the three in isolation will give 
only a limited view (Mintzberg 1990 and De Witt and Meyer 1994). Pettigrew (1992) 
makes the same point and calls for the reintegration of research on these three 
dimensions of strategy. However, for such reconciliation to occur, each stream of 
thinking must develop in commensurable lines and there must be the academic 
motivation to attempt such reconciliation.
Having dominated academic research on strategy during the 1970s and 1980s, interest 
in the content of strategy has waned over the last decade Researchers have turned 
their attention to the process of strategy and this has led to significant progress in this 
area (Mintzberg et al 1998). However, the development of thinking on strategy 
content has slowed This has led some authors to express concern that it is lagging 
behind other areas of management science, including strategy process (Montgomery et
6
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al 1989 and Porter 1991). Others claim that current views are inadequate to deal with 
today’s competitive environment (D’Aveni 1994 and Brown and Eisenhardt 1998) It 
is these concerns that form part of the subject o f this chapter
In this chapter, we first review the main streams of literature on the content of 
strategy: the positioning school and the resource-based view Through this review two 
critical themes become apparent. Firstly, that research on strategy content has tended 
to take a highly static view based upon the notion of stable equilibria Secondly, that 
this research concentrates on a single level o f analysis, i.e. the industry or the firm, 
and fails to develop a multi-level view.
While some progress has been made in addressing these criticisms, comparison with 
the highly dynamic views that have emerged within the strategy process literature 
reveals significant conceptual and empirical gaps. In particular, with the exception of 
a small and eclectic group of empirical studies, research that takes a dynamic view of 
strategy across an industry is limited
Research from other streams of management thinking suggests that cross industry 
patterns of strategy content will reveal important aspects of firm behaviour that are 
linked to performance. This insight leads to the development of a number of research 
questions relating to such cross industry patterns which our empirical study will seek 
to explore.
This chapter comprises six sections. After this brief introduction, the second section 
discusses the main schools of thought within the strategy content literature -  the
7
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positioning school and the resource-based view of the firm. The third section 
describes significant criticisms of these two schools of thought. Section four explores 
a small group of studies of strategy content that address the concerns raised in section 
three Section five describes three ‘alternative literatures’ -  innovation diffusion, 
institutionalism and contextualism -  which offer important insight into the nature of 
strategy content The final section, demonstrates how our research questions emerge 
from this review of the literature.
The Content of Strategy
Two fundamentally different streams of research - the positioning school (Mintzberg 
1990) and the resource-based view of the firm (Wemerfelt 1984) have dominated the 
strategy content literature (De Witt and Meyer 1994). The positioning school is most 
closely associated with the work of Porter (1980 and 1985) and has had a significant 
impact on strategic management since the 1970s In contrast, the resource-based view 
is relatively new and less well developed (Grimm and Smith 1997).
The Positioning School
The positioning school emphasises the importance of the strategies themselves i.e. the 
content of strategy (Mintzberg 1988 and 1994, Mintzberg et al 1998) It assumes that 
the structure of the industry in which a firm operates largely determines the firm’s 
freedom to manoeuvre (De Witt and Meyer 1994, Teece et al 1997). Hence, 
understanding the structure of the industry and then positioning the firm to take 
advantage of the insights gained are of prime importance Management’s aim must be
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to discover or create a defensible and sustainable position within which the firm can 
generate above average profits.
Industrial Organisation Economics
The Harvard stream of industrial organisation economics has heavily influenced the 
positioning school. This micro-economic perspective has its theoretical roots in 
Chamberlin’s (1933) model of monopolistic competition and Robinson’s (1933) 
concept of imperfect competition. At the core of industrial organisation economics is 
the structure-conduct-performance (S-C-P) paradigm (Mason 1939, Bain 1958)
In the S-C-P framework, structure refers to industry structure in terms of the number, 
size and distribution of firms in that industry, the elasticity of demand and the 
existence of barriers to entry. Conduct refers to the behaviour of firms, whilst 
performance, to the industry’s performance in terms of profitability and growth in 
output. Originally, a one way causation was implied with structure determining 
conduct and hence industry performance Later work questioned this linearity (Scherer 
1970) and suggested interdependency among the three elements of the S-C-P 
paradigm
The primary aim of the early industrial organisationalists (Mason 1939 and Bain 
1956) was to improve performance at an industry level by the use of public policy to 
manipulate industry structure Governments were urged to counter monopoly power 
by removing barriers to entry and promoting competition - thus preventing individual
9
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firms from seeking defensible positions that exploited imperfections in competition 
and thereby gaining above average profits (monopoly rents)
Strategic Positioning and Generic Strategies
From the early 1970s strategy researchers began to adopt the S-C-P paradigm 
Reversing the intent of the Harvard industrial organisation theorists, it was seen as a 
model which managers could use to assess competition, develop monopoly positions 
and maximise profits.
Porter (1980) argued that the performance of a firm is determined by the strength of 
five structural forces - the threat of new entrants, supplier bargaining power, customer 
bargaining power, the threat o f substitute products and the intensity of rivalry among 
competing firms. Firms achieve competitive advantage by adopting advantageous 
positions relative to these five forces or by shaping them to their own benefit
Porter (1980 and 1985) suggests that, regardless of industry context, there are two 
basic types of competitive advantage a firm can possess: low cost and differentiation. 
These combine with the scope of the firm’s activities to produce “three generic 
strategies for achieving above average performance: cost leadership, differentiation 
and focus” (Porter 1985 and Mintzberg et al 1998).
Focusing on a single generic strategy is seen as essential to maximising firm 
performance (Ketchen et al 1996). Firms that have no coherent strategy or try to
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pursue two generic strategies simultaneously are described as ‘stuck in the middle’. 
According to Porter (1985), the profitability of such firms will be below average.
The belief that there are a limited number of viable strategies is an essential feature of 
the positioning school and has practical implications for firms. Senior management is 
advised to target a defensible product/market position identified through a careful 
industry analysis. A generic strategy that matches the conditions at hand is selected 
(Hofer and Schendel 1978 and Mintzberg et al 1998) and the organisation adjusted to 
deliver that strategy
Strategic Groups
The Harvard stream of industrial organisation economics asserts that industry 
structure determines firm conduct and assumes that firms are homogeneous in all 
respects but size (Cool and Schendel 1988). This suggests that there will be one 
optimal strategy that all firms in an industry will adopt (McGee et al 1995) However, 
empirical studies show that groups of firms cluster around different strategies or 
positions on a range of strategic dimensions (Porter 1980, McGee and Thomas 1986 
and Cool and Schendel 1988) These industry sub-groupings are termed strategic 
groups (Hunt 1972/Fiegenbaum and Thomas 1990).
Caves and Porter (1977) suggested that strategic groups are formed partly as a result 
of variations within the industry structure and partly as a result of similar investment 
decisions made by firms in the past. Mobility barriers, a ‘downsized version of entry
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barriers’ (Mintzberg et al 1998), were seen as impeding firms from freely changing 
their competitive positions and changing groups (Cool and Schendel 1988).
Porter (1979 and 1980) argued that firm profitability depends on the structure of the 
group in which the firm operates The higher the inter-industry mobility barriers and 
the lower the degree of rivalry between group members the lesser competition and the 
greater the opportunity to generate higher than average profits. However, group 
structure does not replace industry structure. Rather it defines segments within an 
industry (Caves and Porter 1977).
Empirical Evidence
The cross sectional and quantitative analysis of questionnaire surveys or existing data 
bases (e g. PIMS) have dominated empirical work on generic strategies. Typically 
such analyses have used either single or multi variable linear regression analysis 
(Ginsberg and Venkatraman 1985) to propose generalisations and imply causation 
(Aharoni 1993).
Using the typologies proposed by Porter and others (e g. Henderson 1979, Hambrick 
1983 and Miller and Friesen 1986) researchers have attempted to find the optimal 
match between generic strategy and environmental conditions (Hambrick 1983, Kim 
and Lim 1988 and Kumar and Subramanian 1997). Others have sought to determine 
the effect of strategy type on financial performance, and the influence of intermediate 
variables such as organisational structure (e g. Miller 1988 and 1992).
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Opinion as to the success of this research is varied. Ketchen et al (1996), Miller and 
Dess (1993) and Mehra (1996) suggest that strategy content research has been unable 
to establish a clearly defined relationship between strategy and performance Ginsberg 
and Venkatraman (1985) on the other hand state that research relating strategy to firm 
performance has been consistent and significant when studies have used industry 
structure and environmental factors as contingent variables However, similar studies 
where the link between performance and strategy is contingent on organisational 
variables have produced inconsistent findings.
Research on strategic groups has concentrated on identifying clusters of firms within 
an industry or on attempting to prove the relationship between group conduct or the 
height of mobility barriers, and firm performance (Day et al 1995 and Dranoe et al 
1998). Strategic groups are identified either by using a simplistic manual inspection of 
key attributes or by cluster analysis based on existing data bases (e g. COMPUSTAT) 
(McKee et al 1995 and Day et al 1995). However, the results from this research have 
been mixed (Dranove et al 1998) - leading some to question whether there is a link 
between strategic groups and firm performance or even to doubt the existence of 
strategic groups (Barney and Hoskisson 1990 and Peteraf and Shanley 1997).
How much does Industry Structure Matter?
The Harvard approach to industrial organisation economics asserts that industry 
structure determines firm performance Other industrial organisation researchers do 
not share this view. The Chicago School was particularly critical o f the notion of 
permanently defensible positions (Stigler 1968 and Demsetz 1974). They argued that
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it is the efficient exploitation of heterogeneous and immobile resources at the firm 
level that generates above average profits (Jacobson et al 1996).
The conflicting views on the importance of industry and firm factors have led a 
number of researchers to ask ‘how much does industry matter?’ (Rumelt 1991). 
Conflicting results have emerged Schmalensee (1985) showed that 75% of the 
variance in industry rates of return was due to industry influences, while firm level 
factors had negligible impact In contrast, Rumelt (1991) and Roquebert et al (1996) 
indicate that industry level influences were responsible for only 10% of differences in 
firm performance, while firm level factors accounted for around 50% of such 
variance.
Responding to Rumelt’s (1991) findings McGahan and Porter (1997) used a more 
sophisticated statistical approach (Mintzberg et al 1998) to address this issue. They 
found that industry level influences accounted for 19% of variation in firm 
performance However, differences due to firm level factors were more significant, 
accounting for 36%.
In the light of Rumelt’s (1991) findings, McWilliams and Smart (1993) suggest that 
the positioning school misdirects managers to expend resources on influencing 
industry structure because the firm’s performance will not be greatly affected by the 
changes that result. Black and Boal (1994) argue that strategy should primarily be 
concerned with firm level factors rather than seeking industry level positions Such an 
internal focus is adopted by the resource-based view of the firm
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The Resource-based View of the Firm
Like the positioning school, the resource-based view also has its origins in economics 
and Penrose’s (1959) characterisation of the firm as a collection of productive 
resources is widely acknowledged (Peteraf 1993 and Foss et al 1995). It also has 
affinity with the Chicago School of industrial organisation economics (Conner 1991).
Building on Penrose’s insight, Wemerfelt (1984) argues that the fundamental 
determinant of a firm’s performance is the distinctive resources it controls. These 
resources could be physical assets, capabilities, information, knowledge or other 
assets. To be strategically relevant they must be rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
and have a high utility (Barney 1991). Barney (1991) highlights the problems of 
resource inimitability and this has led many researchers to consider intangible 
resources or bundles of resources as the source of sustainable competitive advantage.
The pattern and quality of the bundle of resources controlled by each firm will vary 
Imperfections in the market for such resources will restrict their mobility and hence, 
differences between firms will persist (Barney 1986 and Peteraf 1993). Hence, the 
possession of scarce and valuable assets will be the source of sustainable competitive 
advantage, allowing firms to earn above average profits (scarcity rents).
While the resource-based view is primarily concerned with firm level factors, there 
has been some attempt to integrate the key aspects of industrial organisation 
economics (Grimm and Smith 1997) Peteraf (1993) provides an example She 
suggests that there are four cornerstones of competitive advantage Two, the
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heterogeneity of resources and the imperfect mobility of key resources, both well 
developed in the work of Barney (1991) and Wernerfelt (1984), are at the firm level 
The other two are industry level cornerstones - ‘ex ante limits to competition’ and ‘ex 
post limits to competition’. In essence, on their own valuable resources cannot 
generate above average profits, it is only through their interplay with market forces 
that their value is released (Collis and Montgomery 1995 and Russo and Fouts 1997).
The resource-based view sees strategy making in terms of senior management 
rationally identifying and exploiting the firm’s resources and capabilities to gain 
competitive advantage. Content of strategy is therefore the unique collection of 
valuable resources that senior management identify and deploy rather than a set of 
product-market positions (Wemerfelt 1984, Barney 1986 and Teece et al 1997).
The resource-based view of strategy is relatively young and its theoretical approach is 
yet to be fully developed (Black and Boal 1994 and Peteraf 1993). Foss et al (1995) 
argue that as a result researchers are unable to identify a priori what resources or 
bundle of resources might lead to competitive advantage
Firm Heterogeneity and Strategic (7roups
The assumption that resource bundles, and therefore firms, are heterogeneous is at the 
heart of the resource-based view of the firm. However, as we have seen other research 
has noted the presence of strategic groups within an industry, the members of which 
pursue similar strategies (Caves and Porter 1977) Despite the apparent contradiction a
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number of researchers have adopted the resource-based view in defining strategic 
groups (Mehra 1993 and McGee and Thomas 1985).
Amit and Schoemaker (1993) provide an answer to this apparent contradiction. They 
suggest that there are two types of valuable resources - ‘strategic industry resources’ 
and ‘firm idiosyncratic resources’ Firms that possess similar configurations of 
strategic industry resources can constitute a strategic group (Mehra 1993). Cool and 
Schendel (1987 and 1988) suggest that whilst in total a firm’s bundle of valuable 
resources may be unique, components of that bundle will be found across a strategic 
group. However, while strategies may be similar, firm performance will vary across 
the group due to firm idiosyncratic resources (ibid).
Empirical Evidence
Empirical research relating to the resource-based view has concentrated on 
determining what features identify strategically valuable resources (Barney 1986 and 
Maijoor and Witteloostuijn 1996). Such work has typically employed cross sectional 
analysis to identify resources or clusters of resources associated with above average 
firm profitability. However, due to the often intangible nature of the resources being 
studied and a wide variation in the definitions and statistical methods used, empirical 
results are mixed (Rouse and Daellenbach 1999). Beyond stating that resources and 
combinations of resources can confer a competitive advantage, evidence for the 
resource-based view of the firm remains largely theoretical (Pettigrew et al 1999).
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Criticisms of Strategy Content Research
The positioning approach to strategy has come under significant criticism since the 
1980s. Typically the positioning school has been grouped with the earlier planning 
and design schools (Mintzberg 1990) and variously described as being ‘prescriptive’ 
(Mintzberg 1990), linear (Chaffee 1985) or economically rational (Knights and 
Morgan 1991). Similar comments have been made about the resource-based view 
(Conner 1991 and Oliver 1997). Often the perspective is then used as a ‘straw man’ 
against which to extol the virtues of an alternative approach.
Much of the criticism relates to the adoption by both the positioning school and 
resource-based view of ideas stemming from the planning school. In particular, the de­
coupling of strategy making from strategy implementation has been widely criticised, 
as has the notion that senior management, armed with the necessary information and 
analysis, rationally and deliberately select the appropriate strategy to pursue 
(Pettigrew 1985 and Mintzberg and Waters 1985).
However, critics have also raised two particular conceptual and empirical concerns 
that relate directly to the content of strategy Firstly, that research on strategy content 
focuses unduly on either firm or industry factors rather than taking a multi-level view 
(Mintzberg et al 1998 and Pettigrew 1985) Secondly, that both the positioning school 
and the resource-based view promote a static view of the firm and its environment 
(Jacobson 1992, Grimm and Smith 1997 and Mintzberg et al 1998) This static view is 
amplified by the research methods utilised
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Single and Multi Levels of Analysis
Strategy content, for the positioning school, is a defensible position defined by 
competitive forces at the industry and strategic group level. In its quest to investigate 
industry structure and define generic strategies, this stream of research, as we have 
seen, has tended to ignore firm level and macro environment factors (Pettigrew 1985 
and Mintzberg et al 1998).
The resource-based view is perhaps equally guilty of taking a blinkered view 
Emphasis is heavily on firm level factors, often to the exclusion of industry effects 
and certainly macro environmental issues. While firm level differences contribute 
most significantly to performance, industry level factors are not without influence. 
With the rise of the resource-based view in the 1990s, the internal focus has become 
dominant. This has led some authors to suggest a more balanced view is needed 
(Mintzberg et al 1998). Through the work of Peteraf (1993), Mehra (1996) and others 
such a view has begun to emerge.
Static Views of Strategy Content
Central to neo classical economics and intrinsic to both the positioning school and the 
resource-based view of the firm is the notion that a firm is in a state of equilibrium, 
i.e. the economic forces acting on it are exactly balanced. Small displacements away 
from this equilibrium are self corrected and a state of balance restored (Bettis and 
Prahalad 1995). Hence, there is no tendency for the firm to change Different
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defensible positions, generic strategies or bundles of resources reflect alternative 
equilibrium states.
The implicit assumption of much of the strategy content research is that management 
rationally identifies a new and more attractive equilibrium position as a result of 
extensive analysis. The organisation will then be swiftly moved to this new position. 
This shift will be ‘step like’ or quantum.
Over the last decade the notion of long periods of environmental stability has been 
challenged (D’Aveni 1994 and Brown and Eisenhardt 1998). Increasing globalisation, 
deregulation and blurring industry boundaries have led many researchers to envisage 
continuously changing and chaotic markets (Kanter et al 1992, D’Aveni 1994, Brown 
and Eisenhardt 1998). In responding to the chaos, organisational change is seen as 
‘continuous and never discrete, fragmented or broken’ (Sztompka 1993).
Strategy process researchers have responded to the demands of this new environment 
by adopting more adaptive models that stress flexibility and change (Chaffee 1985 and 
D’Aveni 1994). However, it is apparent that thinking on strategy content has been 
slow to take a similar step (D’Aveni 1994 and Webb and Pettigrew 1999).
The static natures of the positioning school and the resource-based view have been the 
subject of extensive criticism (Pettigrew 1992, Mintzberg 1994 and Grimm and Smith 
1997) The failure to address how organisations create and develop market positions 
or resources over time receives particular attention (Fiegenbaum et al 1990, Black and
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Boal 1994, Peteraf and Shanley 1997 and Lieberman and Montgomery 1998). 
Recently, researchers from both schools have begun to recognise these concerns.
Developments in the Positioning School
A number of writers from the positioning school have urged their colleagues to take 
more dynamic perspectives (Porter 1991, Bogner and Thomas 1993 and McGee et al 
1995). However, very few researchers from this school have taken up this challenge
Fiegenbaum et al (1990) McGee et al (1995) do suggest a more dynamic view, 
proposing a punctuated equilibrium model o f strategic groups. Stable periods where 
the membership o f a group and the strategies pursued are invariant are interrupted by 
periods of disturbance during which there is change in both group membership and 
strategy. Fiegenbaum et al (1990) and McGee et al (1995) urge researchers to identify 
strategic groups during periods of stability and investigate subsequent change. They 
identify a small number of studies that take this approach
Developments in the Resource-based View
Researchers have begun to recognise that in a dynamic environment any advantage 
provided by an unchanging bundle of resources will be dissipated or bypassed as 
competitors imitate or find alternatives (Benasko et al 1996). Hence, firms must 
continuously adapt and renew their strategically valuable resources. This realisation 
has led a number of writers (Foss et al 1995, Levinthal 1995 and Chang 1996) to
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suggest that evolutionary economics (Nelson and Winter 1982) could be used to 
provide a dynamic perspective of the resource-based view.
Foss et al (1995) suggests that such an amalgam was evident in Penrose’s work but 
was ignored by early resource-based view theorists An evolutionary view implies that 
a bundle of resources will evolve over time through a continuing process of variation, 
selection and retention within the firm (Levinthal 1995).
Teece et al (1997) also stress the importance of adapting to a changing environment 
They suggest that firms must have the ability -  which they refer to as dynamic 
capability - to adapt, integrate and reconfigure skills and resources in response to 
change. A similar dynamic perspective is evident in Prahalad and Hamel’s (1990) 
construct of core competencies. Here core competencies relate to both tangible assets 
and less tangible resources such as organisational learning and knowledge
The development of an evolutionary approach to the resource-based view suggests 
that strategy content will comprise continually changing bundles of firm level 
resources Although this approach focuses narrowly on the firm, it does provide a 
highly dynamic view of strategy content However, it is in its infancy (Teece et al 
1997) and little empirical testing has taken place
Empirical Limitations
The bias towards a static view of strategy content has been partly driven by the 
methodologies adopted. The use of cross sectional analysis at single points in time
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dominates empirical work (Huber and Van de Ven 1995 and Rouse and Daellenbach 
1999). Researchers aim to uncover statistical correlation between various sets of 
variables and imply generalisations of causality.
While such an approach will have a place during stable conditions it will fail to detect 
change (Delacroix and Swaminathan 1991 and Tuma and Hannan 1984). This is a 
significant problem when continuous change in the firm and its environment is 
envisaged.
As criticism has grown of this static orientation, some researchers have begun to adopt 
longitudinal research methods. Typically, cross sectional analyses are repeated at 
several discrete points in time and the differences between each time point used to 
demonstrate change However, this approach may assume that equilibrium has been 
reached at the points at which variables were sampled. Quantum change between 
states of equilibrium occurs sometime between the sample points (Meyer et al 1993 
and Colemen 1981). Thus, a quantum or punctuated equilibrium model of change is 
implied by the method used, though not necessarily by the data.
Various researchers have suggested that methods that are more dynamic should be 
applied to strategy content research (Russo and Fouts 1997 and Rouse and 
Daellenbach 1999). Quantitative methods, such as event history analysis (Tuma and 
Hannan 1984), and qualitative approaches, including case studies and interview 
programs (Rouse and Daellenbach 1999) have been proposed. However, the 
application of such approaches to strategy content research is still rare (Van de Ven 
and Huber 1995).
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Summary
Two critical themes of the research on the content of strategy have been discussed. 
The first highlights that both the positioning school and the resource-based view focus 
on a single level of analysis.
From a positioning perspective strategy content is a defensible position within the 
structure of the industry in which it operates While sub-structures are revealed 
through work on strategic groups, the emphasis is on industry level attributes often to 
the exclusion of firm and macro environmental factors
The central tenet of the resource-based view is that firm level factors determine 
performance. Industry and macro environmental factors have largely been ignored. 
However, there has been some attempt to introduce industry level effects into the 
resource-based view. Peteraf (1993) offers a model that includes both firm and 
industry level factors and various researchers have attempted to use firm level 
resources to define strategic groups (Mehra 1993 and Cool and Schendel 1988).
The second critical theme addresses the static nature of the positioning school and 
resource-based view. The static nature o f these constructs is inherited from the 
economic traditions upon which the two approaches are based. Central to neo-classical 
economics is the notion of stable equilibria, which implies little or no change. 
Consequently, little attention is paid to how strategies emerge and develop over time
Assumptions of economic rationality and a linear view of the strategy process imply 
that a firm’s management identify new and attractive markets or resource positions
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and then quickly shift the organisation to a new position Change, if it occurs, is 
quantum or ‘step like’ and possibly unproblematic
Authors in both content schools (Porter 1991 and Foss et al 1995) have called for the 
development of more dynamic perspectives. Within the positioning school, there has 
been some response from strategic group researchers by way of the adoption of a 
punctuated equilibrium model (Fiegenbaum et al 1990, McGee et al 1995).
A dynamic view o f strategy has recently emerged in the resource-based view 
Evolutionary or adaptive views are taken of a firm and its resources to develop 
concepts such as core competencies (Prahalad and Hamel 1990) or dynamic 
capabilities (Teece et al 1997). Despite the growing popularity of these concepts, they 
are still in their infancy and empirical work is limited
The adoption of more dynamic research has been hindered by the research methods 
commonly utilised. Cross sectional methods with data collected from a single point in 
time dominate research on strategy content. These methodologies are biased towards a 
static perspective.
The main areas of strategy content research together with recent developments have 
been mapped in relation to the two critical themes (Figure 1). This schematic 
representation of the literature demonstrates the lack of research that takes a dynamic 
view, particularly at the industry level. The diagram also highlights the lack of multi­
level research; i.e. that covers both firm and industry factors.
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Dynamic Studies of Strategy Content
In addition to the mainstream content research, there is a small and eclectic group of 
empirical studies that have taken a dynamic view of the content of strategy while 
pursuing wider research issues. Notably, these studies have used methodological 
approaches that attempt to maintain a dynamic perspective. We will review four 
studies that take a multi-level view
The prime thrust of Miller and Friesen’s (1984) quantum view is on organisational 
and strategic configurations However, this study is augmented by their ‘transition 
survey’. This survey aims to identify common evolutionary patterns or sequences that 
characterise periods of change (which they refer to as transition periods). While this 
view is similar to the punctuated equilibrium model o f change, Miller and Friesen 
(1984) concentrate on the transition periods during which continuous and major 
change is apparent.
Given the study’s goal of identifying generalisable types of organisational adaptation 
(ibid) a longitudinal methodology that incorporated a broad sample of firms was 
required. Miller and Friesen (1984) suggest that the ‘only manageable way to do this’ 
was through the use of ‘detailed published organisational histories in the form of 
books’. Histories were compiled for 36 firms covering a 20-year period and, from 
these, transition periods were identified The reliability of the histories obtained was 
checked using questionnaires sent to the chief executives of 12 of the firms
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Twenty-four variables were coded at the beginning and end of each transition period 
and a ‘transition score’ for each variable obtained by taking the difference in each 
case Six significant transition archetypes were then identified using a cluster analysis 
of the scores.
Miller and Friesen’s (1984) study is mainly concerned with organisational variables, 
e g centralisation and delegation, and strategy making However a few of the 
variables relate to strategy content, e g differentiation and product-market innovation, 
and it is implied that during transition periods strategy content is in a state of flux
The transition survey has several strengths In particular it utilises an effective and, at 
the time novel way o f investigating large samples of firms over long time periods. 
However, it also has a number of weaknesses The reliance on books to create 
organisational histories restricts the number of firms that can be studied and it limits 
the accuracy of the timing of change events to, at best, the year in which they 
occurred. A further weakness is the use of difference scores to characterise transition 
periods. In effect having carefully collected data over a continuous time period, the 
temporal component o f this data is removed by the coding and scoring process
Smith, Grimm and colleagues (Grimm and Smith 1997, Smith et al 1989,1991 and 
1992) conducted a series of six investigations that take a dynamic view of strategy 
content. These studies are based on an action-reaction model developed by action 
theorists (Parson 1937/Grimm and Smith 1997)
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This model holds that strategic actions taken by a firm to improve or defend its 
competitive position are countered by reactions by competitors Any competitive 
advantage gained is temporary and dependent on the time taken for competitors to 
respond (Smith et al 1992). Speed of response is linked to an organisation’s ability to 
learn and a set of organisational variables: external orientation, structural complexity, 
organisational slack and management experience (ibid). Later work (Smith et al 1997) 
adopts a resource-based view, linking speed of response to tangible and intangible 
firm resources.
Of the six studies, five targeted individual industries while the sixth investigated pairs 
of industry leaders and challengers in 41 industries Methodologies varied between the 
studies Two were based on field interviews and questionnaires In the other four 
investigations archival studies of industry publications and/or national newspapers 
were utilised. Key word searches were used to identify responses, which were then 
linked to an initial action (Smith et al 1992).
Regression and correlation analyses related firm performance to average response 
time and firm order of response, and linked speed of response to organisational 
variables.
The approach taken by Smith and Grimm suggests a highly dynamic view of strategy 
content. In addition, it links industry level patterns of strategy content to firm level 
factors that explain the phenomena observed. While this must be applauded, there are 
a number of concerns.
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Firstly, the data is analysed by calculating average response times for a firm across the 
study period (7 to 15 years) Hence, any variation occurring in firm responsiveness or 
organisational change over this period will be hidden Secondly, it was not possible to 
check for agreement between the two approaches as different industries were targeted 
by different methodologies The nature of the secondary data used in the archival 
study suggests that such a check would have been valuable
Meyer, Goes and Brooks (1993) adopt a similar methodology to that used by Miller 
and Friesen and Smith and Grimm to investigate strategic change in US hospitals. The 
central thrust of their argument is that hyper-turbulence at the environment level will 
result in continuous change at the organisational level However, survival during 
hyper-turbulence is possible if firms are able ‘to adopt radically new strategies’ (ibid).
‘Highly detailed time lines’ or event histories were created for a number of strategic 
dimensions and environmental factors These time series were generated from 
published information including ‘hundreds of newspaper articles’ (ibid). Having 
generated a highly temporal data set, Meyer et al (1993) interrogate the data using a 
factor analysis based on counts of change types They then show graphically how their 
strategic dimensions, e g  service differentiation and low margin defence, vary 
continuously over time and in step with environmental changes The patterns observed 
are corroborated using primary data obtained from questionnaires and structured 
interviews.
This study is widely praised for the insights it provides into the nature of change in 
hyper-turbulent environments (e g Huber and Van de Yen 1995) The work takes a
30
Chapter 2 -  Toward a Dynamic View o f the Content o f Strategy
highly dynamic view of strategy content and utilises a research methodology that 
provides temporal data In addition, the study takes a multi-level view of strategic 
change integrating organisational level and industry level variation.
However, a weakness is apparent in Meyer et al’s (1993) use of factor analysis. By 
basing this analysis on counts of change types, the approach removes the temporal 
component of the data In addition, while the study does take a multi-level approach, it 
does not attempt to uncover the behaviour or internal dynamics of individual firms.
Research which takes a multi-level approach and relates strategy content to the 
internal dynamics o f the firm is provided by Pettigrew and colleagues’ investigation 
of managing change for competitive success (Pettigrew and Whipp 1991, Pettigrew et 
al 1989) They suggest that strategy content is never static, but the result of the 
constantly changing interplay between management’s intentions and contextual 
forces, both from inside the firm and from the external environment
Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) show that firm performance is related to management’s 
ability to recognise change in the environment and mobilise the appropriate resources. 
They demonstrate the influence of various organisational factors on successfully 
implementing strategic change
Unlike the other empirical work that takes a dynamic view, a purely descriptive 
methodology is adopted Seven comparative case studies of high and low performing 
firms from four UK industries are undertaken. Over 350 semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with personnel from the seven firms and other industry experts. A
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range of documentary data from within the firms and secondary published material 
supplemented the interview data.
This study clearly demonstrates the advantages of a descriptive, case study based 
methodology for the study of change. The approach allows the temporal element of 
the phenomena observed to be maintained during analysis The method also provides 
a rich level of information regarding the internal dynamics of each organisation, and 
as a result of the comparative approach taken and of the coverage of four industries 
provides generalisable lessons for the management of change.
The descriptive approach, however, is also the study’s main weakness. The level of 
access to firms required and the amount o f researcher time entailed restricts the 
number of organisations that can be studied Consequently, polar types, e g a high 
performing firm and a low performing firm, are selected to highlight variations in 
significant factors This approach cannot delineate patterns of variation across an 
industry.
Summary
This section has described a small group of empirical studies that addressed the issue 
of strategy content as part of wider studies. The four studies demonstrated that the 
content of a firm’s strategy is constantly changing in response to turbulence in the 
external environment and to the interplay between management’s intentions and the 
internal context of the firm These studies also take a multi-level perspective in 
addressing strategy content at the firm, industry and macro-environment level.
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Each of the studies utilises a longitudinal approach that allows the tracking of strategic 
change over time. However, the analytical approaches taken by Miller and Friesen 
(1984), Grimm and Smith (1997) and Meyer et al (1993) aggregate the data collected 
across time and across the industry. Such averaging obscures variations during the 
study period and across the sample group. Consequently, cross industry patterns of 
strategy content are missed.
The comparative case study approach adopted by Pettigrew and colleagues also fails 
to detect cross industry patterns of variation in strategy content. The use of polar types 
reveals differences between extremes within an industry but is insufficient to reveal 
the patterns these differences form across that industry.
The homogeneity of strategy content implied by work on strategic groups suggests 
that changes in content will be mirrored across a number of firms. However, polar 
type case studies cannot explore issues such as how the adoption of common 
strategies might vary across an industry group.
Alternative Conceptual Perspectives
While the group of studies reviewed in the last section does take a dynamic approach 
to strategy content, it provides little insight into what patterns of strategy emerge 
across an industry over time. This issue is rarely addressed in the strategy literature
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and is more commonly associated with research on innovation, institutionalism and 
contextual ism.
Research on the Adoption of Innovations
Organisational innovation literature is composed of three streams -  organisational 
innovativeness, process theories of innovation and diffusion of innovations (Wolfe 
1994). Each of these streams addresses a different research question.
The organisational innovativeness stream of research attempts to uncover the 
determinants of a firm’s propensity to innovate or adopt an innovation. A wide variety 
of individual (e g. levels of education) and organisational factors (e g. firm size, slack 
and structure) are highlighted as influential (Slappendel 1996). The process theory 
approach focuses on how innovations emerge and develop within an organisation. 
Research on the diffusion of innovations takes a higher level view, concentrating on 
the spread of an innovation through a population of potential adopters (Wolfe 1994)). 
The aim is to observe and explain rates and patterns of innovation adoption over time 
and space
Potential adopters are assumed to make independent and rational choices to close gaps 
between the firm’s objectives and its current performance (Abrahamson 1991). With 
certain knowledge of the nature of the performance gap and the efficiency of the 
innovation, firms with similar goals will act in the same way.
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Based on this efficiency choice view (Abrahamson 1991), four models of innovation 
diffusion are described in the innovation literature (Tidd et al 1997). The Epidemic 
and Bass models assume that innovations spread as potential adopters become aware 
of their advantages Adopters are seen as being homogeneous The rate of diffusion 
will vary between innovations and will be a function of the number o f firms that have 
already adopted and the number of potential adopters remaining.
The Probit model of diffusion rejects the assumption of firm homogeneity, suggesting 
that potential adopters have different thresholds to adoption Organisational attributes, 
such as firm size, determine the height of threshold levels Bayesian models of 
diffusion reject the notion of perfect information implicit in the other three models 
Potential adopters hold different levels of knowledge about an innovation and it is 
lack of information that acts as a restraint on innovation adoption
Each of these models describes a skewed ‘S-shaped’ curve as the basic pattern of 
innovation diffusion through a group of companies over time (Jensen 1988, Nabseth 
and Ray 1974). However, there are many exceptions to this S-shaped model of 
innovation diffusion, and researchers have yet to understand when, and why it can be 
applied (Wolfe 1994).
The positioning of a firm on the diffusion curve indicates its tendency to adopt the 
innovation, with descriptions ranging from early adopter to late adopter or laggard 
being applied
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The diffusion of innovations, based on the Epidemic and Bass models, has attracted 
considerable attention from marketing researchers (Rogers 1983, Lieberman and 
Montgomery 1998). In particular, there is interest in the issue of when to launch new 
products and the relationship between entry order and performance. Order entry is 
widely linked to firm performance, with first movers gaining long term competitive 
advantage (Kerin et al 1992). However, long term advantage only materialises if firms 
are able to exploit their early moves (ibid)
Equating innovations to new strategy initiatives suggests that strategies will diffuse 
through an industry. The rate of such diffusion will depend on the nature of the 
strategy and/or a number of organisational and individual attributes The speed with 
which firms adopt new strategies will influence their performance (Lieberman and 
Montgomery 1988 and 1998).
Diffusion models o f innovation have their detractors Pettigrew et al (1992) and Tidd 
et al (1997) argue that diffusion models tend to assume that the benefits and methods 
of implementing the innovation are clear and non-contentious. While such situations 
may occur with technical innovations, in the majority of cases of strategy innovations 
the pay off matrix is unlikely to be so clear cut (see Spender 1993). Increasing levels 
of uncertainty will emphasise the effect of institutional influences (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983 and Abrahamson 1991).
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Institutional Perspective
Institutionalism provides a less rational picture of diffusion, emphasising the role of 
mimetic behaviour (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This perspective allows initiatives, 
which are not driven by necessity or obvious advantage, to diffuse through an industry 
group. Firms’ tendencies towards social conformity lead to homogeneity of their 
activities (Oliver 1997).
Institutional theory is usually used to explain similarity and stability of firms within a 
population (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). Indeed, institutional pressures act to 
prevent change and the adoption of innovations. However, such pressures can also be 
used to explain the pattern of diffusion of a new innovation or strategy across an 
industry.
Each organisation will assess the potential returns a new innovation will yield 
(Abrahamson and Rosenkopf 1993). This assessment will be influenced by the degree 
to which the firm is subject to institutional pressures The less institutionally bound 
firms will be more likely to adopt innovations Adoption by one firm will influence 
the adoption decision of others, leading them also to adopt (ibid) As more firms adopt 
the new approach it becomes increasingly institutionalised and pressures on others to 
follow suit grow.
Hence, a new innovation will diffuse through an industry over time. The rate of 
diffusion will depend on the extent to which early adopters influence other firms (i.e. 
are opinion leaders) and secondly the strength of institutional pressures
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At its core, the institutional perspective suggests a model o f adoption that is socially 
deterministic However, recent literature in this area has begun to recognise a role for 
managerial action. Oliver (1991) suggests a number of strategies that management can 
pursue in relation to institutional pressures Greenwood and Hinings (1996) argue that 
in addition to the dynamics of the dominant coalition, the adopting organisation must 
also possess a capacity to implement the change This growing view suggests a role 
for both management agency and structuralism, a duality that is at the heart of the 
work of Giddens (1979) and of contextualism (Pettigrew 1990)
Contextual Perspective
The focus of the contextualists is on the interplay between internal and external 
factors on the birth, evolution and development of strategies within firms (Pettigrew 
1992, see also McKelvey 1997) Managers are seen as being capable of mobilising 
aspects of the inner and outer context in order to reconfigure the pattern of attachment 
to different strategic alternatives.
Strategies will be adopted as a result of key individuals recognising opportunities or 
threats in the firm’s environment and convincing others in the controlling dominant 
coalition of the accuracy of their interpretation and the appropriateness of the 
proposed response. Implementation of the strategy will depend upon the ability of the 
dominant coalition to mobilise the required resources.
38
Chapter 2 -  Toward a Dynamic View o f the Content o f Strategy
The ability of the firm to adopt a new strategy will be influenced by the internal and 
external context of the firm, and the quality of attributes such as leadership skills and 
human resources (Pettigrew and Whipp 1991). In the event o f a change in the 
environment, the organisation that first perceives and interprets this change and 
mobilises the appropriate resource will be the quickest to respond. Such resources 
may be of many kinds e g financial, political, or ideological (ibid).
Comparison of Alternative Perspectives
These three alternative streams of literature all provide a dynamic view of the 
organisation Application to strategy implies that strategy initiatives will diffuse 
through an industry forming patterns of emergence and development over time 
Within an industry, firms will vary in the speed with which they adopt a new strategy
While the notion of early and late adopters is well developed in innovation and 
marketing research, it has seldom been addressed in relation to strategy. Lieberman 
and Montgomery (1998) have recently suggested that the field of strategy would 
benefit from adopting the findings of marketing research on first mover advantage In 
particular, they highlight research relating order of entry to market share and firm 
performance. However, Lieberman and Montgomery (1998) argue that there is little 
understanding of the market and firm level determinants of entry order.
The alternative perspectives reviewed here address this apparent weakness, although 
offering contrasting explanations as to why a firm may be an early or late adopter
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The three streams o f innovation literature taken together suggest that the speed at 
which a firm will adopt an innovation will be determined by the nature of the 
innovation, attributes of the organisation (e g. size and structure) and characteristics of 
individual managers (e g. levels of education) The institutional view suggests that the 
speed at which a firm will adopt an innovation is determined by the degree to which 
the firm is influenced by pressures to conform to industry norms Finally, the 
contextual perspective, while recognising the role of internal and external contextual 
influences, promotes the importance of management ability to recognise 
environmental change and mobilise an appropriate response
Themes and Questions for Empirical Research
During the last decade, the competitive landscape faced by firms has become more 
turbulent and uncertain (D’Aveni 1994 and Brown and Eisenhardt 1998) In such 
hyperturbulent or hypercompetitive environments, traditional approaches to strategy 
have collapsed because of their assumptions of stability (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998). 
Within the literature on the process of strategy, concepts have emerged that reflect this 
highly dynamic situation. However, as we have seen in this chapter, research on the 
content of strategy has been slow to respond to the demands of the new environment 
and approaches that rely on stable equilibria still dominate the field
At the firm level o f analysis, resource-based view theorists have begun to adopt ideas 
from evolutionary economics and develop approaches that are more dynamic. 
Concepts such as dynamic capabilities (Teece et al 1997) and core competencies 
(Prahalad and Hamel 1990) have been widely acclaimed, although empirical work is
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still limited In contrast, conceptual work that takes a dynamic view at an industry 
level or multi-level of analysis is notably limited to a small and eclectic group of 
studies (see Miller and Friesen 1984, Smith et al 1992, Meyer et al 1993 and Pettigrew 
and Whipp 1991).
This small group of studies does have a number of methodological limitations In 
particular, they are not able to observe patterns o f strategy content across an industry 
in time.
Yet research on innovation and marketing suggests that the diffusion of initiatives 
through an industry and the strategic agility of firms, i e the speed at which it adopts a 
new strategy are related to firm performance and hence are important issues (Kerin et 
al 1992, Lieberman and Montgomery 1988 and 1998 and O’Neill et al 1998). Hence, 
the lack of attention to patterns of strategy content across an industry is a significant 
oversight.
It is this theme that will form the basis of our empirical research
Research on strategic groups suggests that similar or common strategies exist across 
groups of firms The innovation and institutional literatures imply that such common 
strategies will emerge and diffuse through an industry group This leads to the first 
research question:
Question 1 : Do common strategies emerge and diffuse through an industry
over time?
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Allied to the concept o f diffusion is the notion of early and late adopters However, 
the innovation literature is divided on the relative influence of innovation and firm 
attributes If innovation attributes are predominant then the identity of early and late 
adopters will not be consistent between different innovations. Alternatively, if firm 
level factors are predominant then the identity of early and late adopting firms will 
remain the same regardless of the innovation Similar logic applies to the adoption of 
common strategies, hence:
Question 2 Are there consistent early and late adopters of common strategies 
or does the order of adoption depend on the nature of the 
strategy?
If some firms in an industry are consistent early or late adopters of common strategies 
it would suggest that firm attributes rather the nature of the strategy determine the 
strategic agility of a firm and influence its performance Hence, understanding why a 
firm is an early or late adopter of common strategies is an important issue However, 
as we have seen, the literature on diffusion provides contrasting views on what factors 
drive speed of adoption This leads to our final question:
Question 3 Why are certain firms consistent early or late adopters of common 
strategies? What factors influence a firm’s strategic agility?
Investigation of these three questions will allow an integrated view of industry and 
firm level factors to emerge In addition, developing a dynamic view of strategy
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content will contribute to efforts to reintegrate the content, process and context o f 
strategy. Further, by identifying firm level factors that determine strategic agility this 
research offers guidance to practitioners
As we have seen, traditional analytical methods have significant failings when used to 
investigate dynamic phenomena. These shortcomings must be addressed in order to 
pursue our research questions. It is these issues that are taken up in the next chapter 
where we discuss the methodology used for this study
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Chapter 3 
Methodology
Introduction
Three philosophical and methodological issues are central to any research study -  
‘why to research?’ ‘what to research?’ and ‘how to research?’ (Remenyi et al 1998). 
The first two of these questions were addressed in Chapter 2, which culminated in the 
statement of our research questions. In this chapter, we will address the issue of ‘how 
to research’.
During the last half of the 20* Century, the positivist view of the nature of knowledge 
has increasingly come under attack from philosophers such as Popper, Kuhn and 
Feyerabend (Crotty 1998). In particular, the notion that the researcher is independent 
and value-free has been challenged From a post positivist perspective (Guba and 
Lincoln 1998), the rejection of this positivist assumption does not necessarily mean 
that research cannot be used to uncover general truths or statements about the nature 
of reality However, what it does mean is the researcher must not only convince his 
audience of the validity of his methods, but also that he has been reflexive (Huberman 
and Miles 1998). The assumptions the researcher has made about reality and about the 
nature of knowledge should therefore be made explicit. In addition, the steps taken to 
minimise any bias that the researcher’s values may introduce into his findings must be 
described
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In this chapter, we detail both the epistemological underpinnings and the research 
methods that we used. We discuss how our research questions and epistemological 
stance influenced our research design. A two phase longitudinal approach was taken -  
first quantitative mapping and analysis, using secondary data from online databases, 
was used to identify firms that were consistent early and late adopters of strategy, then 
a case study analysis was used to collect primary data and explore the internal 
processes and contexts that influenced their strategic agility, i.e. the speed with which 
a firm adopts new strategies Each phase will be described in detail.
This chapter has eight sections This introduction is followed by a discussion of the 
ontological assumptions we have made. Sections two and three describe the 
epistemological underpinnings of our research and our assumptions of the way in 
which knowledge is gained Section four discusses the impact of these ontological and 
epistemological issues on the design of the study, while section five describes the 
methodology chosen Section six and seven describe the methods used in detail while 
section eight provides a short conclusion.
Ontological Assumptions
Burrell and Morgan (1979) use two ontological dimensions or continua to define four 
paradigms which they claim can be used to categorise social theories. Their approach 
has attracted considerable criticism, particularly o f the categorisation of a highly 
complex field by the use of only two ontological dimensions (Clegg 1982, Wilmott et 
al 1993, Donaldson 1996 and Burrell 1996). However, Burrell and Morgan’s scheme 
is used widely in discussions on the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of
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management research (Easterby-Smith 1991 and Remenyi et al 1998). Typically, these 
discussions have concentrated on one dimension - objectivity/subjectivity.
Briefly, an objectivist or realist views reality as being external to the individual, i.e. 
exists independently of our thoughts or beliefs (Marshall 1994). A subjectivist, or 
more accurately constructionist, views reality as being socially and cognitively 
constructed. From a constructionist viewpoint there are multiple, apprehendable and 
sometimes conflicting social realities (Guba and Lincoln 1998).
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that the majority of organisational research is 
underpinned by a view of reality that is towards the objectivist end of the 
objectivist/subjectivist dimension. Several authors claim this is still the case (Marsden 
and Townley 1996). The majority of the strategy literature has taken an objectivist 
view (Knights 1992, Calori 1998 and Tsoukas 2000) In many cases, a firm’s strategy 
is viewed as having an existence of its own. More recently, theorists of strategy 
process have adopted more subjective views, particularly of the intentions of 
managers (e g. Knights and Morgan 1991). However, within the main schools of 
strategy content literature -  the positioning school and resource based view -  a highly 
objectivist view of strategy still prevails.
In this study an objectivist view of reality is taken. Our focus is on the actions of firms 
-  e g. Prudential opening a representative office in Vietnam - which are categorised as 
particular types of realised strategy. In this respect, we have assumed that these 
actions are real
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Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) second dimension - regulation/social change - has 
received little attention. Some authors even suggest that ‘one can ignore this 
dimension without much loss’ (Tsoukas 1994), claiming it is a property of social 
theories rather than an ontological assumption However, a closer look at Burrell and 
Morgan’s definition reveals that this dimension contains an important assumption 
about the nature of reality The dimension is essentially a re-statement of Dahrendorf 
and Lockwood’s earlier division of social theories on the basis of assumptions of 
order and equilibrium and those founded on assumptions of change and conflict 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979). It therefore captures the debate we detailed in Chapter 2 
between the belief that reality is static or stable or the belief that it is in a state of 
continual change
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that organisational theories have largely adopted a 
view o f reality based on assumption of order and equilibrium rather than of change 
As we saw in Chapter 2, this is also very much the case in the literature on strategy 
content (Porter 1991 and Foss et al 1995). Burrell and Gibson (1979) identify Marxist 
theory as being one of the few social theories that have influenced management 
science that assume change (see also Tuma and Hannan 1984).
Within the broader sociological field, Marxist theory has been criticised for its 
deterministic and fatalistic view of change (Popper 1964). These criticisms are 
mirrored by a related concern over the assumption of growth that underlies all 
evolutionist social theories, including Marxism (Nisbet 1969, Stompka 1993). 
However, Marxism’s dynamic orientation must be applauded Stompka recognises 
this while at the same time sharing Popper’s concerns He develops a similarly
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dynamic view of reality based on the work of historical sociologists, e g. Elias (1987) 
and Abrams (1982), and agency theory, which he entitles ‘social becoming’.
Central to the concept of ‘social becoming’ are two key assumptions about the nature 
of reality. Firstly, social reality is not in a steady state but rather perpetually in the 
process of becoming (Stompka 1991). Secondly, the notion of determinism is rejected 
in favour of the notion that an individual can initiate changes in the environment - 
however, the environment in turn influences or constrains these actions (Stompka 
1993 and Pettigrew (1997). This view of reality is still objectivist While reality is 
constantly changing, it exists independently of our thoughts and beliefs (Stompka 
1993 and Adams 1995).
In this study we make explicit three ontological assumptions. We take the objectivist 
view that reality is real. We also agree with Stompka (1991 and 1993) that reality is 
constantly changing. Finally, we favour the notion that an individual is able to initiate 
change in his or her environment although is in turn influenced by it
Epistemological Stance
Objectivist assumptions about the nature of reality are often linked to a positivist 
epistemology Positivism assumes that reality can be accurately perceived and studied 
by an independent researcher. Knowledge is acquired by collecting quantifiable and 
verifiable observations from which general laws and theories can be deduced or 
falsified (Remenyi et al 1998 and Guba and Lincoln 1998) Strategy content research 
has tended to adopt a positivist stance (Calori 1998 and McKelvey 1997). Strategy is
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seen as an objective entity that can be perceived accurately. The researcher 
hypothesises about determinants or components of strategy and then tests his 
hypotheses using quantifiable measures. The findings are then used either to generate 
new theories which are generally applicable, or to support or cast doubt on earlier 
research and theory (see Kim and Lim 1988 and Maijoor and Witteloostuijn 1996).
Within the social and even the natural sciences, positivism has come in for widespread 
criticism. This criticism has addressed two issues. Firstly, theorists adopting more 
subjectivist ontological views (e g phenomenology) have criticised the positivist’s 
objectivist view of the nature o f reality. Secondly, and perhaps more damagingly, 
criticism has stemmed from the emergence of Heisenberg’s ‘uncertainty principle’ and 
‘quantum mechanics’ within the natural sciences, supposedly the home of positivism. 
These developments have challenged the ability of researchers to perceive reality 
correctly and fully and the notion that the observer and the observed are independent
Several authors (Guba and Lincoln 1998, Huberman and Miles 1996 and Crotty 1998) 
suggest that as a result of these criticisms an alternative objectivist or realist 
epistemology has emerged, which they term ‘post positivism’1. This ‘quasi-positivist’ 
position suggests that reality can never be fully comprehended, only approximated in 
a probabilistic manner (Guba and Lincoln 1998, Denzil and Lincoln 1998 and 
McKelvey 1997). Comprehension is limited either because of an intrinsic inability to 
apprehend the complexity of reality or as a result of our perception being mediated or
' These authors use the term to define a  specific epistemology rather than to refer to any paradigm  that 
has followed positivism in time. Guba an d  Lincoln (1998) and Denzin and Lincoln (1998) define two 
objective paradigms -  positivism and post positivism -  and two subjectivist paradigm s -  ‘critical theory 
and related ideological positions' and ‘constructiv ism ’.
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directed through our membership of social communities or through the limitations of 
the language we use to describe reality (Clark 2000).
The notion that how a phenomenon is perceived will be unaffected by the researcher 
or by how the phenomenon is researched is rejected ‘Post positivism’ relies on 
multiple methods, i.e. critical multiplism, as a way of capturing as much of reality as 
possible (Guba and Lincoln 1998 and Huberman and Miles 1998). Different methods 
will reveal different aspects of reality. As with positivism, the emphasis is placed on 
verification - however, the criteria forjudging validity are modified to reflect both the 
impossibility of fully apprehending reality and the influence of the researcher and the 
methodology on the research findings (Hammersley 1992).
While the goal of ‘post positivist’ research is still the formation of generalisable 
statements or theories, such statements will be based on interpretations of reality made 
by the researcher which themselves are based on observations that do not fully 
represent reality (Strauss and Corbin 1998) However, even if these statements do not 
amount to invariant laws, they are still manifestations of the underlying reality (Tsang 
and Kwan 1999). So, while they may be fallible, this does not mean they are not 
valuable in guiding judgement and action
In this study we have made assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are 
similar to those made by the ‘post positivist’ position described by Guba and Lincoln 
(1998) The complexity and constantly changing nature of reality make it impossible 
to be perceived fully and attempts to develop theory that accurately depicts social 
reality at all times are likely to fail (Pettigrew 1992). However, we do believe that
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there are patterns in this changing social reality that can be perceived probabilistically 
and can be used to guide action So, in this study firms that tended to be or were on 
average early or late adopters of strategy can be recognised Clusters of factors that 
‘probably’ influence strategic agility can be identified in the patterns of internal and 
external change that occur over time
The positivist approach to revealing causality relies on the detection of co-variance of 
variables, when all other possible sources of influence are held constant (Clark 2000). 
However, the complexity of social reality and our inability to fully perceive it casts 
doubt on our ability to recognise let alone control all relevant factors Here we agree 
with the realist position described by Tsang and Kwan (1999) and Clark (2000) -  that 
causal explanation requires the understanding of the mechanisms and structures that 
shape or drive the patterns or regularities we detect Hence, it is not enough to identify 
a company as a consistent early adopter of strategy, our goal must be to understand the 
underlying mechanisms and factors that enable it to be a consistent early adopter
Further, and reflecting our ontological assumption of constant change, the influence of 
causal mechanisms and structures will unfold over a period of time So, explaining the 
occurrence of events and patterns of events requires the investigation of a phenomena 
over time. Thus, in this study the speed of adoption of companies and the factors that 
influence it must be monitored over time
If the independence of the researcher and the subject is rejected (Guba and Lincoln 
1998) it places considerable emphasis on critically assessing the findings of research 
Replication and reflexivity are required to demonstrate that the findings are probably
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true (ibid). This means that the researcher must make explicit the influence of the 
researcher, the subject of inquiry and the research method on his or her findings and 
the steps taken to reduce this influence He or she must also show triangulation of the 
findings by the use of multiple methods and multiple observations. In addition, fit 
must be shown between the findings and ‘pre-existing knowledge’ (e g existing 
literature) and acceptance by ‘the critical community’ (eg. journal editors and 
reviewers) (Guba and Lincoln 1998).
As different aspects of reality will be revealed by different research methods we must 
utilise multiple methods to enable us to apprehend reality as closely as possible (Guba 
and Lincoln 1998). So, in our study we cannot expect one method to be appropriate 
both for revealing industry level patterns of strategy and providing understanding of 
the in-firm processes that generate these patterns
Finally, the influence of the limitations of language on our approach must be 
recognised Typically, research on strategy content has used a vocabulary that implies 
static states e g cost leader or vertically integrated (Porter 1980 and Ansoff 1987), and 
restricts consideration of its dynamic properties (Pettigrew and Webb 1996 and 
Pettigrew 1997). Hence, in revealing patterns of strategy within an industry a more 
dynamic vocabulary must be adopted. The choice of terms in previous work on 
strategy content also implies that some absolute level of a particular strategy, e g 
diversification, can be measured or graded in a positivist manner (e g. Rumelt 1974). 
However, the inability to accurately perceive reality suggests that such grading will be 
flawed For example, where do we place divisions between categories on a continua of 
different levels of diversification?
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Pepper (1961) describes four ‘world hypotheses’ or approaches to obtaining formal 
knowledge -  formism, mechanism, contextualism and organicism. Central to these 
hypotheses is the notion that knowledge is acquired through the constant refinement of 
common sense claims by criticism and improvement (Tsouskas 1994). Our 
ontological and epistemological stance implies a method of inquiry that is closely 
aligned to one of Pepper’s world hypothesis - contextualism (Pepper 1961, Pettigrew 
1990 and Touskas 1994).
Contextualism
Pepper (1961) describes contextualism as a synthetic and dispersive theory Synthetic 
in that it takes as its subject patterns of historical events, rather than discrete facts, and 
dispersive in that it assumes that these patterns are loosely structured, rather than 
connected by fundamental laws or algorithms (Tsoukas 1994). Events are intrinsically 
complex and composed of interconnected patterns of activities, which are constantly 
changing over time (Pepper 1961). Although, the reality of the structure of these 
events is ‘vigorously asserted’
The structure of events can be described in terms of their ‘quality and texture’ (Pepper 
1961) Quality refers to the overall meaning or ‘character of the event’, while texture 
is the ‘details and relationships that make up that character’ including its context 
Tsoukas (1994) suggests that these features are ‘two sides of the same coin’ He 
argues that when we perceive the wholeness of an event, we suppress its detail, and 
when we analyse the detail, we ignore the overall pattern Contextualist researchers
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therefore face the difficulty of capturing both the quality and texture of the patterns of 
events being studied.
Pettigrew (1985, 1990 and 1997) suggests contextualist research must aim to develop 
holistic explanations. He argues that this requires phenomena to be examined at 
multiple vertical and horizontal levels of analysis and the interconnections between 
those levels through time recognised. The vertical levels of analysis refer to the social 
and economic, industrial and internal contexts in which events and processes are 
embedded The horizontal level of analysis refers to the ‘sequential 
interconnectedness of phenomena’ in time (Pettigrew 1990). Managers’ actions will 
be influenced by the past, the present and expectations about the future.
Methodology
Our epistemology, together with our ontological assumptions, had significant 
implications for the research methods we adopted We needed to:
collect data using multiple methods 
- acquire data from multiple levels of analysis
acquire longitudinal data and maintain the temporal component of this 
data during analysis
describe events in time and explore the influence of context and 
management action on those events.
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Multiple Methods and Multiple Levels of Analysis
The post positivist view that different aspects of reality are revealed by the use of 
different methods was central to the design of this project. Our research questions 
required not only the identification of phenomena at an industry level but also an 
explanation of the firm level features that cause such phenomena. Pettigrew (1990) 
describes these types of questions as the ‘what, why and how’ of organisational 
research. To these we should perhaps add ‘when’ to emphasis the importance of time 
to our study. Given such a broad set of research questions it would be unrealistic to 
expect one method to meet all our requirements.
Traditionally, researchers adopting a contextual approach have used the comparative 
case study methodology (Pettigrew 1990 and Eisenhardt 1989). This qualitative 
method has considerable strengths It is particularly useful for revealing and 
understanding the micro processes within a firm and how these processes interact with 
the firm’s internal and external contexts However, it also has its weaknesses In 
particular, the method is limited in its ability to ‘see the wider terrain’ (Pettigrew 
1997). So, while the case study method was ideal for addressing our questions on firm 
level phenomena, it is not suited to detecting patterns at an industry level
It was apparent that a multiple method approach was required for our study. There is 
considerable debate within the methodological literature about the appropriateness of 
such a research design (Jick 1979, Greene et al 1989 and Creswell 1994). This focuses 
on whether qualitative and quantitative methods should be mixed. Crotty (1998) 
suggests that there has been a ‘great divide’ portrayed in ‘most research textbooks’,
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with qualitative and quantitative research being seen as polar opposites Typically, 
quantitative methods would be deemed appropriate for positivist research while 
qualitative methods would be deemed appropriate for phenomenology and other 
subjectivist epistemologies.
Greene et al (1989) suggests there are three groups in the debate - purists, pragmatists 
and those who adopt a middle ground position. Purists (e g. Guba and Lincoln 1998) 
argue that particular methods are intrinsically related to a particular ontology and 
should never be mixed with methods associated with other views of reality. Creswell 
(1994) argues that academic journals are intrinsically purist due to the limitations of 
space in which researchers can adequately detail the use of multiple methods 
Pragmatists take the opposite view (Miles and Huberman 1998, Jick 1979 and 
Mathison 1988). Methods are independent of ontological and epistemological 
positions (Crotty 1998). For instance a case study based on interviews may be 
designed in a positivistic manner to test or prove false hypotheses or in a 
phenomenological way to build a narrative of the situation being studied (Remenyi et 
al 1998). As a result, methods can be mixed and matched to meet research 
requirements Researchers who adopt the middle ground position suggest that the 
epistemological stance of the research will determine the main research tool that is 
used (Creswell 1994). However, other methods can be introduced to prompt new 
ideas, corroborate findings or through elaboration provide richness and detail (Greene 
et al 1989).
In line with the post positivist view we agree with the pragmatists over the issue of 
mixing methods. Like Remenyi et al (1998) and Crotty (1998) we believe it is not the
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method itself, but how that method and the results obtained are used that is dependent 
upon the ontological and epistemological position. So, we are free to pick and choose 
methods to explore different aspects of reality providing we pay due regard to the 
validity and credibility of our results (Denzin and Lincoln 1998).
Longitudinal Research Methods
Management science, including research on strategy, has been dominated by cross 
sectional methods that collect and analyse data from a single point in time (Monge 
1990 and Huber and Van de Ven 1995). Pettigrew (1985) makes the same point 
suggesting that the majority of such cross sectional studies are ahistoric and 
aprocessual.
While far less common, qualitative longitudinal methodologies are now well 
established within management research. The case study method increasingly forms 
part of studies on the process of strategy (e g Pettigrew and Whipp 1991 and Brown 
and Eisenhardt 1998) However, due to the heavy commitment of research time and 
funding required, normally only a small number of cases are undertaken In addition, 
as we discussed above, the case study method is of limited use when the objective is 
to explore patterns at an industry or societal level
As we saw in Chapter 2, the use of quantitative longitudinal methods is rare within 
management and particularly within strategy research (also see Huber and Van de Ven 
1995). Even where researchers have assumed that organisations and their 
environments change over time they have often used analytical techniques that assume
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stability or that equilibrium has been reached (Teece 1984, Boeker 1991 and Coleman 
1981). Techniques such as regression analysis and standard correlation techniques 
assume relationships between variables are unchanging (Turna and Hannan 1984 and 
Delacroix and Swaminathan 1991). Monge (1990) has suggested that, as a result, 
organisational research has suffered from methodological determinism, i.e that the 
methods used by researchers introduce a static view into their research questions and 
the theories they develop Similar concerns have been expressed within sociological 
research (Turna and Hannan 1984).
Patterns of change can be described using longitudinal quantitative data in three ways 
-  numerically, visually or graphically, and mathematically (including statistically) 
(Menard 1991). Numerical methods typically involve the use of event counts over 
defined periods of time, e g. number of changes in a year Visual methods generally 
involve the plotting of variables on a graph where the horizontal axis is time Where 
data is categorical or dichotomous, mapping may provide a more informative 
presentation Whether seen as the initial or final step in an analysis, the visual display 
of data is essential for detecting general patterns or problems within a data set (Morris 
1989, Mason and Lind 1990 and Pettigrew 1990). However, few authors provide a 
comprehensive discussion on the appropriate forms o f visual display The researcher 
is left to innovate and find the approach which best reveals the information contained 
within their data
Turna and Hannan (1984) suggest that there are three types of mathematical analysis 
of longitudinal data which should be used more often in sociological research -  panel 
analysis, event history analysis and time series analysis. Panel analysis is conducted
58
Chapter 3 - Methodology
by undertaking two or more cross sectional analyses at different points in time and 
then comparing the results of each analysis. While this type o f  analysis can provide 
significant insight (see Whittington et al 1999), the actual timing of changes is ignored 
(Tuma and Hannan 1984). Event history analysis is used to study the probability of an 
event occurring during a given period (Yamaguchi 1991). Hazard rates, the risk of an 
event occurring during a given period, are calculated and then compared or linked to 
explanatory variables (Yamaguchi 1991, Menard 1991 and Allison 1984). Event 
history analysis is a valuable tool for social scientists and has been used widely by 
population ecologists. However, rather than analysing the overall pattern of events, 
incidents are analysed one at a time and their aggregate properties determined across a 
group of cases (i.e. companies or other entities) (Abbott 1990).
The third mathematical approach suggested by Tuma and Hannan (1984) is time series 
analysis. Although much of the literature on the use of this method focuses on the 
analysis of a single time series, techniques are available to compare sets of time series. 
These techniques use modified correlation and regression analysis Typically methods 
that deal with the analysis of a single time series are prefixed by the term ‘auto’ -  e g. 
‘autocorrelation’ -  while those that deal with the comparison of multiple time series 
are prefixed with the term ‘cross’ -  eg. ‘cross correlation’. While little used in 
sociological inquiry these techniques have been extensively adopted in economic 
research and signal processing. They allow patterns of events found in one case (i.e. a 
firm) to be compared to patterns observed in another, although as with all regression 
and correlation techniques causality is not necessarily implied
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Earlier Longitudinal Quantitative Research on Strategy Content
As we discussed in Chapter 2, four earlier studies have taken a dynamic view of 
strategy content. Three of these have used quantitative methods to collect and analyse 
longitudinal data (Miller and Friesen 1984, Smith et al 1992 and Meyer et al 1993. 
The fourth (Pettigrew and Whipp 1991) has relied mainly on qualitative data 
collection and analysis in the form of the comparative case study method
All three o f the quantitative studies used a combination of archival searches and 
questionnaires to build time series of the events that occurred during the period under 
study. However, the approach each used to analyse the data differed considerably. 
Miller and Friesen (1984) calculated the differences in a range of variables between 
two points in time and then used a form of cluster analysis to identify types of 
transitions. Their approach can be likened to the panel analysis described by Turna 
and Hannan (1984). Smith et al (1992) and Meyer et al (1993) generated counts of 
events during periods of time and average order rankings These representative 
statistics were then linked to organisational variables using graphical and standard 
regression techniques
In each of these studies the data collection method provided detailed time series of the 
events that occurred during the study period However, the data analyses undertaken 
do have their problems. In particular, the use of counts and difference scores removes 
the temporal element of the data. This suggests that these approaches would not be 
suited for this study.
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Research Strategy and Design
Having discussed the implications of our ontological assumptions and of our 
epistemological stance for our selection o f the methods to be used for this study, we 
can now detail the research strategy we adopted Our first two research questions 
required us to identify cross industry patterns of strategy in time and determine if 
particular companies were consistently early or late adopters. To accomplish this we 
had to acquire longitudinal data to construct time series of the strategy initiatives 
pursued by each of the companies within an industry group These time series would 
then be compared with each other The success of Miller and Friesen (1984), Smith et 
al (1992) and Meyer et al (1993) in composing rich time series from archival data 
suggested that this approach was an appropriate data collection methodology. From 
our discussion above, it was apparent that two methods of analysis were appropriate - 
visual display or mapping and time series analysis Although well used in other areas 
of research, both methods were innovative within the field of strategy research
Our third question required us to explore why firms were consistently early or late 
adopters of strategy Here a very different approach was needed since the internal 
processes and contexts of the firms identified as early or late adopters needed to be 
explored. The ideal method of inquiry was the comparative case study technique 
(Pettigrew 1990 and Eisenhardt 1989).
Our study was therefore conducted in two phases. The first involved the collection of 
archival data, in the form of newspaper and journal articles, for a large group of firms 
within one industry and its analysis using mapping techniques and time series
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analysis. In the second, the comparative case study method was used to explore the 
internal processes and context of the firms identified in the first phase as being 
consistent early or late adopters of strategy.
In addition to complementing each other in terms of the insights they were able to 
provide, triangulation between the two phases strengthened the validity of our 
findings. The case study interviews provided the opportunity to check the patterns of 
strategy observed and the identification of early and late adopters, while the mapping 
and analysis confirmed the sequencing and timing of the events discussed by our 
interviewees.
We will now discuss in detail each of these two phases.
Longitudinal Mapping and Analysis Phase
Sector and Sample Selection
The UK insurance industry was chosen as the site for the investigation of the dynamic 
nature of strategy content It was selected for several reasons Firstly, it is one of the 
few UK sectors which contains a significant number of companies within the FTSE 
200 The media closely follows companies within the FTSE and their actions are 
widely reported in newspaper and journal articles. Secondly, it has undergone 
extensive change, particularly following the deregulation of the UK financial services 
sector in the mid 1980s Prior to this, the sector had been relatively closed and 
tradition bound. Indeed, we can trace the history o f  most of the top 10 insurers back a
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century or more. This long historical legacy was in turn compounded by the 
dominance of the traditional professions of actuaries and underwriters More recently, 
however, the dominating cognitive and political influence o f the actuarial profession 
has been reduced with the appearance in senior positions of managers from fields such 
as I.T., personnel, finance and investment management Many of these executives had 
worked in other sectors before joining the insurance industry. These demographic 
changes have undoubtedly influenced the patterns of strategic thinking and action in 
our sample firms. Lastly, earlier research into the insurance sector by the researcher’s 
supervisor (see Pettigrew and Whipp 1991) meant that there was a strong network of 
established relationships through which we could negotiate access for interviews with 
prominent industry executives
In order to maximise the amount of material available from archival sources we 
decided to select the ten largest insurance companies However, during the data 
collection phase we found that very little public information was available for one of 
the top ten firms (Standard Life). Efforts to replace this firm in our sample with 
another company from the top 20 firms also proved unsuccessful, again due to lack of 
available information As a result, we reduced our sample to 9 firms These companies 
together with their net premium incomes for 1994 were as follows:
Prudential Corporation 
Commercial Union 
General Accident 
Royal Insurance 
Sun Alliance 
Norwich Union 
Guardian Royal Exchange
£8,271 million 
£6,762 million 
£5,140 million 
£4,762 million 
£4,651 million 
£4,329 million 
£3,703 million
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Eagle Star 
Legal & General
£2,990 million 
£2,417 million
Source: C om pany Accounts
Study Period
Initially it was decided to confine the study to a two year period, 1993 and 1994. 
However, it was soon apparent that this time span was too short to sample adequately 
ongoing change processes Consequently, the period was extended to cover 
approximately six years, from 1990 to mid 1996. This extended period can still be 
criticised for its shortness, particularly when we consider the emergent and long term 
character of major change (Pettigrew 1985). However, we were unable to extend the 
period further back given the poor coverage of UK sources by online services prior to 
1990. In addition with the merger of Royal Insurance and Sun Alliance in 1996 we 
were unable to extend the period forward and maintain a consistent sample.
Data Collection
The data collection method used for this study was based on the use of online 
computer databases. This approach was developed as part of the ‘New Organisation 
Forms for the Information Age’ project, a collaborative study initially involving Duke, 
Cologne, Waseda and Warwick Universities and now also incorporating research 
teams in The Netherlands, Korea, Sweden and Switzerland This project aims to build 
a database of organisational change events occurring within the largest companies in 
Germany, The Netherlands, Korea, Japan, Scandinavia, Switzerland, the UK and the
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USA, using business related information and news sources The study detailed by this 
thesis formed the UK group’s input to this international project.
In the UK the main source of data was the Lexis Nexis online database This system 
provides users with the facility to search news and business articles from major 
newspapers and journals both in the UK and internationally. Lexis Nexis articles are 
extracted using a common set of search terms, which are modified depending on the 
country and industry being studied These search terms determine the period being 
studied, the number of occurrences of the organisation’s name and if one or more of a 
number of key phrases are present in the article
A control check was conducted by repeating the search for one company in our 
sample but with the search terms determining the number of occurrences of the 
company name removed and ensuring that the articles originally omitted did not 
include useful data.
Following the capture of articles using this automated approach, a further manual 
filter was required to remove unwanted data still present. This was accomplished 
firstly by using citations and secondly by scanning the complete articles Having 
selected the required data, the lull articles were downloaded for analysis
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The Use of Secondary Data
Our data collection for the mapping study relied entirely on secondary data in the form 
of published newspaper and journal articles, press releases and news-agency reports 
Hence, it had not been collected for the purposes of this study. As Stablein (1996) 
points out the user of secondary data cannot even assume that such data represents 
organisational reality. Consequently, it is the responsibility of the researcher to 
demonstrate the reality o f the phenomena it describes and validate his use of it
In this study, a high level of validity can be claimed due to the nature of the data and 
the way in which it was used. The data was used solely to identify the types of 
initiative being pursued by the sample companies and to record the year and month 
they were implemented. No attempt was made to use any explanation given in an 
article by the company or the reporter for a particular initiative Information was 
gathered primarily from articles that appeared in national newspapers or from 
international news agency reports. It would be unlikely that these types of source 
would misrepresent the actions of major companies - particularly at the level at which 
we were using these reports -  e g ‘Prudential opened a representative office in 
Vietnam’ or ‘GRE sold their Australian subsidiary’. In most cases, the same 
information appeared in several of the major newspapers, and therefore although only 
one article was used to code the initiative, we could be fairly confident that the event 
had in fact occurred. Finally, the companies’ annual reports were used to verify 
information sourced from press articles
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There is a second problem for the researcher intending to in the use of secondary data 
for the creation event histories and for mapping strategies -  missing data. The press 
may not have picked up all the strategic moves made by a firm. However, our 
selection of FTSE 200 companies meant that the firms in our sample were the subjects 
of close media scrutiny, particularly within the UK. Consequently, the main danger 
was that we might miss strategic moves made in other countries Here our database 
selection was crucial in ensuring that it provided coverage of international news 
sources including ‘news agency reports’ The listings of strategic initiatives obtained 
from our online database work was checked carefully against the annual reports for 
each company for missing data. In addition, in the case of our case study companies, 
our interviewees were asked to confirm the initiatives detected and identify any we 
had missed
The issue of missing data is equally relevant to primary data collection methods Such 
methods rely on the memories of individuals or on them being willing and able to 
access archival sources. We would argue that whether primary or secondary data is 
used for the purposes of identifying and timing past strategic initiatives there will 
always be some risk of data being missed, but of the two, the use of secondary data, of 
the type used here, is likely to be far more reliable.
Operational Experience of Data Collection Method
Given the novelty of the data collection methodology, it might be valuable to describe 
our experience of its use. Three issues were found to be of critical importance — data 
base selection, cost and research time
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Data base selection proved critical to the study’s success. First, to ensure coverage of 
all the initiatives undertaken by each company and to provide confidence in the 
information reported, the data base must cover a wide range of national and 
international publications over the entire period being covered Secondly, the number 
of times a FTSE 200 company is mentioned in the press during the course of a year is 
surprisingly high, with mentions including share price listings, details of company 
sponsored cricket matches and many other unwanted reports. It is therefore essential 
that the database offers search algorithms that go beyond a simple key word search. 
Using an effective search facility is vital if  the best use of researcher time in 
downloading and sifting the acquired data set is to be made and research costs are to 
be kept at an acceptable level. Lexis Nexis was identified as providing both an 
impressive coverage of publications and a programmable and highly flexible search 
facility It was therefore chosen for this study
The cost of this type of data collection can be high Multi-source online databases 
charge both by connection time and for supplying articles (usually by the line of 
text!), some even increase their charges for recovering data from earlier years Given 
the volume of data required for this type of study it is obvious that these charges will 
mount up quickly even when an effective search algorithm is being used This became 
a significant issue. Initially, Lexis Nexis was available through the Warwick 
University library at a specially reduced academic rate. However, mid way through 
our data collection this were withdrawn, making it impossible to complete our data 
collection within the budget available (or even one that could be practically obtained).
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Fortunately, our involvement in the NOFIA project allowed data collection to be 
continued at one of the associate universities where the reduced rate still applied
Subsequently, the cost of database use was to prove a problem for some of our 
colleagues in the NOFIA group. They also encountered difficulties because of the 
amount of downloading that was occurring. The suppliers became concerned that 
because such a significant proportion of their data was being downloaded it could be 
used to establish a rival database
This form of data collection consumes a large amount of researcher time The initial 
access to the Lexis Nexis system in the Warwick University library was over the 
Internet via the ‘Janet’ gateway The combination of the volume of data being 
transferred, the volume of traffic on the Internet and the limitations of a personal 
computer (processor power and size of RAM and hard disk) meant that the process of 
searching and downloading was excessively slow Downloading was also hampered 
by frequent breaks in communication and the need to let others use the system. 
Eventually, permission was sought and given to leave the system running overnight to 
download data, although the researcher was not allowed to be present On several 
occasions, the communication link went down and hence searches frequently had to 
be repeated
Data collection at our NOFIA partner’s site was less fraught A more stable and faster 
communication link to the database supplier and the ability to use the system 
continuously greatly speeded up data searching and downloading
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Strategy Content Typology
In order to undertake this investigation it is necessary to expose the in-firm 
sequencing and cross sector patterns of strategy content. In addition, to separate firm 
attributes from those of the strategies being pursued we needed to investigate multiple 
types of strategy Hence, strategic actions need to be identified and categorised using a 
set of standard descriptors. Such a typology should have the following requirements:-
1 be well supported by the existing conceptual and empirical literature,
2. be embedded in the empirical realities of the 1990s’ business environment,
3 be expressed in a dynamic rather than a static vocabulary, and
4 contain clearly defined and easily recognised strategy types that can be 
identified in the data collected
Existing typologies of strategy content appear to be the product of the context in 
which they were bom and hence their adequacy in defining the strategies evident in 
the 1990s is debatable. Available strategy typologies are also shaped by the theoretical 
assumptions and perspectives adopted in the existing strategy literature and 
consequently have invariably taken a static rather than a dynamic view
Our empirical study required us to track a variety of strategy types. With the four 
above restrictions in mind, we decided to concentrate our analysis on 3 or 4 easily 
recognised strategy types that were well grounded in the literature and frequently 
referred to in newspaper articles in the 1990s’ business context
To check the relevance of such strategy types to the 1990s, we utilised a survey of the 
strategies of 100 UK organisations based on interviews with senior managers and
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published by the Corporate Research Foundation (1995). The strategies implied by the 
reports compiled on each company were coded using a variety of widely used strategy 
types The frequency with which particular strategy types were indicated was as 
follows:-
Market Penetration 48
Diversification 34
Internationalisation 34
Consolidation 33
Innovation 25
Focus 19
Flexibility 12
In the light of this analysis, four strategy types were chosen: diversification, 
internationalisation, consolidation and market penetration However, during coding it 
became apparent that the reporting within the UK insurance industry of initiatives to 
increase market penetration was inconsistent Therefore, in this study we focused on 
diversification, internationalisation and consolidation.
In addition to the type of strategies adopted it is clear from our database work, and our 
analysis of the Corporate Research Foundation (1995) study, that managers are likely 
to report their company pursuing more than one strategy at the same time and to 
describe these strategies emerging dynamically. Typically, they detail intended or 
realised moves in a certain direction, for example, increases or decreases in the degree 
of internationalisation or diversification Strategic initiatives are normally portrayed 
by managers as movements of the firm in a certain direction along a number of 
continua or dimensions
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As a result of this observation, we adopted an approach that reflected this dynamic 
and directional view of strategy. Thus instead of recording levels of, say, 
diversification, we coded movement and direction and captured this by means of the 
dynamic language of, for example, diversifying and downscoping (Hoskisson and Hitt 
1994). Using this approach we defined the following strategy typology based on the 
three strategy types discussed above
Diversifying/downscoping involves actions that increase or decrease the 
product/market scope of the firm’s activities within its home nation (see Ansoff 1987, 
Porter 1980, Hoskisson and Hitt 1994). Diversification may be accomplished by 
acquisition, co-operation with others or by organic growth that increases the scope of 
the firm Downscoping occurs by divestment, reducing co-operative arrangements 
with others or by other closures that decrease the scope of the firm
Intemationalising/withdrawing consists of actions that increase the geographic scope 
of the firm’s activities outside its home nation (see Ansoff 1987, Porter 1990, 
Mintzberg 1988) Internationalising may be the result of acquisitions, joint ventures or 
other partnerships, or through greenfield organic growth. In addition to coding the 
occurrence of internationalising, we also logged the target of such moves by 
geographic area Initiatives that represented a diversifying move but only outside the 
home market were logged as internationalising However, where initiatives were made 
that involved both the home and other nations, the action was logged as both 
internationalising and as the other appropriate strategy type
Our third strategy type - consolidating, was operationalized as actions aimed at 
reducing costs and/or increasing efficiency within existing activities in the home
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nation without reducing the scope of the firm’s activities. Typically such actions were 
described in terms of downsizing, rightsizing and re-engineering While it can be 
argued that the boundary between downscoping and consolidating is ill defined, 
separating and coding these two types proved straightforward
Trials of this typology have been conducted by our NOFIA partners in Germany, 
Japan and the USA, in addition to this project in the UK, and have proved effective in 
coding the strategic actions reported by firms in all four countries
Formal inter-coder reliability tests were conducted with an independent researcher 
repeating the coding for one of our companies. An intercoder reliability of 94% was 
obtained In addition, a repeat coding o f the data for two of the companies by the same 
coder, but after a gap of around one year, demonstrated a 96% agreement These 
figure finds close agreement with work on other NOFIA studies, using similar data 
collection and coding procedures but where multiple coders were used In the Duke 
NOFIA studies inter-coder reliability scores of between 93% and 97% were noted 
(Hunter 1999).
The data contained in each collected article was interpreted using the strategy 
classification system described above.
The details of a firm’s strategic actions contained within the articles obtained from our 
database work can be assessed in two ways. Firstly, we can consider the statements 
made by managers of their intentions However, such statements may not reflect
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accurately the true intentions (see Mintzberg 1978) or may indicate a post hoc 
rationalisation of some action Alternatively, the actual actions of the firms can be 
interpreted in terms of the ‘realised’ strategy they imply, thus avoiding any 
elaboration attempted by the managers or interpretation by the reporter. It is this 
second approach that we adopted
The prime focus of our analysis was the three strategy types o f diversifying, 
internationalising and consolidating. However, we did examine the database for the 
occurrence of other strategy types. This wider analysis revealed that strategy 
initiatives implying changes in diversification, internationalisation and consolidation 
accounted for 85% of the strategic actions of the firms in our sample
The strategy descriptors were then colour coded and mapped over time, based on the 
month in which they occurred, to allow patterns and possible relationships to be 
observed. The resulting map is displayed in Figure 3.1, where the vertical ‘bar codes’ 
for each company demonstrate the timing of each initiative and the different shading 
the type of initiative. The figure shows the occurrence o f seven types of strategy: 
diversifying (1), downscoping (2), internationalising into Europe (3), 
internationalising in the Far East (4), internationalising elsewhere (5), withdrawing (6) 
and consolidating (7). Although detail regarding individual strategy types cannot be 
discerned in Figure 3.1, it does indicate the level and variety of strategic activity that 
occurred during the study period. Given the evident complexity of Figure 3.1, maps 
were redrawn for individual strategy types and the companies ordered according to the 
timing of the first reported incident of that strategy (see for example Figure 3.2).
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1991
1992
1993
1995
1996
Figure 3.1 -  Map of Strategy Initiatives.
1994
1996
Figure 3.2 - Realised Strategy - Consolidating Actions
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Quantitative Data Analysis
The visual mapping provides evidence of the presence of industry patterns of strategy 
and suggests that early and late adopters do exist. However, these findings are based 
on the timing of the first detected occurrence of a particular strategy in each company 
Given our reliance on secondary data we cannot be certain that each company’s first 
move has been recorded Quantitatively comparing the sequences of strategy 
initiatives for each company would provide a way in which this potential problem 
could be overcome and a more robust set of results obtained. Such an approach would 
confirm the presence of cross industry patterns and would enable the detection of 
companies that tended to be consistently early or late adopters, irrespective of strategy 
type. It would also allow variations in such tendency to be assessed.
There are however a number of problems in conducting such an analysis. Firstly, in 
order to detect variations in the time of adoption and therefore identify early and late 
adopters, the temporal component of the data must be maintained. Secondly, any 
match between the time series for each company would occur after some unknown 
delay, which itself would be subject to a degree of variation. Thus, we are unable to 
apply standard correlation techniques. Finally, as a result of preserving the temporal 
component of the data, the approach adopted must be applicable to dichotomous 
variables, i.e is each strategy type either present or absent?
Given these issues, we decided to utilise the cross-correlation method of analysing 
time series. This formal analysis has been used in research undertaken in a number of 
fields, including economics (see Koch et al 1988, Brock and LeBaron 1996, Huang et
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al 1996 and Cheung and Ng 1996). The method is also widely used in the natural 
sciences, in particular signal processing (see Bendat and Piersol 1971). The analysis 
generates the cross-correlation function which describes the measure of similarity 
between the two time series as a function of positive or negative time lags applied to 
one of the series
This analysis technique has a number of strengths. Firstly, the approach does not 
require the summing of data over time and hence meets our requirement of preserving 
the temporal component of the data. Secondly, by measuring the degree of similarity 
over a continuous range of time lags it identifies where the degree of similarity is at a 
maximum This addresses the issue of an unknown and variable time lag between 
matching patterns in the two time series. Thirdly, the measure of similarity used to 
compare the two time series at each time lag can be selected according to the nature of 
the data, and hence by appropriate selection of this measure can be applied to 
dichotomous data.
The cross-correlation analysis is conducted in a number of steps. First, a check of each 
time series must be made to ensure it is stationary and if not, that it is converted to a 
stationary series by appropriate filtering (see McClearly and Hay 1980). Secondly, the 
two time series are compared at each time lag using an appropriate similarity measure, 
to produce the cross-correlation function between the two series With a sample of 
nine time series, nine sets of results are produced each containing eight individual 
functions Given our wish to observe the relationship between one time series and all 
the other eight series, the third step is to sum each set of cross-correlation functions 
The final step is to check the statistical significance of the resulting summed function
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The first step in this process is critical. If the series are non-stationary, i.e contain 
patterns of drift and trend, they will always be cross-correlated and spurious results 
will be produced. In this study the check was conducted by calculating the 
autocorrelation function for each time series and ensuring these functions decayed 
rapidly to zero (see McClearly and Hay 1980 and Gottman 1981).
The main issue in calculating the cross-correlation functions (step 2) is the selection of 
the similarity measure to be used to compare the series at each time lag where the data 
is dichotomous Abbott (1995) has suggested that in such situations management 
researchers should make use of methods widely used in other fields In particular, 
Abbott highlights research on macro molecules and species identification in biology 
(see Sokal and Sneath 1963 and Abbott 1995).
In addressing dichotomous data, Sokal and Sneath (1963) state that a critical issue in 
selecting the type of similarity measure is whether to consider only matches of 
presence for a particular attribute or both matches of presence and absence. Given our 
reliance on published reports of the actions of the companies studied, we cannot be 
confident that our failure to detect an initiative during a particular month implies the 
absence of that initiative. Consequently, we adopted the approach of only considering 
matches where the particular strategy type was present
In such situations, Sokal and Sneath (1963) recommend measuring similarity by 
counting the number of matches and dividing this figure by the total number of 
possible matches Given that the data series for each of our companies are of constant
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length, we simplified this coefficient by removing the denominator Therefore, the 
measure of similarity at each time lag becomes a simple count of the number of 
matches
Thus, at each time lag, the strategy sequences for two companies are compared month 
by month and a tally kept o f the number of occasions when the same strategy types are 
present in adjacent samples. The result is that the cross-correlation function obtained 
is equivalent to a frequency distribution of the time lags between matching strategy 
initiatives. This procedure is then repeated for each company against each of the other 
companies in the sample to generate sets of cross-correlation functions.
As we have suggested, the time lag between the adoption o f  particular strategies by 
two companies will not be consistent However, if one firm consistently adopts 
initiatives ahead of the other, when comparing two companies we would expect the 
distribution of time lags between initiatives to be skewed (positively or negatively 
depending on the ordering of the companies used) Further, when we sum the set of 
cross-correlations obtained for one company (step 3) if that company is a consistently 
early or late adopter we would expect the summed function also to be skewed (see 
Figure 3.3).
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Lag (Months)
Note: The figure shows the cross-correlation functions for both Prudential (thick line) and Guardian 
Royal Exchange (thin line). At each time lag. the value o f  the function w as calculated by m easuring the 
similarity betw een the time scries o f  strategic initiatives for each o f  these two com panies with those for 
the eight o ther firm s in the sample. The set o f  functions created for each company is then summed to 
produce the functions displayed here. Each function is equivalent to the frequency distribution o f the 
time difference betw een strategic actions undertaken by the company being analysed, i.c. Prudential or 
Guardian Royal Exchange, and the  same types o f  initiatives undertaken by the other eight firms. The 
magnitude o f  th e  functions lias been normalised for this display. The skews evident in the two functions 
have tested as significant (at the 95% ) level w hen compared to the function expected for a random 
series.
Figure 3.3 -  Cross Correlation Functions - Prudential and GRE
Recognising that not all strategies will be related and that a considerable level of noise 
will be present, we must then question if the skew detected by the cross-correlation is 
significant (step 4). In testing for significance, we defined a null hypothesis model by 
determining the probability of each strategy type occurring in each month for each 
company assuming a random distribution This model was then subjected to the cross­
correlation analysis and summed for each company. The actual summed cross­
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correlation functions were then compared to the null hypothesis model using the chi- 
squared test
It must be recognised that there are limitations to the cross-correlation approach and 
hence the results must be interpreted with care. At a statistical level, the short time 
period covered by our study and the data collection method do cause some concerns. 
In particular there is the question of right or left censoring, i.e. events that form part of 
the trends detected but fall before or after the study period and regarding the 
possibility of missing data, stemming from our reliance on secondary data.
There were also potential concerns regarding the assumption that one company will 
respond to another by moves of the same strategy type This was addressed by 
repeating the analysis but with the type of strategy ignored. Thus when similarity was 
measured a match was recorded when any strategy type was present in each time 
series. This second analysis confirmed our identification of significant early and late 
adopters, suggesting that this concern is not a major limitation for this study
Finally, it must be stressed that while our analysis addressed the speed o f response, it 
did not address the quality or appropriateness of the strategies implemented
Despite these potential problems, we believe the cross correlation approach has a 
number of merits for the analysis of time series data. Provided the researcher is aware 
of the problems we describe above, the method provides a valuable and innovative 
contribution
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In order to assess the degree to which firms varied in their speed of adoption an 
additional step was taken. The time series for two of the significant early and late 
adopters were divided into three overlapping ‘windows’, each four years in length. 
The cross-correlation analysis was then repeated on each of these windows and the 
mean for the resulting distribution of lags calculated and plotted against time (see 
Figure 5.16, page 183). Given the reduced time period covered by each window, 
confidence in the mean values obtained will be lower Significantly, it was the trends 
suggested by this approach that received the greatest support during the interview 
phase of our research.
Interview Support for our Mapping and Analysis Findings
In order to confirm the results of the mapping and analysis, our case study 
interviewees were asked to comment on our findings Their responses confirmed the 
broad patterns derived from the analysis o f secondary data In particular, all 
commented on the accuracy of the patterns produced by our time varying cross 
correlation analysis In addition, they supported our identification of early and late 
adopters within our survey group.
Case Study Phase
The second phase of our research strategy required an investigation into why the firms 
identified by our mapping study were early or late adopters The case study method 
was selected as the most appropriate approach for exploring the internal processual 
and contextual factors that influence a firm’s strategic agility The strength of the case
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study approach is its ability to provide detailed answers to the questions o f ‘why?’ and 
‘how?’ organisational phenomena occur (Pettigrew 1990 and Eisenhardt 1989). It was 
an approach that complemented our mapping study where the emphasis was on the 
questions o f ‘what?’ and ‘when?’.
Traditionally qualitative methods, such as case studies, have been linked to research 
that takes a phenomenological or subjective stance However, as the writings of 
Pettigrew (1990), Remenyi et al (1998) and Huberman and Miles (1998) show, these 
methods are equally valuable to researchers who take a ‘post positivist’, or even 
positivist view. However, the need to demonstrate the validity of any findings adds 
considerable rigour to the approach that is followed.
Case studies can be used in two ways. Firstly in a deductive manner to test established 
theory (see Remenyi et al 1998) Hypotheses based on existing theory are articulated, 
case data collected and analysed and then the hypotheses are tested against the case 
material Secondly, case studies can be used inductively as part of a grounded theory 
approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967 and Strauss and Corbin 1998). This approach 
builds theory by the continuous comparison of data and existing theory and begins 
with data collection (Eisenhardt 1989). Theoretical concepts or themes emerge from 
the case data which direct the researcher to streams of the literature, which in turn 
suggest modifications to the initial concepts. Huberman and Miles (1998) dismiss the 
distinction between deductive and inductive case studies, suggesting that in building 
theory from case studies, the researcher shifts between inductive data collection and 
analysis and deductive testing and verification
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There is an on going debate over whether a single case study has any real value 
(Gummesson 1988). A single case study can provide useful empirical evidence to test 
hypotheses or provide context specific information in the manner of ethnography 
(Remenyi 1998). However, for a post positivist, the need for findings to be 
generalisable and of demonstrable validity does place a question mark over the utility 
of a single case study for theory building. The grounded theory approach to theory 
building relies on researchers continually making comparisons both between subjects 
and with existing theory (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Pettigrew (1990) and Eisenhardt 
(1989) advocate that this comparative approach should be adopted when the case 
study method is used To enable comparisons to be made at least two case studies 
must be undertaken.
Pettigrew (1990) describes the choice of case study companies as often being shaped 
by ‘planned opportunism’ The nature of the research topic, the questions being posed 
and the practical issue of gaining access may all guide the choice of case study sites 
Pettigrew (1990) suggests that as the number of case studies that can be undertaken 
will be limited, those chosen should be polar types, i.e. reflect opposite extremes of 
the phenomena being studied. Eisenhardt (1989) agrees that they should be chosen to 
fill theoretical categories rather than for statistical reasons and should provide 
examples of polar types
In line with Pettigrew’s (1990) and Eisenhardt’s (1989) advice, in this study we chose 
to conduct retrospective case studies of polar types To this end we targeted 
Prudential, which was shown by our mapping to be a significant early adopter, and 
Guardian Royal Exchange, shown to be a significant late adopter.
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In addition, we also adopted the approach advocated by Huberman and Miles (1998) 
in that we cycled between different phases of inductive data collection and analysis 
and deductive testing and verification.
Interviewee Selection
Given our aim of exploring the way in which strategic decisions were made, we 
needed to gain access to a large number of executives at board level and just below 
Two issues determined the number o f interviews conducted for each case study 
Firstly, a sufficient number of interviews were needed to provide coverage of the 
period being studied and to establish confidence in the information provided We 
found, however, that there was a balance to be struck between the number of 
interviews and the value of the material that each additional interview was able to 
provide We found towards the end o f our study that interviewees were tending to 
confirm the details provided by others rather than giving fresh insight. Secondly, there 
was a limit to the number of senior managers who were able to provide insight into the 
firm’s strategic decision-making and who were willing to be interviewed.
In total twenty-one in-depth interviews were undertaken. Of these nineteen were with 
current or former executives of Prudential or Guardian Royal Exchange. Of these 
nineteen interviews, two were conducted with ex-chief executives and ten with current 
or former executive directors. The other seven were with senior managers who 
reported to executive directors
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Transcripts from a further six interviews with directors of Prudential were made 
available to the researcher These were conducted by Professor Andrew Pettigrew and 
Dr Terry McNulty during the course o f their study of the Power and Influence of 
Board Members (Pettigrew and McNulty 1995). They proved valuable for checking 
the responses obtained during our primary interviews
Gaining Access
Gaining access to the two companies for our study proved challenging. In the case of 
Prudential, initial contact was made with an executive director who had close 
connections with the Warwick Business School. While he was willing to be 
interviewed, he unfortunately felt unable to champion our research to his colleagues 
This was not seen as a major problem as most of the other executives we wished to 
interview had either retired or left the company Two ex-executive directors (who also 
had close links with the Warwick Business School) agreed to participate With these 
three interviews arranged or completed, other potential interviewees were contacted in 
a series of ‘cold calls’ and, hearing of the involvement of their ex-colleagues, readily 
agreed to participate
Arranging access to Guardian Royal Exchange proved more problematic Initially 
help was sought from the IBM Consulting Group, one of the sponsors of this research, 
whose insurance practice claimed to have close contact with Guardian Royal 
Exchange However, Guardian Royal Exchange were concerned that confidential 
information could be put to commercial use and hence they did not respond to IBM’s 
approach It was then decided to make a direct approach and a cold call was made to
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an executive director. He was assured that IBM would only see the results o f  the 
project, not the details of individual interviews, and that material gained from the 
interviews would only be used in this thesis and academic journal articles Our contact 
agreed to be interviewed and to arrange interviews with two other senior managers 
(although not executive directors). He then began to avoid agreeing dates for the 
interviews It later transpired that the company had began negotiations for its takeover 
with several firms including AXA.
Eventually in February 1999, the researcher was able to arrange the three promised 
interviews Realising that three interviews would not be sufficient to develop the 
depth of insight and confidence required, cold calls were made to other senior 
Guardian Royal Exchange executives. With the AXA takeover agreed, these calls 
proved highly successful and nine interviews in all were arranged
Data Collection
Timing
As we discussed above, data limitations and the need to maintain a consistent sample 
dictated the period studied during the mapping phase However, the shortness o f  the 
study period is a limitation to this research (Webb and Pettigrew 1999). Given that the 
purpose of the case studies was to help us understand the patterns observed in the 
mapping phase, it was essential that the antecedents of the change observed in the 
1990s were investigated. Consequently, it was felt necessary to extend the period 
investigated by the case studies back in time.
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Judging by how much the study period should be extended was, however, more 
difficult. As authors such as Pettigrew (1985) and Lewin et al (1999) argue action that 
takes place in the present is influenced by patterns of action and decisions taken 
throughout the history of the firm. This would suggest that our analysis should extend 
back to the formation of our case study firms. However, these firms have histories 
extending back into the 18th and 19th Centuries and this would be impracticable. It was 
therefore decided to compromise by extending the period to be covered by in-depth 
interviews back to 1980 In addition, each company’s history would be briefly 
investigated using published information to determine what earlier patterns of 
strategic agility there were.
Case Study Protocol
The literature on the case study method (e g. Pettigrew 1990 and Eisenhardt 1989) 
advises researchers to plan how they ‘enter the field’ carefully (Eisenhardt 1989). This 
advice was followed - the objectives of each case study and each interview together 
with the approach to be taken were carefully considered
The objective of the two studies was to uncover ‘how’ and ‘why’ Prudential and 
Guardian Royal Exchange differed in the speed with which they adopted new strategic 
initiatives. To accomplish this, we planned a series of semi-structured interviews 
which would enable the interviewees to comment on the issues relating to the 
processual and contextual factors that influence the emergence of strategic initiatives
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Data Types
The case study phase o f our research involved three main types of data -  in depth 
interviews, observational notes and documentary data Our mapping phase 
supplemented this with published articles and press releases We will deal with each 
of these data types in turn - although in fact all data types were collected 
simultaneously and used in combination to build and triangulate our narrative of each 
case study.
Case Study Interviews
The interviews for this study were semi-structured. While pre-established questions 
were used to guide the subject through the topics we wished to cover, many were 
deliberately open ended to allow the interviewee to link his answers to other issues 
and introduce new themes A conversational style was adopted in order to gain the 
subject’s trust and build rapport (Fontana and Frey 1998). In all but one of the 
interviews this was achieved and the study benefited greatly from the subjects’ 
frankness. The level of rapport that was established is evident from the fact that each 
interview lasted for on average two hours and some lasted for more than three.
The GRE interviews were conducted against the background of the company’s 
acquisition by AXA However, while our interviewees and the other staff we met were 
concerned about the future, all were keen to talk about the past and some even seemed 
to see it as a release from their worries. When assessing the responses of the GRE 
interviewees, we bore in mind that ill feeling about the takeover might have biased
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their responses However, if anything the takeover seemed to inspire positive 
memories - almost akin to mourning - rather than bitterness.
Prior to each interview, the nature of the research project and the purpose of the 
interview were explained. The researcher also briefly described his background This 
seemed to be genuinely appreciated - it demonstrated openness and helped to build 
trust. The interviewee was then asked if he was willing for the interview to be 
recorded We confirmed that all information provided would be held in confidence 
and that the interviewee’s comments would not be attributed if the material was used 
for any purpose other than this thesis. All of our interviewees agreed to be recorded.
In the first part of the interview, the interviewee was asked to describe his current 
position and career history. If he had joined the company from elsewhere or had left to 
work elsewhere, the opportunity was taken to ask how the company compared with 
his previous or current company The interviewee was then asked to describe which 
strategic moves he saw as being the most significant during the 1980s and 1990s. This 
provided data that was used to confirm the patterns detected in our mapping analysis. 
It also led to significant events or ‘critical incidents’ being raised, which could be used 
to explore the influence of organisational processes and internal and external contexts 
that existed at the time they occurred (see Pettigrew 1990 and Easterby-Smith et al 
1991).
Usually the initial questions would prompt the subject to discuss his experiences and 
insights. As the interviewee opened up, the role of the researcher would shift from one 
of questioning to one of prompting and guiding the conversation. Remaining flexible
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was vital but in most cases the historical order of events was used to provide some 
structure and guide the subject - with the researcher regularly probing (Easterby -  
Smith et al 1991) for comparisons with previous initiatives or periods. As trust 
developed, these comparisons provided deep insights into the relative strengths and 
weaknesses o f individuals and into sensitive and controversial issues. In addition, this 
cycling back to previous initiatives also provided a way of checking earlier answers.
At the end of the interview, the subject was asked if there any were further issues that 
he felt were important to the strategic agility of the firm The executive directors were 
also asked what they would have done differently if they had become CEO. This 
question proved very effective in revealing what alternative moves had been 
considered and the extent to which the interviewee had agreed with what had been 
done
Initially, the interviewees were shown the results of our mapping and analysis study at 
the very end of the interview and asked for their comments. In later interviews this 
practice was changed and instead the analytical themes that were emerging from the 
case studies were presented and discussed with the interviewee.
- Interview Pro-forma
An interview pro-forma was developed to guide the researcher through a series of 
questions grouped around the themes found within the literature and highlighted by 
our mapping exercise This was tailored before each interview to reflect the position
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and background of the intended interviewee and the information gathered from 
previous interviews.
The pro-forma proved an invaluable tool for prompting the researcher to ask specific 
questions and for guiding the direction of the interview. It was at its most useful 
during the initial phase of each interview when most subjects appeared happier 
answering specific questions and were less inclined to elaborate or raise and discuss 
related issues. It was also valuable to be able to use a pre-prepared question when the 
direction of the interview needed to be realigned or when there was a lull in 
discussion
It should be stressed that the pro-forma was used as a guide and not a template 
Questions were added or rejected depending on the interviewee’s responses and to 
enable the researcher to explore themes that emerged or forced a reinterpretation of 
earlier interviews While this flexibility could be criticised as it reduced the 
consistency between interviews, it was essential to our analysis and theory building 
(Eisenhardt 1989).
- Tape Recording
Obtaining value from interviews relies on capturing the detail that the interviewees 
impart Even if the researcher is skilled at note taking, such detail may be lost due to 
poor or inaccurate articulation, or poor listening and recording Tape recording 
enables the researcher to evaluate not only what is said, but also how it is said 
(Goodman and Pryluck 1974).
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In addition, to maximise the value of the data collected the researcher must coax the 
interviewee to reveal the type of information required in the depth required. He must 
be able to pick up quickly any issues which warrant further exploration and shift the 
focus of the interview accordingly The concentration required to get the most from 
the interview will be reduced if the researcher needs to undertake note taking at the 
same time.
All the interviews conducted for this study were tape recorded, with the interviewee’s 
consent In most cases, after a short while, most of the interviewees seemed to forget 
the tape recorder was running and became increasingly less guarded. Only in one 
interview did the subject point to the tape recorder and say, “I will tell you later”, 
which indeed he did.
- Transcription
Each interview was transcribed In all cases care was taken to transcribe every word 
used by the interviewee and to indicate where pauses occurred. As a result, the process 
was very time consuming. However, it proved an invaluable aid to the researcher, 
helping him gain an in-depth familiarity with the wealth of material contained in each 
interview.
The transcriptions formed the basis of the subsequent analysis.
93
Chapter 3 -  Methodology
Documentary Data
The validity and reliability of documentary data is the subject of considerable debate 
(Manning and Cullum-Swan 1998 and Remenyi et al 1998). Pettigrew (1990) 
highlights the dangers of the selective deposit and survival of documents, while 
Remenyi et al (1998) point out that most documents are not written with future 
research in mind. However, if treated with appropriate caution documentary data can 
provide essential support for the oral responses of interviewees, confirm the timing of 
events and provide insights into the context in which decisions were taken (Remenyi 
et al 1998). Pettigrew (1990) describes this use of documentary data as an aid to 
triangulation.
Four types of document were used during this study in addition to the archival data 
used in our mapping analysis -  annual reports, press releases, company histories and 
internal documents. They were used to corroborate the data obtained from our 
interviews - although it quickly became apparent that the interview data was far richer
Both Prudential and Guardian Royal Exchange were happy to provide annual reports 
back to 1980, press releases, company histories and general archive material. 
However, obtaining access to internal confidential documents proved more difficult. 
This was limited to reading brief sections during interviews
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Observational Notes
The collection of observational data involved making field notes during or while 
waiting for interviews. Wherever possible the opportunity was taken to have informal 
chats with other members of staff e g. secretaries and reception staff. These notes 
proved useful in prompting questions during interviews and in getting the general 
‘feel’ of the place. The interest in different types of questions from the interviewees in 
each company was revealing. In general, the interviewees from Prudential were more 
happy to discuss strategic issues, while those from GRE were more interested in 
operational details This insight prompted a series of questions regarding the 
willingness of managers to question the nature of the organisation and its 
environment, which became an important sub-theme of this study
Case Analysis
The objective of the analysis stage was to identify from the case study data consistent 
themes or factors that explained the differences observed in strategic agility The 
analysis involved two phases The first phase adopted an approach based on 
‘grounded theory’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967) in order to identify significant themes. 
The second phase used a more deductive approach to validate and demonstrate the 
support for these themes across our interviews
Researchers have commented extensively on the iterative and, at times, messy 
character of case study analysis (Pettigrew 1990, Huberman and Miles 1998 and 
Eisenhardt 1989). Analysis overlaps data collection and literature review, with each
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mutually informing the others. Pettigrew (1990) describes the process of analysing 
case studies as cyclical, involving alternating periods of complexity and 
simplification He explains that while maintaining the richness of the data is essential, 
it must be simplified to reveal common analytical themes and the interrelationships 
between them As themes emerge, they stimulate the collection of further data and 
further comparison with existing academic literature, therefore generating further 
complexity. Pettigrew (1990) highlights the value of data reduction techniques based 
on visual display and analytical writing.
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that there are three interwoven and iterative threads to the 
inductive analysis o f comparative case studies -  analysing within-case data, searching 
for cross case patterns and ‘enfolding’ the literature (comparing and contrasting with 
existing literature).
Analysing within-case data involves detailed write-ups or narrative descriptions and 
longitudinal displays and graphs Huberman and Miles (1998) describe the value of 
constructing simple narratives detailing what was going on and why. Visual displays 
allow the researcher to see the patterns within each case study Ultimately the 
objective is to develop a ‘rich familiarity’ (ibid) with each case
The second thread is the search for cross case patterns Researchers are encouraged to 
beware of the tendency to reach a conclusion quickly based on only part of the data, 
which may then act to filter out disconfirming evidence Eisenhardt (1989) suggests 
being overly influenced by the opinion or the seniority of individual subjects is a 
common error. To counteract this tendency, researchers should look at the data in
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many different ways and through diverse theoretical lenses We encountered a good 
example of this type of danger during this study. One of our first interviews was with 
an ex-chief executive who gave the impression that the turnaround in his 
organisation’s performance was the result of changes he had personally implemented 
and heavily criticised his predecessor However, over time the slow accretion of 
contradictory opinions from other sources and reinterpretations prompted by 
alternative streams of literature allowed a more balanced view to emerge
It quickly became apparent that the differences between the two case study companies 
were not the only contrasts that were revealed by our data In each case study, there 
was also a significant variation in strategic agility over time. This variation was of 
considerable value to our analysis for it allowed us to test the explanatory power of 
the factors identified from the cross case analysis in relation to the temporal 
variations
The final thread detailed by Eisenhardt (1989) is ‘enfolding the literature’ She 
suggests that a key feature of theory building from case studies is the comparison of 
emergent concepts with the existing literature Similarities and contradictions are 
identified and the researcher must seek to understand and explain them. As we saw 
above, contradictions can be particularly valuable as they can lead to alternative 
interpretations and suggest new issues to be considered The constant cycling between 
case data and existing literature ensures that emergent theory is well grounded and 
improves its validity. This is particularly important when the findings rest on a limited 
number of case studies
97
Chapter 3 - Methodology
Our approach to the case study analysis conformed to the approach described by 
Eisenhardt (1989) - however, it was also supplemented by a more deductive approach 
(Miles and Huberman 1998). Our reading of the literature enabled us to develop a 
number of hypotheses about the factors that influence strategic agility. These 
hypotheses were then used to interrogate the case study data. This process greatly 
aided our understanding of the case material and its connection with the existing 
literature
In addition, writing a paper for Organisational Science (see Webb and Pettigrew 1999) 
helped our analysis. The comments of the editors and independent referees proved 
particularly beneficial in clarifying our analytical themes and methodology.
As ideas began to form, various visual and textual tools were used to develop 
analytical themes. Highlighter pens and the cut and paste facilities on word-processing 
packages were used to sort the interviewees’ comments into nascent themes Mind 
mapping was used to find links between quotes and to delineate themes and sub­
themes (see Figures 3.4 for a schematic example). During the later interviews the 
themes that had emerged were discussed with our interviewees and refined in the light 
of their comments As we will describe in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 four consistent factors 
ultimately emerged from this process.
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Example Quotes Sub-Factor Factor
“The investment side 
was always very 
separate. They regarded 
themselves as different 
beings"
“There were two camps 
actuaries and non 
actuaries and quite a bit 
o f  conflict between the 
two at some levels"
“The key thing was 
bringing in people from 
outside with different 
perceptions o f how 
things should work"
“As chairman Corby 
proceeded to  make the 
board into a much more 
powerful animal"
“It moved from being 
dominated by actuaries 
to now where the chief 
actuary reports to the 
finance director”
“Each time someone 
like me came in the 
actuaries got pushed 
back further into their 
specialisation and 
sometimes they didn't 
like it.”
“ It was a conscious 
decision by Corby to 
bring people in. lie was 
looking to stimulate 
change and didn’t want 
to import the same 
insurance traditions that 
they always had From 
that point onwards there 
was an increasing flow 
o f  people from outside 
the organisation
“Newmarch was 
spitting bullets as to 
how the process 
lacked rigour and was 
stupid"
“Some o f the 
decisions Newmarch 
took about the 
international division 
I was less than happy 
with”
“Newmarch trailed 
dissatisfaction rather 
than an agenda"
“Newmarch believed 
that there were a lot 
o f  things that were 
overdue for change 
but Corby didn’t”
“Newmarch liked to 
have people around 
him who said lets do 
this and then 
challenged it. Then 
you would argue like 
hell and out came a 
proposition"
“The one thing that 
Corby was willing to 
do which Newmarch 
would never do was to 
tolerate someone as 
awkward as 
Newmarch”
“Decisions would be 
made collectively in 
the group There 
would he critical 
discussion and a 
consensus would 
emerge”
Competing 
Mental Models 
of the Firm and 
its Sector
Figure 3.4 -  Schematic Example of Mind Map
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The second phase of our case analysis began once the emerging factors had 
established themselves. For each factor, existing literature was used to develop a set of 
analytical questions e g. ‘did the organisation see itself as similar to other insurers in 
the sample?’. Each case was split into three periods - the 1980s, early 1990s and mid 
1990s - based on the tenure of the chief executives The interview data for each of the 
two companies was coded according to the response it prompted to each question into 
four categories -  ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘it changed during the period/it was different in different 
parts of the company’ or ‘no data supplied’. The results of this coding were then 
displayed visually with the responses that would be expected to lead to greater levels 
of strategic agility highlighted (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2, pages 297 and 298).
An inter-coder reliability check, using 10% of our interview transcripts, was 
conducted independently by a second researcher and the results compared with those 
of the researcher. This check demonstrated a reliability of between 86% and 90%.
The coding provided a way in which to holistically compare the two case studies (see 
Figure 8.11, page 341). It also demonstrated the consistency with which our factors 
were supported by our interview data.
Validity and Limitations of the Case Studies
Researchers who adopt a positivist perspective judge the quality of research using four 
tests -  construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. However, 
from a post positivist viewpoint these tests can never be satisfied. As Heisenberg 
shows, we can only perceive reality imperfectly or probabilistically (Guba and
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Lincoln 1998) Hammersley (1992) suggests four criteria by which research can be 
assessed from a post positivist viewpoint. Firstly, its ability to generate formal theory 
Secondly, the degree to which its findings can be generalised or transferred to other 
settings. Thirdly, the degree to which it is empirically grounded and scientifically 
credible and finally the degree to which it is internally reflexive, i.e. the extent to 
which the researcher has addressed issues of bias originating from the researcher, 
subject or research strategy We will use Hammersley’s set of tests to discuss the 
validity o f our case study findings.
As will become apparent in this thesis, we believe the use of the case study method in 
association with our mapping and analysis work allowed us to identify some of the 
factors that influence the strategic agility of a firm While we must be cautious before 
claiming transferability of our results (see Eisenhardt 1989), the strong support 
provided by the existing literature suggests that these factors will have similar effects 
upon other companies and industries
As this section and Chapter 9 discuss, there are limitations to our study, however, we 
would argue that the findings are well grounded empirically and reasonably credible 
As we have seen, the approach we took in conducting the case studies was well 
grounded within the research methods literature (e g Pettigrew 1990, Eisenhardt 1989 
and Remenyi et al 1998) The support gained for our findings within the literature and 
the responses obtained from both interviewee subjects and academic peer review 
suggest that our findings are credible
101
Chapter 3 -Methodology
While the case study method is now well established within the management 
literature, there has been some criticism that it is susceptible to bias (see Yin 1989 and 
McCutcheon and Meredith 1993). However, to satisfy Hammersley’s fourth test of 
internal reflexivity we must consider the bias that may be introduced by the 
researcher, the interview subjects and by the research strategy adopted. It is the 
primary function of the researcher to identify and minimise the influence of bias 
(Remenyi et al 1998).
The Role o f the Researcher and Bias
The positivist view, that the researcher must be a detached and independent observer 
if his results are to be valid, has been widely criticised, particularly by 
phenomenological and post modernist theorists (Hussel 1932/Crotty 1998 and Lyotard 
1979/Crotty 1998). Even within the natural sciences, post positivists have 
demonstrated that the researcher will always influence the findings of a study 
(Heisenberg / Crotty 1998).
This post positivist view recognises that the researcher interacts with the subject and 
hence may introduce bias due to his own values and preferences (Easterby-Smith et al 
1991). However, to get the maximum value out of semi-structured or unstructured 
interviews demands such interaction (Fontana and Frey 1998). Case study interviews 
can never be perfectly objective. Remenyi et al (1998) agree but argue that by 
recognising this problem the researcher can take steps to minimise any bias that might 
be introduced.
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Eisenhardt (1989) stresses the importance of the researcher remaining receptive to the 
views and interpretations of his interview subjects whatever his own opinions. 
Fontana and Frey (1998) agree, stressing that the interviewer must try to share the 
concerns and views of his subjects However, the researcher must also recognise that 
his own rationality will be unconsciously bound (March and Simon 1958) and that it 
would be naive to assert that any form of research is without bias (Remenyi et al 
1998) Hence, (mirroring one of the findings of this study) a willingness to question 
ones own assumptions and beliefs is a critical requirement for a researcher conducting 
case study interviews.
In this study, a number of steps were taken to minimise any bias that might be 
introduced by the researcher. All interviews were recorded and transcribed word for 
word rather than selectively. These transcripts were then used for coding Chains of 
evidence or audit trails (Pettigrew 1990 and Morse 1998) were created demonstrating 
how comments made by our interviewees related to the themes that emerged (see 
Figure 3 4 for a schematic example) An inter-coder reliability check was conducted 
by an independent re-coding of 10% of the interview transcript (see above) The 
inductive approach adopted to analyse our interviews also meant that the researcher 
was constantly revisiting the literature and then reinterpreting the patterns suggested 
by the interviews. This proved to be an effective way of introducing new ideas and 
challenging pre-existing assumptions
It is also worth mentioning that all o f the subjects interviewed for this study were very 
senior, and most were executive directors of FTSE top 200 companies They each had 
strong, and, in some cases dominant, characters with strong views. It is difficult to
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envisage how this group could have been influenced, particularly given the semi- 
structured and open-ended format adopted for the interviews
Bias Introduced by the Interview Subjects
Bias could be introduced into the interview responses of subjects in a number ways. 
Remenyi et al (1998) identify three Firstly, an individual may not accurately recall 
events, secondly he may be unwilling to disclose important feelings and thirdly, he 
may be unwilling to disclose information that reflects badly on him or his company 
To these, we would add the possibility of a subject wishing to emphasise the 
importance o f his role in the events being investigated or of post hoc rationalisation of 
emergent events Remenyi et al (1998) argue that these dangers are present in all areas 
of social science but particularly within management studies where a subject may be 
concerned about his career. These difficulties are, however, not confined to case 
studies but also need to be borne in mind by researchers using other types of research 
instruments, e g. questionnaires.
Huberman and Miles (1998) believe that the influence of subject bias on a study’s 
findings may be minimised by the use of triangulation. Triangulation occurs at three 
levels Firstly, multiple sources of evidence are used to support assertions (Remenyi et 
al 1998) Secondly, evidence is sought from multiple interviewees within the firm 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998) and finally the opinions of external commentators are 
considered As we have seen in this study, multiple data sets were used, and a large 
number o f senior managers from both case study companies were interviewed. The 
opinions o f external commentators were obtained - journal and newspaper articles
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provided confirmation of significant events and ‘analysts reports’ provided opinions 
on the strategies pursued and on the financial performances of the two firms. In 
addition, two interviews were conducted with senior managers from other insurers in 
which their opinion of the two case study companies were sought
Bias introduced by the Research Strategy
Bias may also be introduced by the design of the case studies themselves. Three 
elements in particular can cause difficulties -  case selection, interview selection and 
timing.
The comparative case study method relies on the researcher identifying significant 
differences between two firms. However, no organisation will be identical to another 
in all ways except the phenomena being investigated For example, firms will differ in 
size, in their markets and in the products they produce
The influence of such differences can be reduced by ensuring that the organisations 
selected are of similar order in size and from the same industry group As far as 
possible this was the case in this study. However, there were still differences in size 
and market and product coverage although their influence was not expected to be 
significant
Our mapping study failed to show a significant relationship between size and strategic 
agility. While the literature on innovation suggests that larger firms can afford to 
adopt more innovations (Subramanian and Nilakanta 1996 and Tidd et al 1997), it is
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generally assumed that smaller firms are more agile, although a significant statistical 
relationship has not been demonstrated between size and speed of adoption 
(Subramanian and Nilakanta 1996 and Tidd et al 1997). Thus, we would expect the 
influence of size on speed o f adoption to either be insignificant or, as the largest firm 
in our study proved to be the more agile, to narrow the difference between the two 
firms. So far as the difference in the markets covered by the two firms is concerned 
the debate on the relative influence of the firm and the industry is informative (see 
Chapter 2). The majority view within the literature (Rumelt 1991 and McGahan and 
Porter 1997) is that the industry or sector is only responsible for between 10% and 
20% of variations in the performance between firms within that industry As the 
sectors served by our two firms overlap considerably the influence of any difference 
was expected to be negligible
While we did not expect our findings to be influenced by this type of bias, we still 
took care to ensure that we remained alive to the possibility.
The second possible source of bias that can be introduced by the research design 
relates to the selection of interviewees In this study the objective of the interviews 
was to explore the nature of the strategic decision making process within each of our 
two case study firms. In order to achieve this we needed to interview those senior 
executives in each firm who were or had been involved in the process. However, this 
necessarily meant that our interviews concentrated on the top management team in 
each case. It could be argued that this may have distorted, or led us to underestimated 
the influence and contribution of members of the two organisations at other levels, e g 
the non executive directors, unions, or other factors, e g. the organisation’s culture.
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Several steps were taken to try to reveal any bias resulting that there may have been 
We made a point, during our interviews, of probing for the influence on initiation or 
implementation of new strategies of other stakeholders, for example all the executive 
directors were questioned about the influence of non executives. In addition, we 
sought the views of external industry experts. One of our interviewees did in fact 
become the non-executive chairman of the companies during the early 1990s and so 
was able to provide particular insight into the influence of non-executives An 
interview transcript with his successor was also made available to this study by 
another Warwick Business School research project, which had specifically focused on 
the role of non-executive directors
The Unions and other employee groups had had quite a strong influence on 
Prudential’s efforts to reorganise its UK sales force and we therefore made a particular 
effort to probe our interviewees about the power of these groups We were helped by 
our archival study as some of the comments of union leaders and disgruntled ex­
salesmen we uncovered suggested questions we could put to our interviewees.
It is argued that these steps will have gone some way to uncover any distortion 
introduced by our selection of interviewees In particular, we believe they helped 
strengthen the credibility of the four factors identified by this study as influencing the 
speed of strategy adoption However, a wider group of interviewees might have 
revealed the importance of other factors
The third design issue concerns the choice of study period. As Pettigrew (1990) 
observes, time sets a frame of reference for what events are studied and how they are
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explained A key ontological assumption made in this study is that change is 
continuous and is influenced by past actions, current situations and expectations about 
the future. While it is believed that this view reflects the real world more accurately 
than models of change based on discrete jumps, it does present the researcher with a 
problem -  what period needs to be studied to capture the patterns of change and 
causality adequately? There is always the danger that if too short a period is selected 
the pattern of change will not be fully captured and bias or ‘aliasing’2 will be 
introduced In Pettigrew’s (1990) words, ‘truth is the daughter of time’.
Aware of this potential problem, we extended the case study period back into the 
1980s. In addition, we generated a narrative of each case study company back to its 
formation, through the use of published company histories This approach ensured that 
long-term patterns would be observed and could be taken into account in our analysis.
Summary
This chapter has considered the methodology we adopted to investigate the three 
research questions we developed in Chapter 2 We described how our work made 
ontological assumptions informed by Stompka’s (1993) theory o f ‘social becoming’ 
and adopted a post positivist and contextualist epistemology These underpinnings 
influenced our selection of research methods -  we needed to collect data using 
multiple methods and levels of analysis, and we needed to collect longitudinal data 
and maintain its temporal component during our analysis
2 Here the concept o f  aliasing is adopted from signal processing. It refers to the sampling of a sound or 
electric wave that is not sufficient to allow an accurate representation o f  the wave to be recreated from 
the sample values.
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In the light of these requirements, we adopted a two phase approach In the first phase, 
we used innovative mapping and analytical techniques to uncover patterns of strategy 
adoption within a sample of nine companies within the UK insurance industry In the 
second phase, we used the comparative case study method to explore the internal 
processes and contexts of two firms which our mapping analysis had shown to be a 
consistent early adopter and a consistent late adopter
This research strategy had several strengths It allowed different aspects of the 
phenomena being studied to be targeted by different methods Thus, the strengths of 
the mapping and analysis technique in detecting patterns at an industry level were 
complemented by the power of the case study method to uncover the internal 
processes and context of the firm. There was also a degree of overlap between these 
two methods - so the findings of one method could be triangulated against those of the 
other.
Finally, the epistemological position taken for this study meant that we had to 
establish the validity of our findings. We have discussed in depth throughout this 
chapter the steps that were taken to ensure the credibility and relevance of our 
methodology and findings In particular, we paid particular attention to the issue of 
internal reflexivity -  i.e the influence o f the researcher, interview subjects and the 
research strategy on our results. Although, no study can ever be completely without 
bias, we believe that the steps we took have minimised distortion to a point where our 
findings are internally and externally valid (Remenyi et al 1998)
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We are now in a position to begin our exploration of early and late adopters of 
strategy. In accordance with the contextual method of inquiry, we will proceed by 
considering three different levels of analysis. We will begin in the next chapter by 
discussing the macro environment encountered by the UK insurers in the 1980s and 
1990s. In Chapter 5 we will deal with the industry level patterns detected by our 
mapping and analysis exercise and in Chapter 6, 7 and 8 consider the internal 
processes and contexts o f our case study companies. Inter-relationships between these 
different levels of analysis will be highlighted where appropriate
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Chapter 4
The UK Insurance Industry
Introduction
The insurance industry is one of the UK’s largest sectors, worth around £98 billion in 
premium income in 1996. The market can be divided into two segments, general and 
long term insurance. General insurance, which is worth around £31 billion, includes 
fire and property, marine, motor, liability, accident and health insurance Long term 
insurance accounts for around 50% of UK personal savings, and is worth around £67 
billion It comprises industrial and ordinary life insurance and pensions. Premiums are 
paid either as single lump sum payments or as regular contributions over the period of 
the policy1. In addition to premiums from policyholders, insurance companies also 
receive a significant income stream from investments (£38bn in 1996)
The UK insurance market is one of the largest in Europe, only the German (£120bn) 
and French (£110bn) markets are larger in terms of premium income Based on 
premium income the UK accounts for 19% of the European market. In 1996, Europe 
represented 32% of the World insurance market, North America 33% and Asia 31%. 
Global premiums were approximately £1600bn
This chapter describes the structure and development of the UK insurance industry in 
the 1980s and 1990s During this period, the environment faced by the insurers has 
changed from one of considerable stability and benevolence to one characterised by
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environmental turbulence and hypercompetition (D’Aveni 1994). This shift is the 
result of regulatory change, the erosion of barriers to entry and the breakdown of 
traditional industry practices
We review the changes that have occurred in the industry’s macro-environment and 
discuss how they have affected the demand for insurance and the competitive 
pressures faced by insurers. Although initially slow to respond, the insurers have 
begun to adapt to the new environment However, it is suggested that some firms, 
such as Prudential, General Accident and Commercial Union, were more responsive 
to environmental change than their industry competitors
Market Structure
The structure of the UK insurance market is complex, having evolved over a period of 
at least three centuries. The market consists of three components1 2: Policyholders 
(customers), intermediaries and insurers (see Figure 4 1).
Policyholders range from individuals to companies and other profit and non-profit 
making organisations, including local and public authorities The insurers provide 
insurance either directly to their policyholders or via intermediaries such as financial 
advisors, brokers and agents
1 Sales o f yearly payment policies a re  more valuable as the paym ents may last up to 30 or more years 
Typically, industry analysts com pare the value o f single and yearly  prem iums by only taking 10% of 
the value o f  single premiums
2 Reinsurance adds additional com plexity and has been excluded
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Source: Ba.scd on Diacon and Carter (1992) 
Figure 4.1 -  Structure of the UK Insurance Industry
Intermediaries, as required by the Financial Services Act 1986, are either independent 
or are tied to a particular insurer A tied intermediary will either be owned by the 
insurer or bound to it by a long term contract and will only offer the products of that 
insurer Intermediary organisations range from individual consultants to large brokers 
such as Willis Corroon Group and Sedgwick Group, both FTSE 250 companies until 
19983 Other large organisations such as banks and building societies act as 
intermediaries, although they have increasingly begun to offer their own insurance 
products
’ The US firm Marsh M cU nnan  acquired Sedgwick in 1998 Willis Corroon was the subject o f a KKR 
led buy out in 1998,
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The insurers comprise insurance companies and the collecting, or friendly, societies 
together with the individual underwriters who operate through Lloyd’s. In addition, 
through the compulsory National Insurance scheme, the state also acts as an insurer, 
providing state pensions and sickness and unemployment benefits
In the UK, there are two types of insurance company: proprietary and mutual 
Propriety companies are the largest group and are shareholder owned Mutual 
companies are owned by their policyholders, who gain a share in any profits made by 
the company through the allocation of bonuses. A significant difference between the 
two forms of organisation is their access to additional capital While proprietary 
companies are able to raise funds by issuing new shares, mutual companies must rely 
on retained earnings
Insurance companies are also often defined as either ‘specialist’ or ‘composite’. 
Specialist insurers concentrate on life or general insurance or in some cases more 
narrowly on a particular type of life or general insurance (e g motor insurance). 
Composite insurers transact both life and general insurance although the proportions 
of each vary from firm to firm All of the companies in our sample are composites
Collecting or friendly societies are a special type of mutual company and only write 
industrial insurance business They have their origins in the collective protection 
societies of the 18th and early 19lh Centuries, which provided local sickness financial 
support for low paid workers and their families Several of these societies have since 
become trade unions Following the introduction of the welfare state and more 
recently The Friendly Societies Act 1992 they have broadened their activities, and it is
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increasingly difficult to distinguish them from mutual insurers4. However, the 
majority of these firms tend to operate in restricted regional areas and offer low 
premium policies to low income customers
While there are over 800 insurers in the UK, market share is heavily concentrated 
among the largest firms, with the top ten holding a combined share of around 55% 
(50% held by the members of our sample).
Professional and Trade Associations
The industry’s two main professional bodies are the Institute of Actuaries and the 
Chartered Insurance Institute The Institute of Actuaries is widely seen as having 
considerable influence5 as it governs entry into the actuarial profession and hosts 
regular meetings of the industry’s chief actuaries
The main trade organisation is the Association of British Insurers. Membership is 
open to all British and foreign insurers registered to transact insurance business in the 
UK It represents approximately 450 firms who between them write approximately 
96% of the UK’s insurance (ABI 1998) Specialist committees, under the ABI 
umbrella, deal with particular types of insurance product or key issues and are 
populated by managers from the member companies The ABI was formed in 1985 
from the amalgamation of various industry associations and tariff committees (see 
below) to act as a focus for industry discussion, communication and government 
lobbying
' Personal conversation w ith  Independent Order of O dd Fellows M anchester Unity Friendly Society 
'  Interview with an ex Prudential Finance director
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With membership of trade associations open to anyone selling insurance in the UK, a 
variety of more restricted, informal groups have formed. The primary aim of such 
groupings has been the promotion of UK insurers in the face of increased foreign 
competition and new entrants, such as banks. In addition, these groups aim to present 
a united front to the National Union of Insurance Workers, the MSF and other 
industry-wide trade unions6. As our interviewees revealed many of the gatherings of 
these groups are held under the title of the ‘Usual Friends’ and they include regular 
meetings of chief executives and personnel directors.
Summary
The structure of the UK insurance industry is complex and consists of three 
components - policyholders, intermediaries and insurers Insurers, the subject of this 
study, vary widely in the nature of their ownership and the range of products they 
offer While there are over 800 providers of insurance products in the UK, market 
share is heavily concentrated among the largest insurers.
A number of well supported trade and professional associations exist within the 
industry. Of these the Institute of Actuaries and the Association of British Insurers 
(ABI) have considerable influence and act as focus points for inter-company contact 
and collaboration Closer ties exist between the larger traditional insurers through 
informal groupings such as the ‘Usual Friends’. These informal groups regularly bring
6 Interview with a director o f  GRE
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together senior managers to discuss industry level issues and collectively promote the 
interests of the UK insurers
A Brief History of the UK Insurance Industry
Long Term Insurance
Life insurance has been available in the UK since the 16th Century. Initially premiums 
were set at a single rate and insurance societies7 restricted their membership to limit 
risk.
The introduction of mortality tables8 in the mid 18th Century enabled risk to be 
assessed more accurately and consequently permitted pricing to be more flexible and a 
wider range of risks to be considered. Although at first slow to be widely adopted, this 
development, together with legislative change9, led to an influx of new companies into 
the life insurance market in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries10. This period also 
saw the expansion of many of the fire offices into life insurance, e g Sun Life, 
Pelican11, Eagle12 and Atlas13.
Despite the influx of new companies, the life insurance market remained small, with 
policyholders coming mostly from the landed, professional or commercial sections of
For example the Union (a subsidiary o f  Commercial Union after 1907) and the  Amicable (m erged 
with Norwich Union in 1866)
8 First used by Equitable Life A ssurance Society in 1752
9 The Life Assurance Act 1774 allowed jo in t stock com panies to enter the market.
10 E.g. Norwich Union and Scottish W idows
11 Amalgamated with Phoenix in 1908, subsidiary o f  Sun Alliance from 1984.
1'  Now Eagle Star
IJ Acquired by Royal Exchange 1959
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society In the li)* Century, however, many of the life companies began to seek a 
wider market by the increased use of advertising, expansion overseas and the 
introduction of new products Life insurers increasingly began to offer products such 
as annuity loans, mortgages and endowment policies. These efforts were helped by a 
change in the tax law in 1853, which allowed life insurance premiums to be deducted 
from income tax14
Of particular impact was the introduction of industrial life insurance in the 1850s. Up 
until then ‘ordinary’ policies had required the payment of relatively large annual or 
quarterly premiums. However, this type of policy did not meet the needs of the vast 
majority of weekly wage earners (Cockerell and Green 1994). Instead, industrial 
policies provided life cover in return for a small weekly premium collected by ‘home 
service’ agents going from door to door To develop and service this new business the 
‘industrial insurers’ established large chains of agents, in some cases numbering tens 
of thousands The first industrial life policies were issued in 1852 by British Industry 
Life closely followed by Prudential in 1854 (ibid).
The 20* Century has seen a growing need for retirement provision resulting from the 
increasing longevity of the UK population The emphasis has been subtly “shifted 
from taking out insurance against an early death to insuring against living too long”1' 
In the 1920s and 1930s, this led to rapid growth in the sale of pension schemes With 
the average life expectancy in the UK exceeding 65 years since 1945 and the 
establishment of a standard retirement age, this growth has continued more strongly in 
the post war years 1
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11 Pelici that wan finally withdrawn in l ‘tH4 
1 '  Personal contact with a director o f Prudential
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In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of new entrants to the market, such as Allied 
Dunbar and Abbey Life, began to offer unit linked life assurance. With this product, 
benefits are paid in direct relation to the investment performance of a portfolio of 
shares managed by the insurer. Since the late 1970s, unit linked policies have become 
increasingly popular due to the stock market’s continuing growth, and this has forced 
the traditional insurers to move into such products. This trend has increased the 
importance of investment management skills.
General Insurance
Forms of fire loss compensation and the spreading of risk relating to ships and their 
cargoes have existed in the UK since at least the 14th Century (Dickson and Steele 
1984). Transactions tended to be conducted by individual brokers in coffee-houses, 
one of which was later to develop into Lloyd’s of London. In 1720, London 
Assurance16 and Royal Exchange Assurance17 were granted royal charters to transact 
marine insurance. These charters ensured that the two firms had a virtual monopoly 
until 1824
The need for the more formalised provision of fire insurance was triggered by the 
losses incurred in the Great Fire of London in 1666 (Cockerell and Green 1994). This 
led to the establishment of a number o f ‘fire offices’, the first of which, the Phoenix111 *1
'' Subsidiary o f  Sun A lliance from 196$
1' M erged with Guardian to  form Guardian Royal Exchange in 1968 
Subsidiary o f  Sun A lliance from 1984
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was established in 1680. The Friendly Society19 (1683) and the Hand in Hand20 (1696) 
followed While these pioneering firms initially focused on the London area, the 
companies that followed21 such as the Sun Fire Office22 (1710) sought wider markets 
for fire insurance by appointing agents throughout the country and as the British 
Empire grew, throughout the world. As the 18th Century progressed, the fire offices 
insured an increasingly wider range of industrial, commercial and personal risks.
Despite a growing number of entrants, by 1800 the market was dominated by Sun, 
Phoenix and Royal Exchange The increasing complexity and level of risk insured 
stimulated co-operation rather than competition between these three firms. 
Discussions in the 1820s led to a sharing of underwriting experience and then to the 
formation of a fire insurance tariff system, or cartel (Cockerell and Green 1994). By 
the 1860s this system of minimum premiums or tariff rates had been adopted by all 
the main fire offices and was being extended to other types of insurance, including life 
insurance.
The system of tariffs formally operated for over a century In the late 1960s and 1970s 
increasing competition from non-tariff insurers and growing government opposition 
caused most tariffs to be abandoned, although the industrial fire insurance tariff 
survived until 1985 (Diacon and Carter 1992). The effect of the tariff system was to 
limit price competition and encourage a high degree o f co-operation between insurers.
19 Traded until 1730
20 Amalgamated with Commercial Union 1905
21 Including marine insurers Royal Exchange Assurance and London Assurance in 1721
22 Subsidiary o f  Sun Alliance from 1959
120
Chapter 4 -  The UK Insurance Industry
Government Regulation
Prior to the 1980s, much of the legislation governing the industry had its origins in the 
19th and early 20th Centuries. The framework for the regulation and supervision of the 
life industry had been established by The Life Assurance Companies Act 1870. The 
Assurance Companies Act 1909 introduced a similar regulatory framework to fire and 
personal accidents insurance, and was extended in 1946 to include motor and other 
new insurance types. The Industrial Assurance Act 1923 restricted the transaction of 
industrial life insurance to a limited number of companies. Between 1946 and 1982, 
various Acts have adjusted or consolidated previous legislation rather than introduced 
radical change21
Summary
The provision of insurance products in the UK has a long history stretching back into 
the 16th Century. However, it was not until the mid 19th Century that it became a 
major industry. Growing collaboration between insurers, due to the increasing range 
of risks being underwritten, led to the formation of tariff or cartel systems in the early 
19th Century These systems remained in place until they were gradually abandoned in 
the 1960s and 1970s, although the last continued to operate until 1984
Competition started to increase with the abandonment of the tariff system and the 
entry of unit trust companies into the long term market. However, prior to the 1980s 23
23 T he Insurance Com panies Act 1958 amended requirem ents for accounting and auditing while the 
C om panies Act 1967 increased solvency requirements. The Insurance Companies Act 1974 
consolidated earlier legislation (D ickson and Steele 1984).
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long standing inter-company relationships, strong professional and trade bodies and 
deeply rooted industry practices limited the impact of these changes (see also Knights 
and Wilmott 1993 and Diacon and Ennew 1996). A director of GRE, commented that 
the insurers would avoid making “unfriendly or hostile” competitive moves towards 
each other as “it wasn’t the done thing!” With little radical change in regulation, the 
environment faced by the insurers prior to the 1980s was passive
The power of such industry groupings was significant even in the 1980s. For example 
when Scottish Equitable raised its commission rates for its agents, the Association of 
Scottish Life Offices expelled the insurer and the chief executive was forced to resign.
The Insurance Market in the 1980s and 1990s - Political, Economic 
and Social Factors.
During the last two decades, the UK insurance market has grown dramatically. 
Between 1980 and 1996, in terms of premium income, the long term market grew by 
657%, and the general insurance market by 347% (see Figure 4 2c) (in real terms, 
250% and 105% respectively - see Figure 4 2d). This section looks at the pattern and 
causes of that growth.
There is a direct relationship between the demand for insurance and national 
prosperity (Diacon and Carter 1992). As national income rises individuals engage in 
more activities and acquire more property (e g larger houses or cars) Firms increase 
capital expenditure and production Consequently, the overall demand for general 
insurance increases At the same time individuals are able to save more and invest in
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financial products such as long term insurance. Hence, an increase in the economic 
performance of a country will produce a proportionate increase in the demand for 
insurance (ibid).
There is also a direct relationship between demand and demographics (Diacon and 
Carter 1992). The larger the population the greater the insurable activity and the 
greater the demand for financial products such as pensions. This was particularly 
apparent during the 1980s and 1990s as the 1960s baby boomers reached adulthood, 
bought houses and other property and made provision for retirement. Figure 4 2a 
indicates that the number of people in the UK between the ages of 30 and 60, the 
group most likely to require insurance products, grew throughout most o f the 1980s 
and 1990s, reaching a growth rate of over 2% between 1988 and 199224.
Adjusting, or ‘de-trending’ the general insurance net premium income in real terms, 
for the effects of UK economic performance and population changes, reveals that 
these two factors were the primary drivers for the growth between 1980 and 1996 (see 
Figure 4.2e)25. De-trending the time series o f long term premium income reveals that 
demand for long term insurance was also influenced by a range of other factors (see 
Figure 4 2e and Figure 4.3). These include changes in government regulation, 
taxation, and interest rates and in the level o f consumer confidence
24 The post war and 1960s baby booms were follow ed by a period o f low b irth  rate. T h is fall has led to 
concern regarding future funding of existing state and  personal pension schemes and has been termed 
the pensions time bomb.
25 Multiple regression analysis o f the demand tim e series against the population and G D P growth gives 
R2 values o f  95%  for general insurance and 91%  for long term insurance.
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a. Total change in real ( il)!’ and population between the age of 30 and 60.
b. Building society average rate o f interest and index o f  consumer confidence
c. la n g  term insurance l JK net premium income anti general insurance net 
written premiums.
d. Real l JK net premium income - long term and general insurance 
(i.c. corrected for inllation by referencing to 1983 prices)
e. IX*- trended real premium income
(i.e. corrected for growth in (»1)1* and population by referencing to 1983)
Bawd on data from ABI (1993 and 1998) and Bank of America
Figure 4.2 -  Economic Indicator?! and UK Insurance Premiums
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Between 1980 and 1996 there was a series of major changes in legislation which had a 
significant effect on demand for long term insurance In 1984, the Finance Act 
removed tax relief on premium payments for new life policies26 Although pre budget 
speculation led to a short-term increase in demand, the effect of the change was to 
reduce the attractiveness of life insurance as a form of savings (Cockerell and Green 
1994) However, the continuing boom in the UK housing market and with it the 
requirement for life insurance linked to endowment mortgages, ensured continued 
growth in premium levels (ibid) (see Figure 4.3).
Perhaps the most significant changes in legislation occurred in 1986 and 1987. The 
Social Security Act 1986 and the Finance Act 1987 were both designed to encourage 
people to make provision for their own pensions (Diacon and Carter 1992). These 
Acts made two major changes Firstly they allowed people to contract out of SERPS 
(the state earnings related pension scheme) and replace it with either a personal 
pension plan or an employers occupational scheme. Secondly, they allowed 
employees in company pension schemes to switch to other company schemes or to 
personal pension plans The insurers responded by introducing and aggressively 
marketing a wide range of new pension products. Although delayed by the effects of 
the stock market crash of 1987, the result was a rapid growth in premium levels in the 
period 1989 to 1991 (see Figure 4.3).
Declining interest rates, low consumer confidence and further tax changes gave added 
stimulus to the boom in long term sales in the early 1990s. Interest rates fell from their 
1980s level of around 10% to just over 5% between 1990 and 1993 (see Figure 4 2b)
26 Although tax reliefs remain on the proceeds o f qualifying policies and on pension policies.
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Traditional savings accounts in building societies and other financial institutions 
ceased to be as attractive and many savers sought more tax efficient savings vehicles 
such as pensions, life insurance, unit trusts and personal equity plans - thereby 
increasing the insurers share of the UK savings market.
Low consumer confidence from 1989 onwards (see Figure 4.2b) led to a reduction in 
consumer spending and an increase in the propensity of the UK population to save. 
The ratio of savings to consumer spending in the UK rose from 5.6% to 11.5% 
between 1989 and 1992 - again leading to an increased demand for long term 
insurance products.
Figure 4.3 -  Macro Influences on Long Term Insurance UK Premiums 
(‘D e -T rcndcd  Real Net U K  Prem ium s)
The low level of consumer confidence also had a significant effect on the levels of 
new yearly and single payment premiums (see Figure 4.4). In particular, financial
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insecurity made consumers increasingly reluctant to commit to long term policies and 
instead stimulated sales o f single premium products27.
The dramatic growth of the previous decade came to an end in 1993 as interest rates 
stabilised and the housing market slumped In addition, following the publication in 
1993 of a KPMG Peat Marwick report on pension transfers, the Securities and 
Investment Board (SIB) launched a series of investigations into the selling of personal 
pensions since 1988 The result has been an increasing number of highly publicised 
cases o f ‘mis-selling’, although opinions vary on the culpability of pension providers 
and the extent o f ‘mis-selling’. Irrespective of the blame, the episode has reduced the 
public’s confidence in the long term insurance providers and given a boost to the non­
insurance providers of savings products (ABI 1998b) (see Figure 4 3 and 4 4)
Year
Source: ABI (1993 and 1998)
Figure 4.4 — Fong Term Insurance -  New UK Premiums
27 Sec annual reports of all 9 o f  our sample between 1992 and 1994.
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A further cause of the slow down, in the view of many of the insurers, was the 
introduction in early 1995 of legislation requiring savings product providers to clearly 
disclose the expenses and commission linked to each product. It is argued that these 
requirements have increased the administration associated with each sale and hence 
have reduced the effectiveness of the sales process This resulted in a reduction in new 
premium income in 1994, while they were gearing up for the change, and again in 
199528.
Summary
Both the long term and general insurance markets showed considerable growth in the 
1980s and 1990s. Demographic and economic growth over the period contributed 
significantly to this growth, particularly that of the general insurance market The long 
term market has been highly turbulent, buffeted by a string of legislative and fiscal 
changes and regulatory issues.
The combination of high growth and significant macro environmental turbulence has 
placed considerable pressure on the established firms. They are faced with the 
problem o f responding to environmental shocks while at the same time trying to cope 
with new competitors attracted by the high levels of growth These pressures have 
been amplified by radical changes in the competitive landscape of the industry during 
the 1980s and 1990s.
"  See Prudential accounts 1995
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The Changing Competitive Landscape in the 1980s and 1990s
Over the 1980s and 1990s, the competitive landscape faced by the UK insurers has 
changed from being passive, even protective, to being intensely competitive and 
hostile. This change was the result of ‘deregulation’, the emergence of new 
competitors and changes in working practices resulting from advances in information 
technology However, many insurers were slow to recognise what was happening as 
the effect of these factors was obscured by the macro influences discussed above and 
by a growing investment income (see Table 4.1). The periodic rise and fall of general 
insurance profits, known as the insurance cycle (see below), further masked their 
impact on firm profitability This section looks at how the industry structure 
developed over the 1980s and 1990s.
£bn 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
General 25 25 27 30 34 33 32 31
Long T erm 36 40 47 52 55 53 56 67
Total Premiums 61 65 74 82 89 86 88 98
Invested Funds 333 309 363 431 541 546 643 690
Investment Income 19 20 23 25 26 27 34 38
Source: Association o f  British In su rers
Table 4.1 -  The UK Insurance Industry -  Worldwide Net Premiums and 
Investments (1990-1996)
Falling Entry Barriers and New Entrants
Until the 1980s, the insurance industry operated within a framework of government 
regulations and industry practices that effectively protected it from outside 
competition Regulation had changed little since the late 19Ul and early 20lh Centuries
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Competition began to increase in the 1970s with the entrance into the insurers 
traditional market of unit trust companies and the ending of the tariff system. 
However, rivalry between firms was still relatively subdued Consequently, the 
fundamental changes seen elsewhere in the UK economy in the late 1970s and early 
1980s were not initially replicated in the UK insurance industry
While there were earlier signs that change was coming, it was the Financial Services, 
Social Security and Building Societies Acts of 1986 that really signalled the end of 
this passive environment This series of legislation, although described as ‘de­
regulation’, re-regulated the financial services industry (Pettigrew and Whipp 1991). 
The effect was to remove many of the barriers to entry for non-UK companies and 
non-financial services firms, as well as allowing established financial services firms to 
expand into parallel sectors. The insurance industry was initially generally dismissive 
of the implications of the new Acts, feeling that any new entrant would lack the 
infrastructure and insurance expertise to be a serious threat.
The industry was also initially dismissive of Direct Line, a subsidiary of The Royal 
Bank of Scotland, formed in 198529. Based on the then innovative concept of selling 
general insurance via the telephone, Direct Line side-stepped the need for the large 
chain o f brokers or sales force that traditional insurers had thought essential to 
marketing and servicing insurance products. The increasing acceptance by customers 
of telephone-based distribution (see Figure 4.6) and the failure of many insurers to 
respond until the early and mid 1990s resulted in the dramatic growth of Direct Line 
By 1995, the company was the largest motor insurer in the UK
29 Interview with ex-director o f  Prudential and a director o f  GRE.
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The growth of direct distribution increased the pressure on brokers and other 
intermediaries, a group traditionally viewed as the customer by the insurers. The 
larger of these intermediaries increased the pressure on the insurers to provide more 
attractive products and pricing and in some cases began to offer their own insurance 
products In addition, early attempts by the insurers to counter Direct Line’s success 
by selling insurance directly via car manufacturers or by establishing telephone based 
operations themselves were fiercely resisted by the major brokers30.
The recognition that customers would accept new distribution channels combined with 
the realisation that insurance expertise could be acquired, often via joint ventures with 
the traditional insurers, had by the mid 1990s, removed any remaining barrier to entry 
By 1996 new entrants in the form of banks and building societies (‘bancassurers’), 
global brands (e g Virgin) and even the multiple chain food retailers had entered the 
market for both general and long term products (see Figure 4.5 and 4.6). The result of 
this growth in competition was to put pressure on premium rates and therefore 
income
30 Interviews with two group directors o f  GRE
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Source: A B I (1998)
Figure 4.5 -  Market Penetration by Foreign Insurers and Bancassurers 
(Long Term Insurance)
Market
Share
(%)
Year
Source: ABI (1998)
Figure 4.6 - Market Penetration of Foreign Insurers and Direct Distribution
(General Insurance)
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Rising Claims and the Insurance Cycle
On the general insurance side rising claims produced a worrying trend for the insurers 
The level of liability awards and the size of claims following natural or man-made 
disasters had continued to grow. With competition restricting premium rates, the 
impact of any error in a firm's underwriting became far more significant
The financial performance of the industry was also significantly affected by the 
insurance cycle (see Figure 4.7). The insurance cycle or underwriting cycle is the 
tendency for general insurance premiums, insurer's profits and the availability of 
coverage to rise and fall with some regularity over time (Rubin 1995). The cycle starts 
when premium prices rise sharply after a period of underwriting losses. These higher 
prices bring increased profits, which in turn attract more capital and hence raise the 
industry’s underwriting capacity Insurers compete to fill this capacity, driving prices 
down, eventually leading to losses before a new cycle starts Cycle periods are 
between 5 and 10 years, although they vary between countries and types of insurance 
(see Lamm-Tennant and Weiss 1997).
During the 1980s and 1990s, lows in the insurance cycle occurred in 1984/85 and 
1990/91 with highs in 1988 and 1994/95 (see Figure 4 7) The bottom of the insurance 
cycle in 1990/91 was far deeper than in the past due to the rising level of claims, 
pressure on premium prices and the coincidence of a dip in UK economic 
performance In 1991 claims and costs exceeded premiums by 34% and in 1992 by 
18% (Economist 1992) The resulting slump in the financial performance of our 
sample is clearly demonstrated in Figure 4 8 General insurance profits improved
133
Chapter 4 -  The UK Insurance Industry
between 1992 and 1995 as prices were increased and risk profiles reduced after the 
slump. Profit levels started to decline again in 1996.
Figure 4.7 -  General Insurance Underwriting and Investment Performance
The Response of the Insurers
We can conclude that at the beginning of the 1990s the UK insurance industry was 
facing a new competitive landscape and challenges to its traditional practices and 
structures. However, as our interviewees identified, most of the insurers were slow to 
recognise what was happening and respond. A director of Prudential in the 1980s and 
early 1990s, described the insurers as being “frozen in time” and “believed the 
industry to be in a solid state where there were no great threats”. The 1990s have seen 
the insurers struggling to adapt as they finally began to confront their changed 
environment. Significant actions were, in some cases, further delayed by the slump in 
performance in 1990/91
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"♦"GRE Sun Alliance ~ à ~  Royal Insurance Eagle Star Norwich Union
—•“ Commercial Union (ieneral Accident ______•  Prudential_______ - 4-  I-egal &  General
Note: Each com pany’s profit figures have been indexed to 1986 to provide a  comparative view o f the 
organisation's financial performance. It should be noted that, in the case o f  long term insurance, stated 
profit figures are an allocated share o f  the bonuses declared each year and hence should be treated with 
caution. The profit value for Norwich Union’s long term insurance activities has been estimated using 
its premium values and an average profit margin for the long term activities o f  the other eight firms.
Figure 4.8 -  Financial Performance of the Sample
The response when it came was to cut costs31 while at the same time attempting to 
diversify geographically (see Figure 4.9). The rise o f direct distribution both for long 
term and general products required the insurers to enter new distribution channels and 
to learn new skills and create systems that focused on the end customer rather than on 
the intermediary32.
31 Hetween 1991 and 1996 the num ber o f people employed in the UK insurance industry fell from 
246,000 to 200,000.
Interview with a director o f  GRE
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Source: A BI (1993 and  1998)
Figure 4.9 -  Overseas Real Net Premium Income of UK Insurers
The continued expansion of the role played by information technology has had a 
dramatic effect on traditional working practices. The computerisation of claims 
handling and policy servicing has enabled significant cost cutting via a reduction in 
staff levels as well as improving customer service
From the early 1990s there was a growing desire to achieve ‘critical mass’ to gain 
economies of scale and ensure access to funds This has generated increasing 
speculation that there would be industry consolidation via take-overs and mergers 
This speculation proved correct with the merger in 1996 of two of the UK’s largest 
insurance firms, Royal Insurance and Sun Alliance. Others have subsequently 
followed this move33 The desire to gain critical mass has also led to an increasing 
number of mutual companies opting to become publicly quoted, either by merger with
33 General Accident and Commercial Union merged in 1998.
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other insurers (e g. Scottish Amicable) or by becoming an independent proprietary 
insurer (e g. Norwich Union).
Towards the end of the study period continual escalation of the definition of critical 
mass shifted from a national to a global scale However, a comparison of the relative 
sizes of the UK’s largest insurers and of the major foreign players suggests that the 
UK insurers were at a disadvantage in terms of size (see Table 4.2). By 1996, such 
global foreign insurers were emerging as potential predators in the UK takeover 
market34.
Source: FT  (1997)
Table 4.2 -  The World’s and The UK’s Largest Insurance Companies
u  In 1998/99, Zurich acquired BA T’s financial services operations, including Eagle Star and Axa 
acquired GRE.
55 Norwich Union was a mutual com pany until 1997 and hence not quoted on the stock exchange 
16 In 19%  Eagle Star was a subsidiary o f  BAT and not quoted separately
137
Chapter 4 -  The UK Insurance Industry
Summary
The structure of the UK insurance market has been severely disrupted Traditional 
barriers to entry provided by government regulation, access to distribution channels 
and technical know-how have been eliminated or side-stepped. This has allowed more 
innovative and/or deep-pocketed new competitors to enter the market
The rise of direct distribution increased customer power. Intermediaries responded by 
increasing the pressure on the insurers to provide larger discounts. With greater choice 
of distribution and more providers, the customer was able to more easily compare 
prices and switch between insurers.
In long term insurance, the increasing availability of alternative savings products and 
the reduction of the tax advantages favouring the traditional products has eroded the 
boundary between the long term insurance market and the wider financial services and 
personal savings sectors. This has dramatically widened the range and diversity of 
competing firms.
With its traditions of stability and co-operation, the insurers have been slow to 
recognise the changing nature of their industry. The impact of this industry change has 
also been obscured by rapidly growing investment income and the periodic 
fluctuations of performance that have been a feature of the industry. However, the 
insurers have now begun to respond and rivalry between firms has grown. Reactions 
have typically focused on international expansion and on increasing efficiency While 
initially attempts to become more efficient focused on staff and branch cuts, more
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recently the emphasis has switched to trying to gain critical mass to gain economies of 
scale via mergers and acquisitions.
A Hypercompetitive Environment?
Over the last three decades, several management researchers have contrasted stable 
and turbulent environments Each has defined the degree of turbulence in relation to a 
number of environmental dimensions.
Emery and Trist (1965) suggest that a turbulent environment is characterised by a high 
degree of change and a high level of interconnectedness between the environment and 
the firm Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) define the environment in terms of the diversity 
and interconnectedness of factors influencing the firm and the degree to which these 
factors can be perceived and predicted.
Khandwalla (1977) provides a more extensive list of dimensions, arguing that an 
environment is turbulent if it is dynamic, unpredictable, fluctuating and expanding 
Ansofif and McDonnell (1990) highlight the changeability and predictability of the 
environment Changeability is defined in terms of the complexity of the environment 
and the novelty of the challenges faced by the firm, while predictability by the rapidity 
of change and the “visibility of the future” (ibid)
Volberda (1998), echoing these earlier writers, develops a ‘scorecard’ of turbulence 
based on dynamism, complexity and unpredictability. Dynamism is defined in terms 
of the intensity and frequency of change. The number and diversity of factors driving
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change and the interrelatedness of such factors determine complexity. Unpredictability 
is assessed in terms of the availability of data concerning future developments, the 
degree to which current trends are identifiable and the extent to which the future can 
be extrapolated from past trends. Volberda suggests that all three dimensions should 
be considered simultaneously.
The application of Volberda’s (1998) approach to the analysis of the environment 
faced by the UK insurance firms in the 1990s is illuminating
As we have seen, prior to 1980, the competitive environment faced by the UK insurers 
was relatively stable, but during the 1980s and 1990s it became increasingly dynamic 
as the intensity and frequency of change grew
With the advent of new competitors and products, new regulation and the 
development of new distribution methods the number and diversity of factors the 
insurers have to consider has grown significantly These factors have become 
increasingly interrelated as the distinction between product types has continued to 
blur, particularly in the case of long term insurance Hence, the level of complexity of 
the environment has increased
As we saw in our analysis of the macro influences on the insurance industry, demand 
for insurance was partly determined by factors for which forecasts can be made 
However, the demand for long term insurance has also been shaped by a number of 
other factors whose effects, particularly in combination, are far less predictable. On 
the general insurance side, while demand has remained predictable, the level of claims
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was highly unpredictable, influenced as it is by single events, for instance the 
hurricane of 1987, the severe storms and flooding of 1990 and terrorist activity (e g. 
1992, 1993 and 1996).
Prior to the 1980s the insurers were highly connected and well known to each other. 
Industry and internal firm information was widely shared among competitors'7 and 
competitive moves were well signalled and predictable. The unpredictability of the 
competitive environment had increased greatly by the 1990s. However, the growing 
rivalry between traditional firms reduced the amount of information that was shared, 
while new entrants often had new and different business practices and did not follow 
established industry norms.
The competitive environment faced by the UK insurance industry has therefore moved 
over the 1980s and 1990s from being one of stability, to being one of considerable 
turbulence, scoring highly on all three of Volberda’s (1998) dimensions. Volberda 
(1998), following D’Aveni (1994), describes such intense turbulence as 
hypercompetition
D’Aveni (1994) defines a hypercompetitive environment as being in a market in a 
constant state of disequilibrium or turmoil, where competition is intense and 
‘competitive advantages are not sustainable for long’. He argues that in such an 
environment the traditional sources of competitive advantage -  cost and quality, 
timing and know-how, barriers to entry and deep pockets -  are quickly eroded or 
bypassed. This description closely fits the UK insurance industry in the 1990s. As we
1 Interview with a group director of Prudential
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have seen, previous advantages based on underwriting and actuarial know-how and 
barriers to entry resulting from regulation and access to distribution have disappeared 
The advantage of deep pockets has also been curtailed as larger, deeper pocketed 
banks and foreign insurers have entered the market. The cost and quality of products 
or the speed of introduction of new variants can only provide short-term advantage 
before imitation occurs38.
Despite this manifestly hostile environment, some of the major UK insurers such as 
Prudential, General Accident and Commercial Union have increased their market 
share of new premium income in the long term sector over the 1990s39 (see Figure 
4 10). However, for others, Legal & General, Norwich Union, Royal Insurance and 
GRE market share has declined (see Figure 4.10). In the general insurance sector, the 
market share of General Accident and Commercial Union has also increased'411 The 
differential performance of the firms in our sample indicates that some coped more 
effectively with the increasingly hypercompetitive environment than others
According to D’Aveni (1994) successful firms in hypercompetitive environments will 
be those that can string together temporary competitive advantages Leading firms will 
constantly attempt to disrupt their market by rapidly adopting new strategies and 
forcing their competitors to respond These firms will move on quickly as each 
advantage becomes unsustainable This view closely match’s Schumpeter’s (1934)
‘*A group director o f GRE, pointed out that the advantage stemming from new product variations lasts 
until the next visit of a salesman from a rival insurer
39 In the early 1990s troth analysts and the stock market has tended to value life insurance more highly 
than general insurance Consequently, insurers have looked to increase their life insurance activity 
(Cockerell and Green 1994)
"  Prudential consciously reduced its general insurance activity a lte r 1990 (Interview with an ex. CEO, 
o f  Prudential).
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concept of ‘creative destruction’ and the thinking of the Austrian school of economics 
(Hayek 1949 and Jacobson 1992).
Figure 4.10 -  Market Share of New Long Term Premium Income41
The Austrian school contends that firms earn profits through entrepreneurial discovery 
and innovative strategies. However, competitors will move to imitate new strategies 
and hence above average profits will be only temporary (Jacobson 1992). This 
dynamic view of competition suggests that firms who attempt purely to maintain their 
present position will be doomed, while high performing firms will be those who can 
recognise and effectively exploit temporary advantages as they occur. As Jacobson 
(1992) suggests, lead time is more important than erecting competitive barriers. 
Kanter et al (1992) and Volberda (1998) make a similar point, arguing that firms must 41
41 New premium income has been calculated by taking 100% o f new yearly premiums and 10% o f new 
single premiums. This m easure is know as Annual Premium Equivalent and is the industry standard 
measure.
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be flexible in order to respond in a timely manner to the wide variety of changes in the 
competitive environment.
The ability of Prudential, General Accident and Commercial Union to respond more 
effectively to the hypercompetitive environment they faced suggests that they were 
able to exploit temporary advantages. We would expect these firms to be quicker at 
introducing new strategies, which would then be imitated by others. So, is there 
evidence to support this proposition? It is this issue that we will explore in our next 
chapter where we describe the results of the mapping and analysis phase of our study
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Chapter 5
Patterns of Strategy in the UK Insurance Industry 
Introduction
This chapter describes the strategic initiatives realised by our sample of nine insurance 
firms between 1990 and 1996. The results of our mapping and statistical analysis (as 
outlined in chapter 3) are considered and a number of consistent early and late 
adopters of strategic initiatives identified.
The chapter is divided into nine sections After this brief introduction, the second 
section compares the models of strategic change that appear within previous academic 
writing on insurance companies The third section describes the ‘in firm’ patterns of 
strategy initiatives for each of the nine firms in our sample The fourth part discusses 
these observed patterns and compares them with those detailed in the previous 
literature on the industry In section five the focus switches to the cross industry 
patterns of strategy observed, while section six describes the results of the cross 
correlation analysis and highlights the support provided by our interviews Section 
seven uses the time varying cross correlation analysis and the interview data to 
demonstrate how the speed with which two of the insurers adopted new strategic 
initiatives, their strategic agility, the speed at which they adopted new strategies, 
varied over time. The penultimate section draws on the innovation diffusion literature 
described in Chapter 2 to discuss the findings The final section is a short summary of 
the chapter
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Previous Research and Contrasting Models of Change
As we saw in Chapter 4, the last decade witnessed the UK’s traditional insurers being 
forced to respond to an increasingly turbulent business environment. However, despite 
the severity o f the turbulence and the presence of several research groups that focused 
on the industry (e g Nottingham’s CRIS1 and Edinburgh’s CFMR2) there has been 
little management research into the strategic response of the insurance companies 
Hardwick (1994 and 1997) highlights this point in his study of the cost efficiency of 
UK insurers, expressing surprise at the lack of research on the strategic and 
organisational issues that affect the UK’s financial services sector and the insurance 
industry in particular.
Database searches of Lexis Nexis, ABI/Inform and BIDS confirm this lack of 
academic research. A key word search of the BIDS database indicates that the 
emphasis to date has been on financial (e g Armitage and Kirk 1994) and macro 
economic issues (e g. Dimson and Marsh 1997 and Hardwick 1997) and to a lesser 
extent on marketing and sales (e g. Fletcher and Wright 1997 and Stone et al 1997). A 
search of the BIDS database for the period 1986 to 1999 shows that of the 7500 
articles1 that mention insurance in their title or abstract only 37 relate to the strategies 
pursued by insurers
1 Centre for Risk and Insurance Studies 
; Centre for Financial M arkets Research
5 The figures for the search o f  the BIDs database are used here, as its coverage is more restricted to 
academic journals ABI/Inform and Lexis-Nexis provide a greater num ber o f aniclcs however in both 
cases this literature is sourced from newspapers and trade journals
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In Chapter 2 we contrasted static and dynamic views of strategy content and argued 
that a static or stable equilibrium perspective heavily dominated research in this area 
While this bias is replicated within the work that focuses on the insurance industry 
there are a small number of studies that recognise strategic change This more 
dynamic work can be further categorised as research which adopts a punctuated 
equilibrium model of change and that which assumes continuous change (see Chapter 
2 and Figure 2.1, also see Weick and Quinn 1999).
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1993 and 1995) describe an empirical study of strategic 
groups in the US insurance industry between 1970 and 1984. As we discussed in 
Chapter 2, this study attempts to define strategic groups during periods of stability and 
then investigate changes in group composition and strategy between stable periods 
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1993) hypothesise that within each strategic group there 
will be a high level of consistency in strategic direction and that the group which is 
able to change its strategic variables most during transition periods will be the highest 
performing. Using a cluster analysis they identify three stable strategic groups -  
diversified (composite), focused life (or long term) insurance and focused personal 
lines (or personal general) insurance. Regression and correlation tests are then used to 
demonstrate that the diversified group undertook the highest number of strategic 
changes and performed better than the other two strategic groups.
Grundy (1993 and 1995) infers a similar punctuated equilibrium model in his study of 
strategic change within a division of Prudential Effective strategic change is 
envisaged emerging from a rational and linear planning phase followed by a short and
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sharp period of change. Grundy (1993) cautions that piecemeal and incremental 
change is likely to falter
The model of change proposed by Grundy and Fiegenbaum and Thomas suggests that 
in mapping the strategies of our nine UK insurance companies over time we should 
observe periods of stability during which the size and geographic and product scope of 
the firm change little or remain the same These periods will be interrupted by periods 
of major change during which there are numerous strategy initiatives Romanelli and 
Tushman (1994) indicate that transition periods are usually completed within a two 
year period, although describe outlier companies where the period was as high as four 
to five years.
Tushman and Romanelli (1985) and Sastry (1997) suggest that as the environment 
changes, the strategic orientation that the firm requires to maximise performance will 
also change. However, inertia or resistance to change will impede the firm from 
making all but minor and incremental change to achieve a greater consistency between 
internal activities and the strategic orientation (Tushman and Romanelli 1985). As the 
competitive environment continues to change the ‘required strategic orientation' 
increasingly differs from the actual strategic orientation of the firm and the pressure 
for radical change grows. Eventually, this pressure overcomes the inertia and the 
organisation re-orientates in an attempt to regain fit with the environment (Sastry 
1997).
An alternative model of strategic change in the insurance industry is provided by both 
Knight and colleagues (Knights and Murray 1992, Knights et al 1993 and Knights and
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Morgan 1995) and by Pettigrew and Whipp (1991). For these researchers, an 
organisation’s strategy is in a state of constant flux due to the constantly changing 
influence of the internal and external environment
Knights and colleagues provide an overview of strategy in the UK insurance industry 
and describe a case study of a small long term insurance firm in the south east of 
England between 1986 and 1990. They suggest that the UK financial services sector 
was slow in adopting the ‘discourse and practices of strategic management’. These 
methods finally began to be utilised during the 1980s However, Knights and Morgan 
(1995) show that the strategic commitments generated by these practices were often 
quickly abandoned to meet short term sales targets or the demands of politically 
influential managers or departments (Knights and Morgan 1995). Consequently, 
strategic initiatives were often panicky and reactive with no clear underlying pattern
Knights and Morgan (1995) suggest that the development of strategic management 
was uneven across the UK insurance industry While some firms acted in a similar 
manner to their case study company, others were more committed to the strategic 
management approach and hence were more consistent in their actions Consequently, 
within our study we would expect to observe a variety of patterns of strategy ranging 
from stability to discontinuous random change
Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) provide an alternative view of strategic change in 
Prudential which is in marked contrast to that of Grundy’s (1993) This detailed case 
study of the company in the 1970s and 1980s formed part of a wider study of strategic 
change in UK companies (see Chapter 2) Based on their research findings, the
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authors argue that ‘fundamental changes are less achieved through revolutionary 
upheavals than along an opposite path; one of long term, cumulative progressive 
synthesis’ (Pettigrew and Whipp 1991). An organisation will attempt to continually 
adjust its strategy both as the demands of the environment change and as the interplay 
between the internal and external context of the firm evolves.
Thus, in the face of the apparent hyperturbulent environment of the 1990s, Pettigrew 
and Whipp’s research suggest that the pattern of strategic initiatives implemented by 
our nine insurance firms should be one of constant flux
We are therefore presented with two models of change by the insurance industry 
literature, which imply differing patterns of strategic change over time On the one 
hand, a punctuated equilibrium model as proposed by Fiegenbaum and Thomas ( 1993) 
and Grundy (1993) suggests a pattern of stability interrupted by short periods of 
dramatic change On the other, the work of Knights and colleagues and Pettigrew and 
Whipp (1991) indicate that our mapping should show patterns of constant change 
throughout the study period
Figure 5.1 contrasts these two predicted patterns with the horizontal bars representing 
strategic initiatives plotted against time for a single company. Each of the vertical ‘bar 
codes’ represents a schematic ‘event history’ of the strategic initiatives a firm may 
implement over time Each event is represented by a single horizontal bar, with 
different shading indicating different types of strategy As the figure shows for the 
punctuated equilibrium model we would expect to observe marked changes in the 
frequency with which strategy changes occur, with observable periods of considerable
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activity interspersed by more stable periods In contrast the continuous change model 
predicts that the frequency of change will be reasonable consistent through out the 
sample time-period.
Punctuated Continuous
Equilibrium Change
Model Model
Nolc: The two models show schematic cvcnl histories for two patterns o f change. The horizontal bars 
indicate the tim ing o f  individual strategic initiatives for a single company and different shading 
different types o f  initiative. For the punctuated equilibrium model, on the left, the firm is expected to 
pass through periods during which considerable strategic activity occurs -  transition periods These 
periods arc interspersed by stable periods during which the frequency o f  strategic activity is lower. For 
the continuous change model, on the right, marked changes in the frequency o f  strategic changes do not 
occur.
Figure 5.1 -  Alternative Patterns of Change
In the following section we will describe and map -  in a similar manner to figure 5.1 
(see Figures 5 2 to 5.10) - the strategy initiatives implemented by each of the nine 
firms in our sample and determine which of these two patterns more accurately 
describes the sequences observed.
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The Strategic Initiatives of the Sampled Firms
Prudential
Prudential is the largest insurance company within the UK and is ranked among the 
world’s top 10 insures Prudential is a publicly quoted company and provides both 
long term and general insurance, with general insurance accounting for 17% of annual 
premiums in 1990. It was founded in 1848 as an ‘ordinary’ life insurer, however, in 
1854, it began to provide industrial life insurance and it was through this activity that 
the company gained prominence. The company continued to sell ‘ordinary’ long-term 
products and since the 1950s, ‘ordinary’ business has been the larger contributor to 
premium income.
The 1980s saw Prudential undertake a series of expansionary moves both in terms of 
product diversification and geographic expansion. These initiatives included the 
acquisition of its US subsidiary, moves into Western Europe; and the establishment of 
an estate agency chain of over 800 offices. However, the property market slump from 
1989 onwards brought into question the value of the estate agency chain.
The 1990s opened with the appointment of a new group CEO, Mick Newmarch, with 
Brian Corby, the previous incumbent, taking over as chairman. After initial moves to 
rationalise the company’s investment division (PPM), the focus of attention shifted to 
the estate agency chain. An initial decision to close around 20% of the estate agency 
branches in mid 1990 was followed by an announcement at the end o f that year that 
the remaining offices were to be sold. 1990 also witnessed the beginning of a major
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restructuring of the company’s direct sales force to shift the emphasis away from door 
to door selling and cash collection towards sales through financial advisers and 
premium payment via direct debit
While downsizing was evident during 1991 and at the beginning of 1992, in general a 
more strategic approach was taken by retreating, or downscoping, from what the 
company perceived to be non-core activity. Its general insurance operations, broker 
business and commercial lines were cut back significantly. There was also a shift 
away from European expansion towards regional growth in the USA and expansion in 
South East Asia
The move away from door to door sales and cash collection, and expansion in the 
USA and South East Asia continued in 1993 and 1994
At the beginning of 1995, Newmarch resigned following continued disagreement with 
the industry regulatory authority, and was replaced as CEO by Peter Davis. Shortly 
afterwards, the group was restructured to a geographic divisional arrangement to 
emphasise the importance of the US and Asian operations. In 1996, plans were 
announced to set up telephone banking and mortgage operation by the end of the year 
To date this move has proved highly successful (Times 21sl July 1999).
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Norwich Union
Norwich Union is unique among the sample in that it is a mutual company, i.e owned 
by its policyholders In addition, it also differs in that its Chief Executive, Alan 
Bridgewater, occupied that position throughout our study period.
Norwich Union was formed in 1797 as a fire office A life company selling ordinary 
life assurance was formed in 1808. The fire office was briefly a subsidiary of Phoenix 
between 1919 and 1925, before it was recombined with the life office. In 1990, 
general insurance business accounted for 31% of premium income.
Unlike the Prudential, Norwich Union continued the expansion of the 1980s into 
1990, with developments in Europe and the establishment of a direct sales force for its 
life and pensions operation and of Norwich Union healthcare insurance. This 
expansionary period extended into 1991, with the setting up of a second “dual 
headquarters in Sheffield, in addition to the existing Norwich base However, there is 
evidence of a dramatic change towards the end of 1991, with the first phase of a series 
of redundancies and other cost cutting actions taking place These actions continued 
through to the start of 1995.
In 1994, the industry regulator fined Norwich Union for ‘miss-selling’ pension 
products and the company suspended its entire life and pensions sales staff for 
retraining Shortly after this action, the general manager of life and pensions was 
replaced and the direct sales force was halved and restructured.
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The beginning of 1995 saw the establishment of a telephone direct selling joint 
venture with Virgin, which operated until the end of the year Norwich Union 
subsequently established its own direct operation at the beginning of 1996.
Towards the end of 1995, the company announced that it was considering abandoning 
its mutual status by flotation on the stock exchange This ‘demutualisation’ occurred 
in 1997.
Eagle Star
Eagle Star provides an example of a third type of ownership, being part of the UK 
conglomerate BAT The company was formed in 1904 as British Dominions After a 
series of amalgamations, including the Eagle Insurance Company in 1916 and Star 
Life in 1917, the company assumed the name of Eagle Star in 1937. It was acquired 
by BAT in 1983. In 1990, general insurance accounted for 63% of company’s 
premium income BAT also owned Allied Dunbar, another large British insurer. 
However, it was not until the mid 1990s that the conglomerate began to merge Eagle 
Star and Allied Dunbar
The period 1990 to 1996, started with a relatively quiet 18 months, only interrupted by 
the disposal of French and Belgium subsidiaries. However, after a warning of possible 
downsizing, 1991 ended with staff redundancies and the closure of branches. 
Following the resignation of Eagle Star’s Chairman and Chief Executive - Michael 
Butt - the roles of CEO in both Eagle Star and Allied Dunbar were combined and
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Brian Galloway, deputy chairman of BAT, took on the new role as a temporary 
measure.
At the end of 1992 there was further cost cutting with branch closures and downsizing 
in the insurer’s life insurance division. In addition, the company’s Australian 
subsidiary was sold.
In 1993, Allied Dunbar’s chairman, George Greenway, was appointed as CEO of both 
companies. Eagle Star began to expand in South East Asia increasing its presence in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan In Europe, the company disposed of its Dutch unit
Eagle Star’s and Allied Dunbar’s asset management operations were brought together 
at the beginning of 1994 to form Threadneedle Asset Management Meanwhile, within 
Eagle Star, South East Asia operation became a separate division with a managing 
director reporting directly to the Eagle Star/Allied Dunbar CEO. Expansion in South 
East Asia interspersed with consolidation in the UK continued throughout the 
remainder of 1994 and into 1995 Towards the end of 1995 BAT took the integration 
of their financial services operations a step further by announcing plans to merge the 
marketing operations of Eagle Star and Allied Dunbar, treating each as a separate 
brand
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Roval Insurance
Royal Insurance was established in Liverpool in 1845. By the early 20th Century, it 
had become the largest general insurer in the UK, although by the 1990s it had 
dropped to third In 1990, general insurance accounted for 77% of premium income
In 1990, Royal Insurance was pursuing a diverse strategic programme that included 
expansion in Europe and consolidation in the USA (including the sale of a subsidiary 
company to General Accident). However, following its first ever trading losses in 
1990 and 1991, UK staff numbers were cut, financial controls tightened and there was 
an attempted withdrawal from the reinsurance market. In September, further cuts in 
staff numbers were announced, together with the restructuring of the life insurance 
division The UK life subsidiary centralised its administration functions and moved 
from a divisional to a functional structure.
In January 1992, Richard Gamble was appointed group CEO - replacing lan Rushton 
who was elevated to the position of vice chairman The early part of the year saw the 
establishment of a European joint venture company, EPIC, with AMB and Fondiara. 
Royal’s subsidiaries in Holland and Spain were then sold to EPIC to ease Royal s 
losses In August, the UK operation was restructured with the transfer of the UK life 
operation. Royal Life, to Royal Insurance Holdings, the parent company However 
overseas life operations remained under Royal Insurance
In the UK, cost cutting in 1992 resulted in some 5% of the company’s staff made 
redundant and the closure of 67 branches from the company’s estate agency division
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Towards the end of the year the Australian general insurance subsidiary was merged 
with Sun Alliance’s Australian operation, to form a joint venture company. This move 
signalled the start of a number o f transactions with Sun Alliance which culminated in 
the two companies merging in 1996.
The cost cutting measures continued into 1993 and the company withdrew from the 
reinsurance market. In October a further deal with Sun Alliance was completed - 
swapping Royal’s New Zealand operation for Sun Alliance’s Canadian business
1994 and the first six months of 1995 were marked by further consolidation through 
downsizing in the general, life and estate agency operations The staff cuts, which 
were driven by the phasing out o f  manual operations by the introduction of IT and the 
redesign of business processes, were predicted by the company to continue for a 
further 2 or 3 years. In addition, an investigation by the regulatory authority brought 
allegations of ‘miss-selling’ and the recall of the company’s entire sales force for 
retraining and re-examination
By the second half of 1995, Royal Insurance’s performance had improved and 
although cost cutting in the UK continued, the company began to expand in South 
East Asia and India In 1996 Royal Insurance merged with Sun Alliance to form 
Royal Sun Alliance
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Sun Alliance
Sun Alliance was created in 1959 through the merger of the Sun Insurance Office the 
Sun Fire Office) and the Alliance Assurance Company A further two mergers with 
London Assurance in 1965 and then the Phoenix in 1984 followed In 1990, Sun 
Alliance was the fifth largest UK insurer by premium income - 74% of this being 
generated from general insurance activities
During the first two years of the study period Sun Alliance moved to create new 
distribution channels through the setting up of a number of joint ventures with other 
financial services companies, e g The Woolwich Building Society At the same time, 
it expanded in Europe and acquired GRE’s New Zealand operation
Whilst 1992 saw continued overseas expansion there was further consolidation in the 
UK. A sequence of downsizing was initiated with some 1200 job losses announced. In 
addition, the company reorganised its operations to shift from a geographic divisional 
to a functional form Although expansionary activity continued to focus on Europe 
with the take over of the Danish firm, Hafnia, there was also increased interest in 
South East Asia. 1993 closed with the exchange of a Sun Alliance Canadian operation 
for Royal Insurance’s New Zealand subsidiary.
163
Ch
ap
te
r 5
 -
 P
at
te
rn
s o
f S
tra
te
gy
 in
 th
e 
UK
 In
su
ra
nc
e 
In
du
str
y
Fi
gu
re
 5
.6
 -
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 S
tra
te
gi
c 
In
iti
at
iv
es
 1
99
0 
to
 1
99
6 
- 
Su
n 
A
lli
an
ce
Chapter 5 -  Patterns o f Strategy in the UK Insurance Industry
In March 1994 Sun Alliance’s group CEO retired and was replaced by Roger Taylor - 
previously a group executive director. 1994 and 1995 saw further expansion in Europe 
and Asia. In addition, the company set up a direct operation, which opened in 1995. 
This expansion was interspersed with efforts to concentrate on core activities in the 
UK, which resulted in further job losses and some branch closure In 1995 Sun 
Alliance again restructured, reverting to a divisional form based on product and 
geographic lines.
The merger with Royal Insurance, which saw the creation of Royal Sun Alliance 
(RSA) took place in 1996.
Guardian Roval Exchange
Guardian Royal Exchange was formed in 1968 when two long established companies 
the Guardian and the Royal Exchange merged As we saw in Chapter 4, Royal 
Exchange had been founded in 1720, while Guardian was established in 1821 In
1990, Guardian Royal Exchange was the 8th largest UK insurer with 72% of its 
premium income being derived from general insurance activities.
In 1990, GRE’s strategic actions continued a drive for international expansion, with 
the integration of the three Italian insurers purchased in 1989, and moves in Asia and 
South East Asia Two of the Italian purchases proved disastrous and were sold in
1991. 1991 also saw GRE withdrawing from New Zealand, Barbados, Kenya and 
Trinidad and Tobago
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1992 opened with the sale of GRE’s Australian operation to Zurich Insurance. In 
return, GRE received shares in Zurich’s Australian operation In the UK, cost cutting 
via cuts in staff numbers was initiated through natural wastage and redundancies.
The following year began with the acquisition of Orion Health Care and the disposal 
of the company’s Spanish subsidiary. In the UK, cost cutting via staff reductions 
continued. A policy of niche expansion in the US was announced and was 
implemented by acquisitions in late 1993 and in 1994.
In February 1994 the Group CEO, Sid Hopkins retired and was replaced by John 
Robins, an appointment from outside the company. In early 1994, GRE established a 
direct telephone sales operation, Guardian Direct. The second half of 1994 was 
dominated by more staff cuts and branch closures in the UK. Outside the UK, and in 
addition to the niche expansion in the USA, GRE expanded in South East Asia
The first half of 1995 was marked by further widespread staff cuts in the UK Staff 
cuts were also made in Germany and US. In June Guardian sold its shareholding in 
Zurich’s Australian operation, thereby completing its exit from the Australian market 
In the second half of 1995, the company’s collaboration with the Nationwide Building 
Society came to an ended. Since the 1980s and until 1994, the Nationwide had acted 
as a tied agent for GRE’s life insurance products After 1994 GRE had assisted the 
building society establish its own life operation GRE reverted to a more expansionary 
mode in the UK during 1996, buying RAC Insurance Brokers and Legal & General’s 
commercial general insurance business.
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Legal & General
Legal & General was established in 1836, initially writing ordinary life insurance only 
but after 1919 general as well. Long term insurance has tended to provide the larger 
share of premium income and in 1990 it attributed for just over 80%.
The 1990s opened with Legal & General continuing to expand into estate agency and 
in the USA, while at the same time seeking to withdraw from the reinsurance market 
However, between 1991 and 1992 the move into estate agency was reversed with the 
disposed of 25% of its branch outlets David Prosser became chief executive, 
replacing the retiring Joe Palmer
1992 marked the start of a period of consolidation in the UK that was to last until 
1995 In particular, the company’s sales channels were restructured to improve 
efficiency and 24 branch offices closed. In addition, Legal & General s information 
systems and services unit was floated as a separate company.
In 1993, a payroll products and services company in Australia was acquired In the 
UK, the Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society terminated its tied agency 
agreement
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Consolidation initiatives continued into 1994 with job cuts, a range of business 
process re-engineering programs and continued refocusing of the company’s 
distribution channels In addition, as the result of an investigation, by the industry 
regulator, into its sales force’s activities between 1991 and 1992, Legal and General 
was fined £180,000. In light of the investigation, the company reduced the size of the 
sales force still further during 1995.
A joint venture with the Woolwich Building Society was establish with general 
insurance products being sold through Woolwich’s high street branches A healthcare 
insurance operation and a direct telephone sales operation were also launched 
Towards the end of the year, expansionary moves in South East Asia were initiated 
with joint ventures being undertaken in Indonesia and Thailand
Plans for expansion of the telephone sales and healthcare operations were announced 
in 1996 Also in the UK, the company sold its commercial insurance business to GRE 
Internationally, Legal & General established a joint venture in India
General Accident
General Accident was established in Perth, Scotland in 1885 to provide accident, theft 
and motor insurance A series of acquisitions in the early 1900s extended its general 
insurance activities and took it into long term insurance In 1990, the company was the 
4th largest UK insurer, deriving 88% of its premium income from general insurance 
activities.
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During the latter half of the 1980s General Accident had made two notable strategic 
moves, the first was the establishment of a chain of 580 estate agency branches, the 
second was the acquisition of a New Zealand banking group, NZI. However, by 1990, 
both these initiatives were causing concern and the company sold 25% of its estate 
agency chain and began the break up and disposal of NZI.
The New Zealand reinsurance operation was sold and there was expansion in the 
USA, with a regional general insurance company being acquired from Royal 
Insurance At the end of 1990, the company began to consolidate its UK operations, 
looking for cost reductions through staff cuts. These cuts continued in 1991.
1991 also saw continued expansion in the USA and Canada. The company also made 
known its desire to increase its European presence although no action was reported
Consolidation in the UK continued in 1992, as did the disposal of the company’s New 
Zealand banking interests In Canada, it bought Prudential’s general insurance 
operation, becoming that country’s leading direct insurer.
1993 saw further moves to improve efficiency and cut costs in UK. The company also 
began to collaborate with the Halifax and the Leeds Building Societies in setting up 
and administering the two societies’ life insurance operations.
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In 1994, expansion in South East Asia and India became a focus of the company’s 
strategy. Initiatives included the setting up of a representative office in China. On the 
home front, a direct sales operation, GA Direct, was launched, based on the previously 
established telephone sales operation GA 1-2-1.
The following year, Nelson Robertson, General Accident’s chief executive since 1990 
retired and was replaced by Bob Scott. Under Scott’s leadership and throughout 1995 
and 1996 there was continued expansion in South East Asia and the establishment of a 
joint venture company in India. In September 1995, General Accident acquired 
Provident Mutual, another UK insurer. The integration of Provident Mutual into 
General Accident continued into 1996 and resulted in a number of job losses amongst 
both General Accident and Provident Mutual staff.
Commercial Union
Commercial Union was formed in 1861 to write general insurance, and began writing 
long term insurance in the UK and overseas from the early 1900s. During the latter 
years of the 19th Century and the first two decades of the 20th Century the company 
grew rapidly as a result of the acquisition of a wide range of other insurers, including 
some of the oldest general and long term insurance firms (see Chapter 4). In 1990, the 
company was the second largest UK insurer with general insurance activities 
accounting for 68% of its premium income
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In contrast to the other firms in our sample, a key feature of Commercial Union’s 
strategy between 1990 and 1996 is its emphasis on expansion in Europe. Initiatives 
include the setting up of a Polish joint venture insurance company and the acquisition 
of a Dutch bank in 1992, the establishment of an joint venture in Italy in 1993, and 
most notably the £1.5 billion acquisition and subsequent integration of the French 
Insurer, Groupe Victoire, in 1994.
While these European initiatives dominate Commercial Union’s activities in the 
1990s, the company did undertake other moves. In 1990, it disposed of its surety bond 
business and closed its leasing operations, while at the same time expanding its 
financial services operations with the acquisition of two asset management companies. 
This expansion continued in 1991 with the purchase of a further two firms.
While 1992 was dominated by European expansion, 1993 also saw moves to 
consolidate the company’s Canadian subsidiary, as well as its Dutch insurance 
operation. Delta Lloyd In December 1993 Tony Brend retired as chief executive and 
was replaced by John Carter.
The key event of 1994 was the launch of the take over bid for Groupe Victoire. In the 
UK, however, a number of consolidating measures were initiated These were to 
continue into 1995, and included large staff cuts within the sales force These cuts 
culminated in the decision to cease distribution of long term products via a direct sales 
force.
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In addition, 1994 saw the company forge a five year joint venture with the bank. 
Abbey National, to sell household insurance Commercial Union became the sole 
supplier of buildings and content insurance through Abbey's high street branches 
Other expansionary activity included the setting up of a joint venture with a local 
financial services company in Indonesia to sell general insurance
In 1995 Commercial Union increased its presence in the South African market and 
sold its New Zealand general insurance operation to Sun Alliance In 1996, the group 
established an insurance company in Vietnam However, the year also saw the ending 
of Commercial Union’s life insurance joint venture with Midland, the bank buying 
Commercial Union’s shareholding.
Patterns o f ‘In-Firm’ Strategic Behaviour
Our mapping and overview of the main strategic initiatives undertaken by the nine 
firms in our study would suggest that strategy is highly dynamic. All the firms in our 
study pursued multiple streams of strategic activity, each in a constant state of flux as 
advances and retreats occurred (see Figure 5.11).
The level of strategic activity in each firm appeared reasonably consistent across the 
study period and episodes of stability or increased frequency of change were notably 
absent This pattern closely matches that predicted by the continuous change model 
implicit in the work of Knights and Morgan (1995) and Pettigrew and Whipp (1991). 
The punctuated equilibrium model, with its assumptions of stability interrupted by
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radical change, gains little support from our observations, unless the entire study 
period was part of a transition period. However, given that Romanelli and Tushman 
(1994) suggest that transistion periods with in a company tend to last less than two 
years, it would seem unlikely that all nine firms in our sample would see such periods 
lasting over 6 years all at the same time.
Guardian Commercial Sun legal &  Kagle Norwich Royal General Prudential
mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm Diversifying » — * Internationalising (Consolidating
11. ....... — .................  Downscoping im u m u u u m m m iu t Withdrawal
Figure 5.11 -  Map of Strategy Initiatives.
The underlying sequence of change was generally consistent across our sample The 
1990s started with a period of growth, with an emphasis on European expansion This 
was followed by a period of consolidation in the UK, and then a mixed pattern of 
continued consolidation in the UK and international expansion, particularly in South 
East Asia.
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At a more detailed level, it is clear that in the 1990s some firms reversed strategic 
moves made in the 1980s Prudential clearly demonstrates a significant change in 
direction in the early 1990s. An extensive programme of downscoping resulted in the 
withdrawal from expansion targets of the past, including estate agency and general 
insurance in the UK. However, the change over from one pattern of activity to another 
does not occur in one sudden jump, but rather there is gradual withdrawal from one 
and the incremental building of another This process occurs over a period of several 
years The data for General Accident, Norwich Union and Royal Insurance also show 
similar patterns of change.
These observations closely match Weick and Quinn’s (1999) account of continuous 
change Change is described as an ‘ongoing mixture of reactive and proactive 
modifications’ resulting from ‘improvisation, translation and learning’ rather than 
intermittent planned interruptions of periods of convergence (ibid) Intervention in this 
flow of change is seen as ‘rebalancing’ during which the pattern of change is 
‘reinterpreted, relabelled and resequenced’.
Weick and Quinn (1999) contrast Lewin’s (1951) classic model of change -  unfreeze, 
transition and refreeze -  with a sequence of freeze, rebalance and unfreeze. The freeze 
stage is described as cognitively capturing the current pattern of change However, 
this does not imply that the organisation itself is frozen and the current pattern of 
change halted Rebalancing occurs as the organisation identifies and is ‘attracted to 
and inspired by’ a new direction Finally, unfreezing is the resumption of 
improvisation, translation and learning but along the new path
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This model of freeze, rebalance and unfreeze provides a view of how an organisation 
will shift from one pattern of continuous change to another One pattern will die away 
while the other is in ascendance This process would explain the shifting patterns of 
strategy observed in the insurance companies
Although the pattern of strategic change in our sample challenges Fiegenbaum and 
Thomas’ (1993) view of episodic change, the sequence of change does support the 
notion of common strategies among a group of companies It is clear that the UK 
insurers pursed highly similar sequences of strategy
As we argued in Chapter 2, the presence of common strategies within an industry 
group raises important questions regarding the emergence and diffusion of such 
strategies We therefore need to look more closely at the cross group temporal 
patterns.
Patterns of Strategy Types across the Sample Group
Closer analysis of the patterns of strategic initiatives for each of the nine companies 
suggests that two specific strategies diffused through the group -  consolidation in the 
UK and internationalisation in South East Asia
A marked trend is observed in the initial adoption of consolidating activity between 
the beginning of 1990 and 1992 (see Figure 5.12). The study indicates that Prudential 
was the first of the nine firms to adopt a strategy of consolidation, followed by 
General Accident, then Royal Insurance, Norwich Union, Eagle Star, Legal &
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General, Sun Alliance, Commercial Union and lastly Guardian Royal Exchange In 
each firm, consolidating activity continued through to 1995
Guardian C ommercial Sun Ilegal & Eagle Norwich Royal General Prudential
Figure 5.12 - Realised Strategy - Consolidating Actions
The second strategy type to emerge as common across the group was an increase in 
internationalising activity in South East Asia (see Figure 5.13). South East Asia, with 
its rapid economic growth and poorly developed insurance market, was a new target 
for international growth During the 1980s and early 1990s Europe and to a lesser 
extent the USA had been the focus for overseas growth The adoption of expansionary 
strategies in South East Asia was again led by Prudential, with initiatives in early 
1993 The sequence in which the other firms followed differs from that observed for 
the adoption of consolidating strategies Guardian Royal Exchange appears as the 
second mover, followed by Sun Alliance, Eagle Star, General Accident, Commercial 
Union, Royal Insurance and finally, at the end of 1995, Legal and General Norwich 
Union does not join this push for increased representation in South East Asia
180
Chapter 5  -  Patterns o f Strategy in the UK Insurance Industry
Norwich I ,rgal &  R oyal Com m ercial (ien cra l K» e je  Sun G uard ian  P rudcndal
I nion (rt'ncral In su ran ce  Union A ccident S ta r Alliance Royal
Note: The figure shows the tim ing  o f  internationalising initiatives for each company. The black bars 
indicate activity relating to South East Asia, while the un-shaded bars, elsewhere. The order in which 
the firms made internationalising initiatives in South East Asia differs from that for consolidating and 
hence the order in which firm s are  plotted in Figure 5.13 differs from order in which they are shown in 
Figure 5.12.
Figure 5.13 - Realised Strategy - Internationalising Actions
Cross-Correlation Time Series Analysis
The visual patterns of strategy described above suggest that in terms of consolidation 
and internationalisation Prudential was an early adopter This position is also reflected 
in the results obtained from the cross-correlation analysis. Figure 5.14 shows the 
results for Prudential superimposed on those for Guardian Royal Exchange. In each 
case, the distribution obtained reflects the speed at which the company adopted 
strategic initiatives relative to the other eight companies in our sample. Prudential was 
significant (at a 99% confidence level) in that it was early in adopting strategies that 
were also adopted by other companies in the group Also significant (at the 95%
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level), Guardian Royal Exchange and Eagle Star were revealed as typically late 
adopters in comparison to the rest of the group
Note: The figure shows the cross-correlation functions for both Prudential (thick line) and Guardian 
Royal Exchange (thin line). At each time lag, the value o f  the function was calculated by m easuring (he 
similarity between the time series o f  strategic initiatives for each of these two com panies with those for 
the eight other firms in the sample. The set o f functions created for each company is then summed to 
produce the functions displayed here. Each function is equivalent to the frequency distribution o f the 
tim e dificrcnce between strategic actions undertaken by the company being analysed, i.c. Prudential or 
Guardian Royal Exchange, and the sam e types o f  initiatives undertaken by the other eight firms. The 
magnitude o f  the functions has been normalised for this display The skews evident in the two functions 
have tested as significant (at the 95% ) level when com pared to the function expected for a random 
scries.
Figure 5.14 - Delay Distributions of Realised Strategy - Prudential and GRE
The cross-correlation analysis for General Accident produces a distribution of delays 
that suggests the company was also an early adopter (see Figure 5.15). As with 
Prudential the cross-correlation function produced for this company was significantly 
different (99% confidence level) from that expected for a random series. The other 
five companies are positioned by the analysis between Prudential and Guardian Royal
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Exchange, although the delay distributions obtained are again not sufficiently different 
from those that would be expected for random sequences to test as significant
Note: The figure summarises the cross-correlation functions obtained for each company. The function 
for each company is represented by calculating the mean and standard deviation. The vertical bars 
represent the lag values that fall betw een the mean plus or minus one standard deviation.
Figure 5.15 — Summary of Lag Distributions for Sample (Mean + 1 sd)
Our interview data confirms the patterns found in our statistical analysis. General 
Accident and Prudential were reported to be on average faster in responding to the 
environment and adopting new strategies. General Accident was highlighted as a high 
performer by 50% of our interviewees while 40%4 identified Prudential as an industry 
leader Guardian Royal Exchange was seen as more cautious, particularly prior to the 
appointment of the new CEO in 1994. GRE was even described by some of its own 
senior executives as being a laggard before 1994. When discussing the other 
significant late adopter, Eagle Star, one interviewee suggested that the confusion 
caused by the piecemeal amalgamation of Eagle Star and Allied Dunbar had led to 
problems. Another interviewee expressed his relief that his company had lost out to
1 Including one o f our interviewees w ho had been a manager in both Prudential and GRE,
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Zurich in acquiring Eagle Star in 1998 Interviewees opinions vary on the ranking of 
the other companies, which would seem to concur with the lack of significant skew 
detected in their cross correlation functions
In addition to providing support for our identification of early and late adopters, the 
interview results also suggested that the strategic agility of a firm would vary over 
time This leads us to consider the results of our time varying cross correlation 
analysis
Time Varying Analysis
The results of the time varying cross-correlation analysis of Prudential and Guardian 
Royal Exchange are shown in Figure 5.16 The senior managers interviewed in both 
companies commented on the accuracy with which this figure described what was 
happening within their organisation over this period An initially high level of 
strategic agility for Prudential relative to the other firms in our analysis fell away 
during the middle period before rising strongly towards the end Our interview data 
suggests two reasons for this change Firstly, the dip relates to a hold put on new 
strategic initiatives during a major strategy review conducted during 1992 Secondly, 
our interviewees suggest that the increased level of formal analysis and control stifled 
the emergence of ideas and slowed decision-making One interview subject even used 
the phrase ‘paralysis by analysis’ It was suggested that the subsequent increase 
resulted from an easing of this formality
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Figure 5.16 -  Variations in Speed of Strategy Adoption
In Guardian Royal Exchange, the initial fall in relative strategic agility was thought to 
be due to advances made by the other members of the sample Many of our 
interviewees attributed the improvements that began to occur towards the end of the 
study period to change initiated in the early 1990s which was then accelerated by the 
arrival of a new CEO from outside the industry.
Analysis of the Observed Patterns
In Chapter 2 we argued that the literature on strategy rarely addresses the issue of how 
patterns of strategy emerge and develop across an industry. Three other streams of
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literature -  innovation, institutional and contextual -  were identified as providing 
insight in this area
These three literatures identify a number of factors that determine the pattern of 
diffusion of strategy across an industry. These factors can be split between those that 
relate to the strategic initiative, those referring to measures or dimensions of the firm 
(e g. size) and those that concern the internal processes and character of the 
organisation and its members (e g. structure and diversity). This division of factors is 
particularly notable in the innovation diffusion literature
The identification of Prudential as a consistent early adopter across a range of strategy 
types suggests that for strategic innovations the attributes of the firm have a greater 
effect than the type of strategy involved
The innovation literature suggests two contrasting relationships between 
organisational size and strategic agility Firstly, when innovativeness is measured in 
terms of the number of innovations, research shows that larger firms are more 
innovative due to their greater resources (Kimberley and Evanisko 1981). Some 
authors (e g Rogers 1983) indicate that this effect of size is moderated by the degree 
to which the firm’s resources are uncommitted or ‘slack’. However, there is also 
evidence that this relationship does not hold for low cost innovations (Brown 1981). 
This may suggest that a Probit model of innovation diffusion may be more appropriate 
with firm size acting as a threshold to adoption (Nasbeth and Ray 1974), i.e. once the 
firm is larger than a given threshold it can to afford to implement the innovation
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The second relationship proposed in the literature relates to innovativeness when it is 
measured in terms of speed of adoption. Contrary to popular belief that small firms are 
more innovative, these studies fail to show a significant relationship between 
innovativeness and organisational size (Tidd et al 1997 and Subramanian and 
Nilakanta 1996).
Possible relationships between the order in which the firms implemented 
consolidating and internationalising initiatives and firm size and slack have been 
tested using Spearman rank correlation tests These tests were conducted using net 
premium income and number of employees to provide alternative measures of size, 
and profit and profit margin as measures of slack. These tests failed to show 
significant (at the 95% level) relationships between the order in which the firms 
introduced consolidating actions or internationalised in South East Asia, and number 
of staff, net premium income, profit and profit margin (see Table 5.1 and 5 2).
Pearson correlation tests also failed to detect a significant (at the 95% level) 
relationship between firm’s strategic agility derived from our cross correlation 
analysis, and the measures of firm size and slack (see Table 5 1 and 5 2)
The final group of factors identified by the innovation diffusion literature concerns 
firm’s internal organisational processes and character Our interview data suggest that 
factors such as CEO change and organisational structure had significant effect on the 
strategic agility of strategy by our nine insurers However, because of its external 
focus our mapping analysis fails to illuminate their influence. Understanding the
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impact of these organisational factors will therefore be addressed in the next chapter 
when we discuss the results of our case study work.
Chapter 2 also refers to research within the innovation and marketing literature linking 
strategic agility to organisational performance. Lieberman and Montgomery (1988 and 
1998) and Kerin et al (1992) review this literature and particularly highlight the 
positive influence innovativeness has on market share. We would therefore expect 
Prudential and General Accident, as significant early adopters, also to demonstrate 
above average performance in the 1990s. As we observed in Chapter 4 this was indeed 
the case, with both companies increasing their market share despite the increasingly 
competitive market.
In Chapter 4, we also highlighted the performance of Commercial Union and, indeed, 
it was praised by our interviewees However, our analysis has identified this company 
as a late adopter This apparent contradiction can be understood if we look more 
closely at the pattern of strategic initiatives which it pursued As we noted above 
Commercial Union focused heavily on expansion in Western Europe These efforts 
culminated in the £1.5 billion take over of a French insurance company The 
concentration of resources and management time on Europe will have delayed 
strategic moves elsewhere Consequently, its pattern of strategic initiatives was 
markedly different to that of the other insurers and our analysis will have been unduly 
influenced by the company’s late moves to expand in South East Asia The high level 
of dispersion evident in the cross correlation function obtained for the company (see 
Figure 5.15) and the lack of significance o f these results clearly demonstrate this lack 
of comparability.
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In - Firm and Across Industry Patterns of Strategy - Summary
This chapter has described the findings of the mapping and cross correlation analysis 
phase of our study It was demonstrated that during the study period the pattern of 
change observed within our nine insurers was one of continual change rather than one 
of stability The pattern observed also casts doubt on a punctuated equilibrium model 
of strategy change, unless the entire 6 year study period represented a transition phase
We also noted that the sequence of change within most of the nine insurers was 
broadly similar The 1990s started with a period of growth, with an emphasis on 
European expansion. This was followed by a period of consolidation in the UK, and 
then a mixed pattern of continued consolidation in the UK and international 
expansion, particularly in South East Asia. Two strategies - consolidating and 
internationalising in South East Asia -  were shown to have diffused through the nine 
companies, each over a period of 2 to 3 years For both strategies. Prudential appeared 
as the first mover
The cross correlation analysis also showed that relative to the other eight companies 
Prudential was a consistent early adopter General Accident was also an early adopter 
while Guardian Royal Exchange and Eagle Star were consistently late adopters These 
patterns of strategic agility were supported by the comments of our interviewees
The detection of consistent early and late adopters suggests that it is the nature of the 
firm itself, rather the nature of the strategy which has the greater influence on firm
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strategic agility However, no significant correlation was found between the measure 
of strategic agility for the nine and measures of firm size or slack resources. This 
result suggests that we must now turn our attention to factors relating to the internal 
processes and character of an organisation to understand why companies are early or 
late adopters of common strategies These issues will be taken up in the next two 
chapters where we detail and discuss our case studies of Prudential and Guardian 
Royal Exchange
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Chapter 6
Case Study Analysis - Prudential
Introduction
In Chapter 2 we introduced three ‘alternative’ literatures (innovation diffusion, 
institutionalism and contextualism) which describe mechanisms through which 
strategy could diffuse through a group of companies over time As we saw in the last 
chapter, these three literatures suggest several of the factors that influence the strategic 
agility of a firm, i.e. the speed with which it adopts new strategies These factors can 
be grouped into those that refer to the innovation itself, those that relate to the physical 
characteristics of the firm (such as its size) and those that refer to the internal 
character and practices of the organisation and its staff While our mapping and cross 
correlation analysis provided evidence of the influence of the first two groups of 
factors, it was unable to give insight into the factors on the adoption of strategy
In this chapter and in the next two we turn our attention to this third group of factors 
and use our case study work to explore the influence of organisational attributes on 
strategic agility. In this chapter we first highlight some of the of firm level attributes 
that may influence strategic agility, the speed with which a firm adopts new strategies 
The rest of the chapter is then devoted to discussing the first of our case study 
companies Prudential, a consistent early adopter The following chapter. Chapter 7, 
describes the findings of our second case study Here Guardian Royal Exchange a
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consistent late adopter -  is the focus Finally, in Chapter 8 the two case studies are 
compared and the factors identified as influencing strategic agility discussed.
Organisational Level Influences on Strategic Agility
There is a strong tradition within the management literature that traditional 
bureaucratic or segmentalist organisational structures, systems and cultures are 
unresponsive to external change (Bums and Stalker 1961, TofTler 1985 and Kanter 
1983). Organic organisational forms are seen as being more suited to turbulent 
conditions This view is taken by the growing body of literature on new organisational 
forms (e g Hedlund 1994 and Miles et al 1997) Typically the ability of managers to 
recognise and direct change is questioned and some form of ‘self organising 
organisation’ (Daft and Lewin 1993) is proposed
Central to the notion of organic organisational forms is the belief that organisational 
conditions or the internal context of the firm determine its responsiveness or flexibility 
(Kanter 1988 and Volberda 1998).
In the last chapter we discussed the lack of a significant correlation between strategic 
agility and financial performance However, the lack of such a relationship does not 
necessarily mean that we can discount the influence of financial performance There 
may be a threshold above which or below which financial performance or perceived 
performance has an impact on strategic agility. For example, the organisation may be 
in crisis and this stimulates innovation in an effort to avoid failure (Grinyer et al 
1988) Alternatively, the success of earlier innovations may give the organisation
Chapter 6  —  Case Study Analysis - Prudential
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confidence to make further innovative moves or experiments March’s (1991) notion 
o f balancing exploration and exploitation is relevant here - firms that continue to 
experiment, while at the same time exploiting current activity, will be more 
successful Lewin et al (1999) suggest that a firm with a legacy of exploration will be 
more likely to innovate and so over time an upward spiral of success may develop
Central to the notion of an organic organisational form is the way in which the 
organisation interacts with its environment. Smith et al (1992) propose a 
communication processing model to describe this process and explain the speed with 
which a firm will respond to the moves of its competitors It suggests that the strategic 
agility of a firm will depend on how that firm detects, analyses and decides to counter 
a change in its environment. This raises two questions, which our comparative case 
study needs to answer Firstly, how do managers sense and how do they perceive the 
strategic moves of their competitors and secondly, how are strategic decisions made 
and implemented within the firm?
How effective the management o f a company will be at detecting and assessing the 
significance of what another firm is doing will obviously depend on how closely its 
competitors are monitored, and this in turn will depend on how great a threat they are 
believed to pose Smith et al (1992) contrast an external orientation with an internal 
orientation, with those firms which track competitive moves (i.e. have an external 
orientation) being the ones that respond most quickly However, we would argue that 
this view is simplistic and ignores one of the ‘alternative literatures we introduced in 
Chapter 2 The institutional literature (e g DiMaggio and Powell 1983) suggests that 
managers will be normatively and cognitively bound by the traditions and values of
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the industry sector and professional group of which they are a part. Particular types of 
strategy will, over time, and as they are adopted by a large proportion of a group of 
companies, become institutionalised Subsequently, the institutional view suggests, 
there will be a reluctance to adopt new strategies that replace or modify existing ones 
The greater the interaction between members of an industry group the greater the 
likelihood that the firm will be immersed within the norms and values of that group 
This raises a question for our case studies -  how is strategic agility affected by the 
level of contact between members of an industry group?
The view promoted by Smith and Grimm (1992) and by the literature on new 
organisational forms assumes that a firm is responding to external changes in its 
environment This perspective is highly environmentally deterministic -  with the 
survival, or at least the performance, of the firm depending on its ability to be flexible
This is one side of the long running debate within management science between 
determinism and strategic choice (Child 1974). An alternative view is that managers 
and their firms are part of their environment and are able to influence it through their 
actions The early adoption of a strategy is not necessarily about quickly reacting to 
the moves of others, it could equally be the result of the firm acting proactively and 
forcing others to react (also see Pettigrew and Whipp 1991, Kanter et al 1992 and 
D’Aveni 1994).
The possibility of proactive action by a firm raises another question we must seek to 
answer from our case study material - what role does management action and ability 
play in determining the strategic agility of a firm? If managerial agency has a
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significant influence on strategic agility then further questions must be addressed - for 
example what affect does CEO succession have on agility? How does the diversity 
and heterogeneity of the top management team and the way in which they work 
together affect the strategic agility o f the firm? How quickly does management action 
influence strategic agility?
It will be apparent from this discussion that there are two sets of issues that we must 
be alert to during our discussion o f the case studies -  those relating to the internal 
context of the firm and those relating to the ability and capacity o f managers This 
raises a further question -  what mixture of contextual and managerial factors has a 
positive impact on the strategic agility of a firm?
With these questions in mind in the remainder of this chapter and the following two 
we will discuss the findings of our case studies of Prudential, a consistent early 
adopter, and Guardian Royal Exchange, a consistent late adopter
Case Study Narrative and Ordering Devices
Managerial and organisational actions are influenced by the interplay of past 
experiences, the present situation and future expectations. This interplay creates a 
complexity that presents a significant challenge when describing a case study 
Ordering devices that structure the case study material may oversimplify this complex 
pattern of interdependencies However, some form of ordering device or structure is 
necessary to reveal the information contained within the case to the reader in a 
intelligible and engaging manner (Remenyi et al 1998 and Pettigrew 1999). Mindful 
of the possible dangers of oversimplification, we will follow Pettigrew (1999) in
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narrating our two cases in terms of the eras delineated by the tenure of chief executive 
officers.
Prudential
Orientation -  Strategic Activity in the 1980s and 1990s
In 1981, Brian Corby became chief executive of Prudential Corby continued to 
restructure the group, a process he had been involved in during the 1970s, with the 
creation of a new management structure. This ‘divisionalised’ the corporation into five 
operating divisions each with an executive director
Under Corby, in the UK, Prudential concentrated on efforts to restructure its 
distribution channels. In 1985 it began to acquire estate agency branches and by 1987 
had established a national chain of outlets, the largest in Europe. The move into estate 
agency by Prudential stimulated a rush of imitative moves by other insurers, banks 
and other financial institutions. Prudential also began to take on the task of 
rationalising its UK sales force with the initiation of projects such as Scenario 3. The 
dramatic changes in the regulation of the UK’s financial services sector and fiscal 
changes relating to life assurance and pensions (see Chapter 4) saw Prudential respond 
quickly with the introduction of new personal pension policies and unit linked life 
assurance products
Internationally, the 1980s was a period of growth in Europe and saw the 
rationalisation of the company’s many small subsidiary operations in far flung
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locations, e g. Pacific islands, which had been established to serve ex-patriot ‘Brits’ 
abroad. Significantly the company also entered the US market with the purchase of 
Jackson Life in 1986, a large life insurer
Mick Newmarch succeeded Corby as CEO in 1990, with Corby staying on as the 
company’s non-executive chairman With the continuing downturn in the housing 
market (see Chapter 4), the company sold its estate agency chain during 1990 and 
1991 Also in the UK, Prudential continued its moves to restructure its distribution 
channels, with further rationalisations of its field sales force and the establishment of a 
direct telephone sales operation in 1993 These efforts culminated in the company’s 
withdrawal in 1995 from industrial life insurance, the service that had made the 
company the largest insurance company in the UK during the first half of the 20th 
Century During the early 1990s, Prudential reduced its exposure to general insurance, 
although it continued to sell household and personal motor insurance This 
downscoping included the closing of its UK brokerage business and the disposal of its 
commercial lines operation
Internationally, under Newmarch, Prudential began to reduce its presence in European 
markets Instead, it began to expand its operation in South East Asia with the 
establishment of new companies in China, Vietnam and other countries in the region
Newmarch’s tenure as CEO ended amid disagreement with the industry regulator and 
claims of improper share dealing. He was succeeded in 1995 by Peter Davis. At the 
same time Brian Corby retired as Chairman and was replaced by Sir Martin Jacomb 
Davis’s period as CEO extended beyond our study period, however the early years of
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his tenure show considerable continuity with the Newmarch era in terms of the 
strategies pursued In particular, he continued to address the issue o f distribution 
channels and the focusing of the company on medium and long-term savings products. 
To this end in 1996 Prudential sold its reinsurance operation and shortly after the end 
of our study acquired Scottish Amicable, a life insurer that concentrated on sales 
through independent financial advisors. However, under Davis, Prudential also took 
steps to diversify into other financial services. In 1996, it established a direct 
telephone banking operation, a move that has recently led to the successful 
establishment of Egg, an Internet banking service
The Company before 1980 -  In the Vanguard of Change
Prudential was formed in 1848 to provide life insurance, loan and investment 
products The firm was one of many new insurers formed during the mid 19th Century 
in response to the growing market for ordinary life insurance However, despite initial 
optimism, the period up to 1854 was extremely difficult for the fledgling company 
With slow growth in sales and financial irregularities on the part of one of its founding 
officers, early closure was only narrowly avoided.
In 1854, after being approached by workers groups Prudential started to write 
industrial life insurance (see Chapter 4). This highly innovative move had been under 
contemplation since 1852 and quickly followed a similar initiative by British Industry 
Life Assurance Company A nation-wide chain of company agents, who sold policies 
and collected premiums by going from door to door, quickly supplemented an initial 
reliance on branch offices to distribute industrial policies The combination of
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providing life insurance to lower income households and distribution through an army 
of salesmen or ‘men from the Pru\ proved highly successful.
Prudential grew rapidly in the second half of the 19-1 Century. This growth was aided 
by the acquisition in 1860 of the British Industry Life Assurance Company, 
Prudential’s only major industrial life insurance competitor Between 1860 and 1890, 
industrial life insurance premiums grew from £84,000 per annum to around £4.5 
million while the sales force grew to over 16,000 agents. The impressive growth in 
industrial business was complemented by a growing presence in the ordinary business 
market - by 1890, premium income per annum had reached over £2 million This 
growth in ordinary business was aided by the acquisition of a number of other 
insurers' By 1870, Prudential was the largest UK life insurer and by 1900 was widely 
seen as a ‘national institution’ with one person in three being insured by the company 
(Dennett 1998).
As well as being notable for rapid growth, this period was also one of continuing 
innovation - a statistical department was established in 1864 and the company was one 
of the first UK firms to employ women as clerical workers. It was also an early 
adopter of office machinery such as typewriters, internal communication devices and 
calculating machines (Dennett 1998 and Barnard 1948).
1 Consolidated Investment and Assurance Company (1865). British Mutual Life Association Society 
(1868) and the troubled Hercules Insurance Company (1869) which had recently acquired International 
Life Assurance Society.
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Growth continued throughout the early decades of the 20th Century and was further 
stimulated by moves into general insurance in 1915 and pensions in the 1920s. Again, 
and in contrast to most other insurers, the period was marked by innovation The 
company’s continued efforts to mechanise its back office operations are notable - 
many writers (and several o f our interviewees) refer to the adoption of Powers Samas 
punch card machines to highlight Prudential’s innovativeness (see Dennett 1998 and 
Barnard 1948). A C. Thompson, general manager2 and then chairman of the 
Prudential between 1907 and 1928, commented that Prudential always attempted “to 
pre-empt change: to be in its vanguard rather than the rear” (Thompson 1921/Dennett 
1998).
Dennett (1998) suggests that the willingness of the company to pursue innovative 
approaches was combined with a conservative approach to the use of policyholders 
funds and stemmed from a concentration on perfecting its own activities She argues 
that this was due to a degree of insularity that resulted from the composition o f  its 
board and its location In the 19th Century and early 20th Century, the board of 
Prudential was mainly composed o f ‘self made men’ rather than ‘eminent city names’; 
while the location of Prudential’s head office in Holbom meant that it was slightly 
removed from the other insurers and financial institutions of the City. However, this 
argument is somewhat countered by the extensive involvement that senior managers 
of Prudential had in insurance industry associations and professional bodies’ A 
practice which continued into the 1980s
2 Until recently, the title o f  an insurance com pany’s ch ief executive officer was general m anager or 
group general manager.
For example, during the pro w ar and post war periods general managers o f  Prudential w ere often 
elected presidents o f  the Institute o f  Actuaries
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The inter-war period saw Prudential expand internationally. In the 1920s, this growth 
was in general insurance and then, from the 1930s, through ordinary life and pensions 
business with the focus on the British dominions and commonwealth countries
The growing prosperity of the UK in the 1950s and 1960s and the growing demand 
for pensions and other savings products were of mixed benefit to Prudential. Sales of 
ordinary life insurance, pensions and general insurance grew quickly. However, the 
increasing wealth of the working class and the provision of pensions and benefits by 
the state meant that growth in industrial business was curtailed In 1956, ordinary 
business exceeded industrial business for the first time since the 1850s. By the end of 
the 1970s industrial business premiums were half o f  those for ordinary business and 
only accounted for 15% of the company’s profits.
The relative growth in demand for ordinary business in comparison to industrial 
business and the growth of new competitors, such as unit trust companies, resulted in 
Prudential losing market share. Nonetheless, Prudential has remained the largest UK 
insurer.
Recognising the increased importance of ordinary business and the threat of new 
competition, Prudential began to look to broaden its distribution channels. The 
company realised that its large sales force was less suited to selling products to higher 
income customers and it therefore started to try to increase sales through independent 
financial advisors. These moves continued into the 1970s with the rescue of the 
Vavasseur Life Assurance Company, which was renamed Vanbrugh Life Distribution
202
through independent financial advisors was then routed through this new subsidiary to 
avoid conflict with the field sales force (Bennett 1998 and interviews with three ex­
executive directors).
Opportunities to broaden its product range were also pursued For example in 1968, 
Prudential acquired the Mercantile and General Reinsurance Company (Dennett 
1998).
Prudential introduced its own investment linked pensions in 1970 in response to the 
growing market share of unit trust companies (Pettigrew and Whipp 1991 and Bennett 
1998) This placed an increased emphasis on the investment management skills of the 
company, as opposed to the more traditional requirements of actuarial and sales force 
management expertise.
The growing diversity of products and distribution channels led to the establishment 
of a holding company, the Prudential Corporation, in 1978 This new arrangement 
increased the financial flexibility of the organisation and provided access to both debt 
and equity markets (Pettigrew and Whipp 1991) This was to prove valuable over the 
course of the next decade in funding acquisitions and increasing the company’s 
solvency4 Within the new structure, Geoffrey Haslem, group general manager since 
1974, became group chief executive.
During this post war period. Prudential continued to be innovative It was one of the 
earliest insurers to set up an organisation and methods department and to employ
Chapter 6 -  Case Study Analysis - Prudential
' Interview with an cx-CEO.
203
outside management consultants. In 1951, it was one of the first companies to offer 
‘with profits’ pension policies, an innovation that contributed directly to it becoming a 
market leader in the provision of group pensions plans in the 1960s (Pettigrew and 
Whipp 1991 and Dennett 1998).
The Corbv Era
Brian Corby took over from Haslem as group chief executive in 1981. Corby, an 
actuary by training, had spent his entire career within Prudential Returning from a 
period in South Africa, Corby had progressed rapidly up the organisation and had 
been heavily involved in creating the Prudential Corporation in 1978 Within 
Prudential, Corby was seen as an agent of change5 who in the words o f one executive 
director, and the head of investment at the time, “recognised that the pace of change 
had to increase”. Several of our interviewees suggested that his desire to stimulate 
change was not a result of external pressure, but more a desire to improve proactively 
and a recognition of potential long-term threats'’
Like many of Prudential’s senior management in the 1970s, Corby had recognised that 
the company’s industrial business was in slow decline and the company had to build 
alternative distribution channels and markets7 Despite this recognition, there was a 
reluctance to act, partly due to resistance to change within the company’s sales force. 
Corby, however, was willing to act and many of the initiatives pursued during his
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tenure were driven by this underlying logic8 These moves were to culminate in the 
company’s withdrawal from industrial insurance in the early 1990s.
Most of our interviewees who were then with Prudential, highlight two steps as being 
pivotal in increasing the pace of change and to the success of the company in the 
1980s and 1990s -  the external appointment of senior personnel and divisionalisation
Prior to the late 1970s, Prudential had traditionally promoted staff from within or as 
many of our interviewees put it, ‘grown its own timber’. Staff would join the company 
as salesmen or actuaries and then spend their entire careers within the company The 
company’s size and prominence allowed it to attract the better actuarial students, often 
those holding Oxbridge double first degrees, and it was from these ranks that the 
majority of the company’s senior managers emerged9
In the 1970s, the new demands of information technology had led to the appointment 
of specialist staff from outside In 1977 a significant appointment was made with the 
selection of Tony Freeman as chief accountant. Freeman was the first chartered 
accountant and non-actuary to hold that position. Freeman had previously spent his 
career with Peat Marwick and the National Freight Corporation and was the first 
senior manager to be appointed from outside the company. Our interviewees suggest 
that his appointment, partly pushed through by Corby, then deputy general manager, 
was “firmly made on the grounds that they didn’t want to import the same insurance 
traditions that they’d always had”.
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Other senior management appointments from outside continued in the 1980s. In 1984, 
Geoff Keeys joined from Massey Ferguson as personnel director and in 1987, Michael 
Lawrence became the company’s first finance director. Keeys described how this 
pattern was replicated further down the organisations with “whole coteries of non- 
insurance people coming in to Prudential”. He also claims that, as a result, Corby’s 
successors “did not have cultural problems” when they began to introduce their 
change programs in the 1990s.
Corby saw that although the creation of the Prudential Corporation had increased the 
financial flexibility of the organisation, the bulk of its activities were still grouped 
together within the Prudential Assurance Company This part of the company 
dominated management time and attention and meant that little time was spent 
exploring diversification into other financial services10 *. In 1984 a new structure was 
put in place which organised the group into five operating divisions -  UK Individual 
(split into the UK Individual Life and General Insurance divisions and Vanbrugh 
Life), UK Group Pensions, International, M&G Reinsurance and Prudential Portfolio 
Managers (PPM) This restructuring stimulated competition for resources among the 
new divisions With each division being responsible for developing its own plans, the 
number and diversity o f new initiatives being proposed increased"
Corby’s choice of managers to head up each of the new divisions also demonstrates 
his wish to promote change12. Of the five divisional heads, only two were actuaries1’,
10 Interviews w ith an ex-CEO and an executive director
"  Interviews w ith  two executive directors
12 Interview w ith an executive director 
IJ Derek Fellows and Brian Medhurst
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although one of these, Brian Medhurst, had spent much of his career within 
Prudential’s investment operation Notably, after only 7 years with Prudential, Tony 
Freeman was made head of the UK division. In 1985, four of these divisional heads -  
Freeman (UK), Medhurst (International), Fellows (Group Pensions and Chief 
Actuary), and Artus (PPM)14 -  joined Corby on Prudential’s main board
Although Artus was the senior executive within PPM, the day to day operations were 
the responsibility o f Mick Newmarch Newmarch complained bitterly that he had not 
also been put on the board, and with the support of Artus, was duly appointed a few 
months later15.
Derek Fellows retired in 1988 His replacement as chief actuary was not appointed at 
executive director level, but reported to the finance director. This move reflected 
Corby’s belief that actuaries were “product designers and not necessarily managers”16 
It also marked the first time in Prudential’s history that the chief actuary was not a 
member of the senior executive.
Leadership and Management
Following the 1984 restructuring, the heads of each division met weekly as the 
executive committee. There was also considerable communication on a daily basis 
both verbally and through memos. In addition, Corby had regular weekly or bi-weekly 
individual meetings with each divisional head Our interviews with the members of
"John  Lock the m anaging director o f  M&G Reinsurance becam e a m ain board director in 1988 His 
predecessor as head o f  M&G. Peter Howell, had not been a m ain board  director.
5 Interviews with five executive directors.
16 Interview with an executive director
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this executive committee suggest that meetings and communication were relaxed and 
informal People “tended to sense what issues needed to go to Corby or the executive” 
- what needed to be put in a memo or what required an “informal chat” with another 
member of the executive.
One executive director also pointed out that the long history of working together 
resulted in a high degree of trust between Corby and his direct reports Corby was 
therefore willing to let the executive run things without a great deal of interference17 
In the case o f large initiatives, Corby would tend to agree the direction to take with the 
individual manager concerned, possibly following a debate within the executive 
committee18.
Many of our interviewees suggest that Corby’s willingness to delegate allowed him to 
become heavily involved with the ABI (see Chapter 4). Indeed, during his tenure as 
chief executive, Corby served as president o f the ABI. He was keen to develop close 
links with the chief executives of other insurers, particularly through the ‘Usual 
Friends’ (see Chapter 4). Some of our interviewees commented that these external 
activities limited the time that Corby could spend with his direct reports19 Encouraged 
by Corby, other Prudential executives also met with their peers in other insurers 
However, as the 1980s progressed many felt that there was less and less common 
ground with other insurance companies
I Interview w ith  an executive director
18 Interviews with three executive directors Another, however, paints a different picture, one o f  
“cabinet consensus” and collective decision making
II Interviews w ith two executive directors
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The atmosphere of informality and trust was complemented by a willingness to 
challenge and be challenged among most of the executive20 However, such challenge 
usually lacked personal rancour, tending to be “gentlemanly and intellectual”21 One 
executive director contrasts Prudential’s executive with the senior management of 
other firms that he observed while managing their pension funds. He argued that 
although there was challenge there was not the same level of aggressiveness, 
individual competition and even rudeness among the senior ranks of Prudential.
Another executive director suggested that this informality extended down through the 
ranks of senior and middle management. The senior levels of the company were 
likened to an “academic common room or club”. He suggested that there was 
“freedom for an individual to have an idea, persuade a few colleagues and just do 
it”22 *. A further director agreed, commenting that in the 1980s “there were a lot of 
bright people around and if they wanted to do something they could just do it”. 
However, this informality coexisted with a strict system of rules and procedures 
regarding operational issues.
The lack of formality, particularly within strategic decision making was the subject of 
criticism among some executives, most notably Mick Newmarch. Newmarch was 
openly hostile to Corby over what he saw as a lack of rigour or procedure2' Many of 
our interviewees indicate that the arguments between Corby and Newmarch were at 
times very heated. Newmarch himself believes he “must have been impossible to 
Corby as [he] spent his entire life telling him he was getting it wrong”. However,
20 Interviews with three executive directors
Interviews with two executive directors
This view was supported by three executive directors
1 Interviews with three executive directors
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Corby was willing to accept the presence of different views among the senior 
executive, and was willing to act without consensus24, a situation that one senior 
executive believes Newmarch would never have accepted during his tenure as CEO. 
He remembers only two occasions when Corby insisted that all the executives towed a 
consistent line - one was during the negotiation with the trade unions over the 
introduction o f a new pay structure and the other was the re-branding of the company 
in 1986.
While Newmarch continued to criticise Corby’s lack of commitment to substantive 
strategic planning25, some moves in this area were made during Corby’s tenure 
Following divisionalisation, the divisions were in competition for the resources to 
fund expansion. With this competition came the need to demonstrate the benefits of 
the projects proposed and to articulate the reasons for doing them An executive 
director suggested that as a result the divisions started to introduce corporate plans and 
budgeting, in an “amateur way”, from the mid 1980s. The arrival of Michael 
Lawrence in 1988 as finance director accelerated this process by introducing proper 
budgeting procedures and review and standardised capital expenditure appraisal.
The informality and flexibility of the strategic decision process operating in Prudential 
at this time is best illustrated by the two largest strategic initiatives undertaken in the 
1980s -  the acquisition of a US subsidiary (Jackson Life) and the establishment of an 
estate agency chain.
24 Although executive directors were expected to provide support al main board level w hen a  decision 
had been made.
35 Interview w ith an ex-CEO and a senior executive
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The Acquisition o f Jackson Life
Until the 1980s, Prudential’s overseas operations were concentrated in countries that 
were either part of the British Commonwealth or were former colonies Subsidiaries 
existed in countries that ranged in size from Australia and Canada to small island 
groups. On his appointment as head of the international division, Brian Medhurst 
began to rationalise this “hotchpotch” of operations and look for areas where 
expansion could be justified Medhurst and Corby believed that the main gaps in the 
company’s geographic spread were in Europe26 and the USA, the largest insurance 
market in the world27
Medhurst believed that only practicable route for entering the US market in a 
significant way was through a large acquisition. He established a set of criteria for the 
type o f  target required -  a life insurance company with nation-wide coverage and 
good management These criteria were agreed with Corby and passed by the executive 
committee28 and main board Armed with this approval, Medhurst and his assistant, 
Jim Sutcliffe, made contact with the investment banks in the USA. Finding that 
Jackson Life, a family owned insurer was available and met their criteria, Medhurst 
went back to Corby and the board to gain approval to start negotiation Final approval 
of the acquisition price was sought from the board before the deal was completed in 
November 1986.
26 In E urope, driven by widespread hype regarding the creation o f  a single market in 1992. Prudential 
began to  acquire small insurance firm s in several o f  the European Union’s m em ber countries, which it 
intended to grow organically.
27 Interviews with three executive directors
a  N cw m arch. who felt (hat the company should buy an investment operation in the USA, provided 
some criticism .
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Our interviewees stressed that the acquisition followed a series of logical steps with 
approval being obtained at each stage However, it did not follow any formally 
established set of procedures. Instead, it was a case o f “making it up” as the 
acquisition developed, as were the criteria and financial hurdles to be met. He believes 
that the flexibility afforded by this lack of formal process was crucial in completing 
the purchase of what is now a highly successful part of Prudential29 *.
Prudential Property Services
Like Prudential’s acquisition in the US, its move into the estate agency market sprang 
from a general view of the direction in which it wished to advance and its ability to 
take advantage of an opportunity when it presented itself. However, with estate 
agency, Prudential failed to control implementation.
Prudential had recognised that it was highly dependent on its sales force, and was 
actively seeking ways to diversify its distribution. One option that had been widely 
discussed among the executive was the development of a “high street presence” '0 
During the 1980s, Prudential looked at the banks, building societies and various retail 
stores, including Marks & Spencer31 Of particular interest was the sale of insurance 
products allied to the sale and purchase of residential property At this stage, however, 
building societies, the main providers of mortgages, were unavailable for acquisition, 
and the company therefore looked for other ways in which it could target potential
29 In 1995 Jackson Life accounted for 24%  o f Prudential’s premium income and 30% o f operating 
profits.
Vl Interview w ith  two executive directors.
11 A scries o f  discussions were held w ith Marks & Spencer, although ultimately they decided to enter 
financial services on their own.
212
customers who were buying a house. Estate agents were seen as one of the potential 
alternatives.
Against the background of these internal discussions and a booming property market, 
a firm of estate agents in Huntingdon approached Tony Freeman with a similar idea 
Freeman took the suggestion to Brian Corby and Ron Artus, who decided it was an 
opportunity to experiment32 After approval from the board, Prudential acquired the 
Huntingdon estate agency in the summer of 1985. Many of our interviewees felt that 
the decision to experiment was correct, particularly as the sum paid was negligible for 
a firm of the size of Prudential33. Newmarch, however, was highly critical of the 
decision, arguing that the underlying logic was flawed and that no real analysis had 
been undertaken He was less convinced that estate agencies would provide a 
significant distribution channel and felt that the problems of managing their core 
business of selling houses had been overlooked
The building societies and other insurers took note of Prudential’s initiative, and 
several responded by purchasing their own estate agencies. This response was seen by 
many in Prudential as confirmation of the value of estate agencies. To make a 
significant contribution to sales the company believed it would have to build a nation­
wide chain o f agents The moves of others brought concern that if it did not move 
quickly it would miss the opportunity to buy good agencies and Prudential began to 
rapidly acquire estate agents throughout the country. As a result, lessons that could
Chapter 6 -  Case Study Analysis - Prudential
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have been learnt from the purchase and operation of the Huntingdon group of agents 
were not given time to materialise34
Other financial services companies responded similarly and by mid 1986 the rush to 
acquire agents had become frenzied. Many of our interviewees admit that there was 
panic and described how the company set “silly yardsticks like a quarter of a million 
pounds a branch”. Two executive directors suggest that this expansion was out of 
control -  they point out that there was no overall budget and that the only monitoring 
was a tally of new branches acquired. The estate agents saw the panic and became 
aware of the yardsticks They began to open new branches just to increase the price an 
insurer or building society would pay for their firms
By the end of 1987, Prudential had built a chain of over 600 branches, the largest in 
the UK and had announced its intention to increase this number to over 1000 by the 
end of 1989.
In early 1986, the estate agency business was established as a separate division -  
Prudential Property Services Ron Artus headed the new division as chairman Joe 
Bradley, previously with a building society, was appointed as managing director. 
Bradley was keen to exploit the national coverage of the new chain to develop its core 
estate agency activities as well as the sales of Prudential’s insurance and savings 
products. In an attempt to mimic building societies, he introduced national pricing and 
commission rates, terms and conditions for employees and company uniforms.
"  In te rv ie w  w i th  fo u r  e x e c u tiv e  d ire c to rs .
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Development started on a property IT system, which would allow buyers to go into 
any Prudential estate agency and access properties in any other part of the country
Given the volume of data involved the development of an effective IT system proved 
problematic. One interviewee suggested that this would have become a major 
headache, if the property market had not slumped so dramatically in 1989 The slump, 
however, brought its own problems. In the past small independent chains would 
respond to market fluctuations by quickly “paying off staff and running the business 
on a shoe string until the market picked up”3' Prudential chose to maintain staff levels 
and was saddled with the additional overhead costs of a large centralised organisation.
The underlying logic of a centralised national chain was also being brought into 
question Significant variation in market conditions between different parts of the 
country challenged the logic of nation-wide pricing and rates of commission. Further, 
the sales of financial service products via estate agents, the reason Prudential had 
chosen to enter the market, were proving disappointing36
Many of our interviewees suggest that the executive were initially unaware of these 
problems due to the lack o f effective control and monitoring of the division’s 
operations However, by 1989, the property market slump meant that they could no 
longer be concealed and “it was becoming clear that the whole thing was failing and 
failing badly” 37 Corby and Lawrence decided to appoint Coopers Lybrand to conduct
"  Interview w ith an  executive director 
36 Interviews w ith tw o executive directors 
Interview w ith an executive director
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a review o f the operation and the prospects for the property market in the 1990s38. 
Lawrence indicates that Corby knew that the results of the study would leave 
Prudential with no option other than to withdraw. However, he retired as CEO, to 
become chairman, before the Coopers Lybrand report was completed and it was left to 
his successor Newmarch to take Prudential out o f  estate agency.
After the appointment of his successor as head o f PPM, Newmarch had spent a brief 
period as managing director of Prudential Property Services39 before taking over from 
Corby This period convinced him that Prudential should get out of estate agency The 
Cooper Lybrand report confirmed Newmarch’s view of the business and indicated that 
the housing market would not improve until the mid 1990s at the earliest. Armed with 
these findings, Newmarch obtained board approval to exit the estate agency business. 
Medhurst was given the responsibility of managing the withdrawal. In July 1990, 175 
branches were closed and over the next 12 months, very much to Newmarch’s 
surprise, Prudential managed to sell the remaining 500 branches.
Prudential’s decision to withdraw was heavily criticised in the press and by other 
financial services companies with estate agency chains However, within 12 months of 
Prudential’s withdrawal others were being forced to close branches or exit the market 
-  including some of the companies that had bought branches from Prudential. There 
was speculation that Newmarch or Corby should resign over the issue However, as 
Newmarch had not been CEO when Prudential had built the chain and Corby was able
’* On executive contradicts this view claim ing that it w as Ncwmarch who instructed Coopers Lybrand 
when he becam e CEO.
”  Joe Bradley left Prudential at this time -  One interview ee believed th is was a result o f  Corby's 
decision to  bring in Coopers Lybrand. Others suggest that Newmarch sacked Bradley during his 6 
weeks as head of PPS.
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to claim that changed market conditions had led to the about turn, this was never a 
serious consideration40.
The move into estate agency was ultimately an expensive failure, however it is 
instructive as an example of strategic decision making during the Corby era. In the 
initial decision, we can see the company’s recognition that it needed to change and its 
willingness to act quickly and flexibly when an opportunity presented itself The 
informality of the strategic decision making process and the presence of challenge 
among the top management team are also apparent However, the episode does raise 
questions regarding the Prudential’s ability to implement and control initiatives.
The Continuing Rise o f Investment -  What Market are We In?
In the previous sections we described the role played by Mick Newmarch in 
challenging the strategic decision making process within Prudential However, despite 
their disagreements, Corby privately expressed admiration for what Newmarch 
achieved within PPM and was ultimately to recommend Newmarch as his successor41 
On executive stated that the selection of chief executive was formally the 
responsibility of the board However, he suggested that Corby’s control of the board 
was such that Newmarch was “undoubtedly Corby’s appointment”42.
Newmarch had joined Prudential directly from school in 1955, initially, in the 
economics intelligence unit. Although not an Oxbridge graduate like many of his *
*  Interviews with two executive directors
41 Interview  with an executive director
42 A view  also held by tw o executives including one who cham pioned Newm arch as Cotby’s successor.
217
Chapter 6 -  Case Study Analysis - Prudential
colleagues, Newmarch was gradually absorbed into the mainstream of the investment 
operation. During this time, he took an economics degree by distance learning During 
the 1960s and 1970s he progressed up through the investment area and by 1980 was 
heading up the international investment operation. In 1984, he became chief executive 
of PPM, the investment division created by Corby. Newmarch was appointed to the 
main board in 1985.
One interviewee indicated that Newmarch was particularly successful in running PPM 
stating that he “had done a good job, he took the investment side by the scruff of the 
neck and adapted it to the new world where the competition wasn’t the insurance 
companies anymore”43 4*.
The success of PPM while Newmarch was its managing director is highlighted by 
several of our interviewees They referred to a number of initiatives to demonstrate 
how Newmarch had driven the division forward during this time -  the successful and 
early introduction o f unit trusts in 1985 and personal equity plans in 1987; an 
increasing involvement in the management of other company’s investment funds ; 
and the restructuring of PPM into global units based on investment type4'
The success of Prudential’s investment operation had increased in importance 
following the withdrawal of tax relief on life insurance premiums in 1984 This 
change removed the ‘fiscal advantage’ of life insurance in comparison to other savings 
products46. Consequently, there was increased emphasis on the performance of life
43 Two other executive directors also commented on Newmarch’s success as head as PPM
44 For example British Rail and Unilever’s pension funds
43 Prior to 1985 the investm ent operation was split into to areas -  UK and foreign
44 Interview with an executive director
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policies, and therefore on investment returns. Within Prudential, it was recognised that 
the investment operation was central to its other activities and was leading the 
company into a wider range of financial service products. Increasingly senior 
managers in Prudential began to see the company as an investment and savings 
company rather than an insurance firm47.
One of our interviewees feels that the recognition that the company was no longer an 
insurance company but a financial services company was an important factor in 
Newmarch’s appointment as chief executive in 1990. He felt that Newmarch “fitted 
this broadening financial services field”.
The Newmarch Era
Newmarch, like Corby, recognised that Prudential had to continue to change if it was 
to compete within the wider financial services market Consequently, the Newmarch 
era showed considerable continuity with the previous five years - e g. a continuing 
inflow of outside personnel, a shifting focus from life insurance to personal savings 
and the development of alternative distribution channels. The period also saw the 
continued rationalisation of the UK sales force leading in 1994 to the company 
ceasing to sell industrial life insurance. However, there were significant differences 
between the two eras, most notably the differing management styles and approaches to 
decision making.
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Changes in Senior Management
Following Newmarch’s promotion, Hugh Jenkins was appointed as head of PPM and 
as an executive director Jenkins had formerly been head of investment at Allied 
Dunbar.
Newmarch created a new division in 1991 -  Prudential Financial Services (PFS) PFS 
focused on all UK distribution other than that through Prudential’s sales force and was 
formed from the merger of the Prudential Holbom (previously Vanbrugh Life) and 
Prudential Corporate Pensions. Keith Bedell-Pearce, previously head of operations 
and marketing in the UK division, was appointed as its managing director. Bedell- 
Pearce also became a main board director in 1992.
Michael Lawrence, Prudential’s finance director, left in 1993 to join the Stock 
Exchange However, his replacement, Jonathon Bloomer, was not appointed until 
January 1995, the same month that Newmarch resigned as chief executive Bloomer, 
an accountant, joined Prudential after a 20 year career with Arthur Anderson
In 1994 Tony Freeman, executive director of the UK division retired Jim Sutcliffe, 
who had recently returned from Jackson Life, replaced him Brian Medhurst also 
retired in 1994 At the beginning of 1995, the international division was placed under 
John Maxwell who joined Prudential from outside the financial services industry. 
Maxwell had joined Prudential in March 1994 as corporate development director, a 
role he retained in addition to his international responsibilities However, the
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American and Asian businesses were split off as separate divisions, under Bob 
Saltzman and Mark Tucker respectively.
Management and Leadership
Newmarch had long believed that analysis and decision making at a strategic level 
lacked structure and rigour. He saw the failure of the estate agency venture as ample 
proof of this weakness. Newmarch’s wish to address this issue became a central theme 
of his tenure48 With Michael Lawrence he introduced a wide range of formal controls 
and procedures, e g. quality systems, key performance indicators and management 
development and succession plans49. A formal appraisal system was also established 
whereby strategic proposals or requests for resources were scrutinised by the finance 
department Newmarch would then be briefed on their analysis before he discussed 
the proposal with its originator
A significant proportion of our interviewees felt that this increased formality was 
overdone'0. One interviewee argued that while the new approach was more rigorous, it 
slowed decision making and delayed change. Another suggested that the increased 
bureaucracy stifled innovation and initiative He believed that if this regime had been 
in place in the 1980s then Prudential would have never been able to buy Jackson Life. 
Indeed, several large strategic initiatives were rejected during Newmarch’s tenure — 
e g. acquisitions of the Skipton and Cheltenham & Gloucester Building Societies , 
and the French insurer, Groupe Victoire (later acquired by Commercial Union -  see
Interviews with four executive directors. 
m Interview with an executive director 
w Interviews with four executive directors
51 Despite acquisition o f  a  building society being publicly stated as a  key aim  o f Prudential
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Chapter 5)5i. However, two interviewees suggest that the rejection of such 
opportunities was more due to Newmarch’s unwillingness to take risks
Newmarch’s management style differed markedly from Corby’s. All our Prudential 
interviewees describe Newmarch as being far more confrontational and argumentative 
than his predecessor One senior manager believes that Newmarch liked having 
“people around him who said let’s do this and he would challenge it and then you 
argued like hell and out came a proposition”. An executive director described the 
interaction among the senior management team as a rugby match. He describes 
Newmarch as a second row forward in a ruck and “the ball is there to win, you go in 
for it and you bash around, you thump the other guy if the [referee] is not looking 
but it is not personal and at the end of the day you all go to the club house and have a 
beer together” This interviewee explained that Newmarch wanted people to argue 
with him and if his argument won, he expected you to accept it, but if yours won, he 
respected it. However, he was not willing to act unless he had his senior management 
team behind him He would rather “shout and argue with [people] for another few 
days”52 3 until they were convinced.
For many of the senior management team, this approach was highly inspirational54 
One interviewee describes how Newmarch “had a very strong personality but left 
people with a lot of dignity by arguing with and listening to people” He then went on 
to suggest that Newmarch “only put down people with the vehemence of his argument 
and the directness with which he said you were wrong”.
52 Interviews with three executive directors.
55 Interview with an executive director
M Interview with two senior executives.
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However, some of the senior management team disliked this aggressive approach to 
challenge and argument, preferring “the cold calm logical discussions that 
characterised the Corby era”55 One interviewee suggested that those people “not able 
to cope with the rugby match might have had good ideas but were unable to argue 
loudly enough”. Consequently a less diverse range of people contributed to the debate 
and hence fewer opinions or options were put forward
Many o f our interviewees indicate that the senior management o f the UK division 
were the least comfortable with the new approach. Although hampered by the strength 
of the company’s sales force, change within the UK operation had been initiated 
during the 1980s. However, Newmarch believed that it had been far too slow and was 
openly critical One executive director believed that the problem was a cultural one 
He explains that the UK team would interpret what Newmarch said as instructions 
rather than as the starting point for argument
Several o f our interviewees also indicate that the combination of Newmarch’s style 
and the formal procedures began to change the relationship between the executive and 
other senior managers They suggest that the atmosphere of trust that had been present 
under Corby was replaced by one o f interrogation and confrontation Our interviewees 
indicate that this breakdown in working relationships came to a head over the strategic 
review that ran between 1991 and 1992 (see below). In the wake of this “blow up, 
Newmarch realised the need to get the senior management team to work together 
better and a substantial amount of time was spent building on how it worked together
55 In te rv ie w  w i th  a n  e x e c u tiv e  d ire c to r
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and setting up some rules of behaviour towards each other”56 One executive 
suggested that, in the wake of this exercise, relationships improved.
In Search o f Strategy -  "Boiling the Ocean "il
Throughout Corby’s tenure, Newmarch had expressed concern over the lack of a 
formal corporate strategy, a feeling shared by others in the senior management group 
(eg  Lawrence and Keeys). However, while he had persuaded Corby to bring in 
consultants to advise on developing such a strategy, Corby had never been convinced 
of the benefits
On becoming CEO, Newmarch was keen to correct what in his view was a failing and 
quickly appointed Laurel Powers-Freeling as head of strategy Powers-Freeling was 
appointed in 1990 from Morgan Stanley where she had spent a couple of years as an 
investment banker. Previously she had spent 9 years with McKinsey as a strategy 
consultant in their insurance group
Newmarch instructed Powers-Freeling to “build a capability to think about how 
Prudential should look in the future” and develop a strategy for the company “based 
on fact based analysis”58 They agreed that Powers-Freeling should build an internal 
consulting group and initiate a substantial strategic review of the organisation
“  Interview w ith an executive director 
57 Interview w ith and executive director 
'* Interview with a senior m anager
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With Newmarch pushing for the review to be conducted quickly, the strategy team 
pushed on with their own studies and presented their findings to all the Prudential’s 
senior management at a three day conference towards the end of 1991 However, the 
review was “tom apart by the businesses who felt completely alienated having not 
been asked for their input”59. One interviewee admits the strategy team made some 
mistakes at this time, however he also suggests that there was some ill feeling because 
the strategy review had been “foisted on the other managers”, who were by no means 
convinced that it was needed. Others suggest that most of the executive believed that a 
high level strategy was required and that it was the approach taken during this initial 
review that invoked the aggressive response It was the conflict generated by the 
strategy review that led to the attempts to re-establish good relationships among the 
senior management team (see above).
The strategy team was forced to redo the analysis, this time invoking the help of the 
businesses. One senior manager believes that in the end, not much of the review had 
to change, but Powers-Freeling “had to work through it with each of the businesses 
until they were happy with it”.
However, some were still unhappy about the process One executive director 
commented that “people were left totally frustrated by the whole experience, it was 
such a time consuming and bureaucratic affair” Another suggests that internally it 
was referred to as “boiling the ocean” While a third suggests “that in the end [even] 
Newmarch became very scathing about it”.
”  In te rv ie w  w ith  a n  e x e c u t iv e  d ire c to r .
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The output of this second round of analysis was presented to Prudential’s board 
towards the end o f 1992. There is, however, considerable scepticism among our 
interviewees as to the value of what emerged A current executive director believes 
that the strategy that emerged “stood [the company] in good stead” He suggests that 
the strategic initiatives that took place between 1993 and 1997 were “the result of the 
implementation of the strategy” Others, including Mick Newmarch, are less certain, 
feeling that the strategy was just a formalisation of what Newmarch had intended to 
do anyway60. One executive director is more critical suggesting that “not a single 
thing came out of it” and indeed our interviewees did find it difficult to detail the 
strategy that emerged.
One executive felt that the review led to a number of strategic priorities being 
established. Prudential was to expand in the UK, USA and South East Asia, 
particularly China and withdraw from Canada and Europe In the UK the review 
confirmed the need to develop alternative distribution channels, and proposed the 
acquisition of a building society, and the establishment a banking subsidiary 
Withdrawal from general insurance in the UK and from reinsurance, by selling 
M&G61 were also recommended However, the majority of our interviewees suggest 
that these initiatives were either in progress or were obvious62
The recommendation to pull out of general insurance was resisted by the UK 
division63 They believed that sales of household insurance enabled the sales force to 
earn reasonable commission levels which otherwise would have to be generated
Interviews with four executive directors
61 One executive stated that M &G were never told o f  the decision. It w as eventually sold in 1996.
62 Interviews w ith four executive d irectors 
6* Including three executive directors
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purely by long term product sales. This part of the strategy was therefore dropped 
Prudential did pull out of commercial general insurance in mid 1993, although 
according to one executive director this was not as the result o f  the strategic review 
but due to large losses Another senior executive’s comments support this view He 
indicated that discussions about pulling out of commercial general insurance had been 
going on since the late 1980s and continuing poor performance forced them to act
The decision to exit Europe was a reversal in policy. Under Corby, and driven by 
expectations of the creation of a single market in 1992, Prudential had bought a 
number of small insurance operations in EU countries. The intention had been to grow 
these businesses through the distribution of products already sold in the UK. However, 
the arrival of the single market did little to remove cross border barriers in the form of 
legislation, cultural preferences and access to distribution channels*’4 These barriers 
were particularly marked in the long term insurance and savings markets. With little 
prospect of change in the near future, it was unlikely that the small operations that had 
been acquired would attain critical mass or exploit synergies with the UK operation*’5 
Hence, in the strategic review it was concluded that Prudential should dispose of its 
European subsidiaries, although one executive director suggests this had already been 
Newmarch’s intention64 56.
One interviewee indicated that once Europe was discounted as a target for expansion, 
they looked for other attractive geographic areas. He argues that “any objective view
64 One executive, using a football analogy, described it as being like ‘C he lsea  playing Real Madrid in 
Madrid, w ith a Spanish referee and linesmen'.
65 Interviews with tw o executive directors.
66 One executive argues that New march had been critical o f  the m oves to buy sm all European 
com panies in the 1980s.
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[would have] led to the conclusion that the great growth area for savings markets was 
going to be South East Asia”. Another executive agreed, commenting that South East 
Asia was “virgin territory where [Prudential] could establish its [own] models [of 
distribution]”. Having made the decision to expand in this area, it was suggested that 
as local suppliers were “practically non-existent, the only real [entry] choice was 
organic [growth]” . Prudential amalgamated its existing operations in Singapore and 
Hong Kong into a new division, and actively began to seek expansion in the area 
Newmarch was particularly interested in the potential of the Chinese market and spent 
a considerable amount of time visiting China promoting Prudential personally.
Several of our interviewees are sceptical of the suggestion that the decision to expand 
in South East Asia had its origins in the strategic review Three executive directors 
suggest that Newmarch already saw potential in China and “pushed very hard” for the 
strategic review to reflect that interest
Once the new corporate strategy had been agreed, the top 100 managers in Prudential 
were briefed at a series of 2 and 3 day seminars and each manager was asked to sign 
up to it. Responsibility for achieving it was devolved to the divisions and the Powers- 
Freeling team was disbanded An interviewee explained that the actual “strategy was 
pretty simple at the corporate level and didn’t require a huge amount of review” 
Another executive, however, believes that Newmarch had become disenchanted with 
the highly regimented approach to decision-making and wanted to curtail the level of 
bureaucracy that had developed Powers-Freeling moved briefly to a position within 
the UK division, before leaving Prudential
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Several of our interviewees suggest there were two reasons for the softening of 
Newmarch’s views. Firstly, Michael Lawrence, who had with Newmarch championed 
a more formal approach to decision-making, had left. Secondly, Newmarch had 
become embroiled in a fight with the industry regulators (see below) and hence had 
less time available
Contact with Other Insurers
Newmarch was highly dismissive of the value of insurance industry trade bodies such 
as the ABI and the ‘Usual Friends’. He saw these groupings as having limited value to 
Prudential as it increasingly saw itself as a financial services company rather than an 
insurer In addition, he was also concerned that some of the issues discussed at such 
industry bodies could be construed as rate fixing, possibly prompting allegations of 
anti competitive behaviour
Newmarch was also highly critical of the performance of the other UK insurers He 
was more concerned with monitoring the activities of the banks, building societies and 
foreign insurers such as AXA.
These strong views were shared by many of the senior management team, who also 
distanced themselves from contact with other insurers and nominated junior managers 
to industry committees This led to claims of arrogance by the other insurers and even 
among the press67
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Trouble with the Regulator
The last two years of Newmarch’s tenure as chief executive were characterised by 
continuing disagreement between the company and the industry regulators The 
origins of this conflict are found in the changes in regulation introduced by the 
Financial Services Act 1986. Prudential, while endorsing the aims of the act, had 
argued that there should only be one regulator rather than a range of self-regulating 
organisations, such as LAUTRO -  the life assurance and unit trust regulatory 
organisation - under the umbrella of the Securities and Investment Board (SIB). The 
company felt the approach was overly bureaucratic and legalistic. Newmarch was 
highly critical of the system, claiming that the regulators acted as consumer 
champions rather than as industry regulators (Dennett 1998).
In 1993, a new body, the Personal Investment Authority (PIA) took over the functions 
of LAUTRO. Newmarch believed that the new authority would not overcome the 
problems inherent in self-regulation. In March 1994, Prudential opted for direct 
regulation under the SIB rather than the new PIA This move put it at odds with the 
other insurers and met with considerable resistance from the regulators Several of our 
interviewees suggest that the conflict with the regulator led Newmarch to resign as 
chief executive. One executive believes that while Newmarch’s argument was correct, 
at that point, he really needed to be more conciliatory over this issue, but, despite 
counsel from Artus and Lawrence, he was unwilling to be so The pressure to conform 
increased throughout 1994, and was compounded by allegations that Prudential had 
miss sold pensions and of financial impropriety on the behalf of Newmarch himself.
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By January 1995, Newmarch felt that his relationship with the regulators had become 
untenable and resigned68
Peter Davis, Newmarch’s successor, adopted a more conciliatory approach to the 
regulator69. However, the allegations of mis-selling and claims for compensation have 
continued to haunt Prudential to the present day.
The Davis Era
After a 3 months period during which Brian Corby stepped in as chief executive, Peter 
Davis was appointed as Newmarch’s replacement. Davis, although a non-executive 
board member since 1994, was the first chief executive (or equivalent) to come from 
outside the company in Prudential’s history. On Davis’ appointment Brian Corby 
retired as chairman and was replaced by Sir Martin Jacomb.
At the time of writing, Davis has been chief executive for five years 70, however only 
the first two years of his tenure fall within the period covered by our study In terms of 
strategy content, these two years show considerable continuity with Newmarch’s 
tenure. Shortly after his appointment, Davis confirmed that Prudential would continue 
to concentrate on the UK, USA and South East Asia However, he also expressed a 
desire to look again at Europe and an interest in acquiring a building society and other 
UK life insurance companies Plans to develop a banking subsidiary were brought
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m Interview s with three executive d irectors Also sec Dennett (1998) and Prudential annual report 1995.
69 Interview s with two executive d irectors
70 D avis recently announced his intention to retire in 2(XM) and that h is successor would be Jonathon 
Bloom er. Pm dcntial's finance director.
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forward, leading to the launch of a direct operation in 1996. Mike Harris, who had 
previously set up First Direct71, was appointed as head of the new banking operation
Shortly after Davis’ appointment, the UK division and Prudential Financial Services 
were combined. Jim Sutcliffe72 became chief executive of the new division while 
Keith Bedell-Pearce became its managing director.
In 1996 Hugh Jenkins retired as head of PPM and was replaced by Derek Higgs 
Higgs had previously been with SBC Warburg. Geoff Keeys also left in 1996.
Management Style and Leadership
While the content of Prudential’s strategy showed continuity with the Newmarch era, 
there was a substantial change in the management approach and decision-making style 
adopted by Davis. One executive director suggests that Davis was far more willing to 
listen to the views of others and strive for consensus than Newmarch. He also 
indicates there was a greater willingness to take decisions based on intuition. 
However, once a decision is taken Davis did not expect it to be challenged. Our 
interviewee contrasts this with the quest for rigorous analysis and argument during 
Newmarch’s tenure73. Davis himself is reported as expressing a preference for taking 
decisions forward on an iterative basis by “involving people several times and taking 
account of their opinions”74.
71 Midland B ank 's telephone banking  service
12 Sutcliffe left Prudential in 1997 to  jo in  Liberty International
71 One interviewee indicates that while he believes this approach was cfTcctivc he preferred the 
analytical approach and this was one  o f the reasons he let! Prudential.
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Davis’ approach is replicated in his relationship with the company’s non-executive 
directors. Newmarch had been keen to modernise Prudential’s board and with Corby 
had been instrumental in introducing reform -  reducing the size of the board and 
bringing on CEOs and other senior executives from other industries. However, he had 
been unwilling to involve the board in discussions on operational or strategic issues74 5 
Davis, having seen the frustration of many o f  the non-executives in the year prior to 
his appointment as CEO, adopted a more open approach.
The £2.9 billion purchase of Scottish Amicable, a large UK mutual life insurer, at the 
beginning of 1997 is indicative of the approach taken to strategic decision-making 
during Davis’ tenure. It was also similar in many ways to the purchase of Jackson Life 
during the Corby era In 1996, Davis had expressed concern that by relying on organic 
growth in the UK. Prudential was not developing quickly enough given the increasing 
rate of consolidation within the financial services industry Following internal 
discussions both among the executive and with the board, Davis announced the 
Prudential’s intention to seek growth in the UK through acquisition and expressed 
interest in buying other life insurance companies A list of possible targets was drawn 
up and approval of the principle obtained from the board76 As a result, when Scottish 
Amicable expressed its intention to seek a buyer Prudential was able to move quickly 
and without further recourse to the board in making a bid.
74 Interview w ith executive director o f Prudential.
75 Interviews w ith two executive directors, also in terv iew s conducted by Andrew Pettigrew  w ith three
Prudential executive directors. )
76 Interviews w ith two Prudential executive directors.
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Summary
Our discussion of the key strategic issues has highlighted a number of strong themes 
in the Prudential case study material Some of these themes showed continuity 
throughout our study period while others exhibit marked variation. Four of these 
themes showed continuity during the 1980s and 1990s -  a continuing history of 
innovation and experimentation, the appointment of new senior managers from 
outside the insurance industry, a willingness to question and abandon the status quo 
and the increasing distancing of the company from its industry peers
Prudential has a long history of innovative behaviour. Since its formation in 1848, the 
company has been in the ‘vanguard of change’ in the industry (Dennett 1998 and 
Barnard 1948). This readiness to adopt new practices and abandon old and established 
behaviour, even to abandon a cherished operation before its useful life has ended, 
continued into the 1990s It is most clearly demonstrated by the company’s 
willingness to first question and then abandon industrial life insurance, the product 
that until the 1960s had been the main factor in Prudential’s growth Indeed it was 
industrial life insurance that had made Prudential the largest insurer in the UK
The large number of new senior managers brought into Prudential from outside the 
industry during the 1980s and 1990s is notable This process had started in 1977 with 
the appointment of Tony Freeman as chief accountant and had two effects. Firstly, it 
brought new methods and ways of thinking into the top management team and 
secondly, in combination with the growing presence of executives with a background
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in investment, it overturned the previous dominance of senior managers from the 
actuarial profession.
Among both the senior managers arriving from outside the industry and those who 
had spent their careers with Prudential there was a willingness to question current 
interpretations of the environment and of the firm. It is clear that in the 1980s the top 
management team was questioning the appropriateness of its traditional distribution 
channels and even its identity as an insurer Concerned about the long-term future of 
the company, rather than driven by crisis, a vision of the company as a medium to 
long term savings company emerged. This vision was the logic behind most of the 
strategic moves undertaken in the 1980s and 1990s.
To achieve their goal. Prudential’s managers were generally prepared to take action 
and try things77 As the failed move into estate agency shows they were also willing to 
act quickly to correct errors, despite any embarrassment this might cause
During the 1980s and 1990s the top management team became progressively more 
convinced of the lack o f similarity between Prudential and the other UK insurers. By 
the 1990s the level o f  contact between senior managers and their peers in other 
insurers had been drastically cut and there was a reduced involvement of senior 
managers in insurance industry trade and professional bodies - subordinates were 
usually sent to industry committees and the like In addition, the senior management 
had become openly critical of the financial performance of most other UK insurers
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any hesitancy was lim ited to  large acquisitions.
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While there was continuity in these issues throughout the study period, other aspects 
saw considerable change during the 1980s and 1990s. In particular, there were 
significant differences in the management style and approaches to decision making 
between the Newmarch era and those of Corby and Davis
Under Corby there were, according to our interviewees, parallel management systems, 
which ran side by side Within the operating divisions and the sales force, activities 
were closely controlled through formal rules and procedures. However, among the top 
management team, decision making was informal and devolved Managers were able 
to float ideas among their colleagues freely and if they were supported, pursue them.
The expansion in the USA is indicative of the lack of procedure The head of the 
international division believed that the company needed to be in the USA in a 
substantive manner and gained support from the CEO. His pursuit of this belief led to 
the acquisition of Jackson Life While he sought approval at each stage of the 
acquisition, the process that was followed was ‘made up by him’ as he went along. 
The build up of the estate agency chain showed a similar lack of formal procedure 
with the result that the company lost control of its expansion
Under Newmarch the strategic decision-making process changed dramatically. Formal 
systems and procedures were put in place in order to generate and analyse strategic 
proposals. Divisional executives prepared strategic plans that were then appraised by 
the finance department before being passed to the CEO. The CEO, armed with the 
finance department’s comments, would then “interrogate the plan’s originator”. These
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new systems cut back the freedom of senior managers to take decisions and increased 
the centralisation of strategic decision-making
The pursuit o f formality and rigour in decision making changed the nature of the 
interaction between the members of the top management team Under Corby, a 
“collegiate” or “common room” style existed, where open discussion and challenge 
was the norm However, challenge lacked personal rancour and was often “more akin 
to academic debate”. Corby was willing to listen to debate, even when his decisions 
were being attacked.
Under Newmarch, discussion among the top management team became far more 
aggressive While debate and challenge continued, several o f the senior executives 
were uncomfortable with the manner in which it was conducted Consequently, they 
began to contribute less to discussion. Relationships between the top management 
team members began to deteriorate This culminated in angry exchanges over the 
preparation o f the strategic plan during 1992/93 and the taking of steps to rebuild 
working relationships through team building exercises.
During the Davis era a less confrontational style reasserted itself. Davis was keen to 
seek the opinions of other senior managers, although he was perhaps less receptive to 
his own decisions being challenged than was Corby
Earlier in this chapter, we highlighted a number of factors that we suspected would 
influence strategic agility. These factors referred both to the ability of managers to act 
and to the internal context of the organisation. We suggested that a legacy of
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innovative behaviour, the way in which strategic decisions are made and the level of 
contact between members o f an industry group were factors at a contextual level that 
would affect agility. The characteristics of managers individually or as part of the top 
management team, and the way in which they work together were suggested as 
managerial factors It is clear that these factors were significant components of the 
themes identified in the Prudential case study material.
We will now turn our attention to Guardian Royal Exchange and see if the same type 
of issues are apparent in our case study material for this company.
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Chapter 7
Case Study Analysis - Guardian Royal Exchange
Introduction
In the last chapter, we discussed the first of our two case study companies -  
Prudential We described the managerial and contextual developments within this 
consistent early adopter of strategy during the 1980s and 1990s We will now turn our 
attention to a company identified by our cross correlation analysis as a consistent late 
adopter -  Guardian Royal Exchange (GRE). As in the discussion of the Prudential 
case study, we will first summarise the key strategic moves made during the 1980s 
and 1990s and then discuss the managerial and contextual issues that relate to GRE’s 
adoption of new strategies.
Guardian Royal Exchange
Orientation -  Strategic Activity in the 1980s and 1990s
Peter Dugdale became chief executive of GRE in 1978 and remained in that position 
throughout the 1980s In terms of strategic activity, this period was particularly quiet 
with the company focusing on organic growth despite its fairly strong financial 
performance Notably, during the early 1980s, GRE entered an arrangement with 
Nationwide Building Society, whereby the building society was ‘tied’ to provide only 
GRE’s life assurance products in association with its mortgages This agreement 
meant that the long term business of GRE was heavily exposed to mortgage related
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business. This became a problem when the housing market slumped at the end of the 
1980s (see Chapter 4).
Towards the end of the 1980s, GRE sought to increase its speed of growth. In the UK 
it cut its premium rates and quickly grew its share o f the general insurance market. 
Overseas, it began looking for acquisition opportunities and in 1989, bought an Irish 
motor insurer and three Italian insurers. However, two of the Italian purchases proved 
disastrous and GRE was forced to sell them in 1991.
In 1990, Peter Dugdale retired and Sid Hopkins became chief executive Initially 
under Hopkins, GRE sought to continue its “dash for growth” and negotiations were 
begun to acquire further overseas operations However, towards the end of 1990 it was 
becoming apparent that the general insurance market had deteriorated dramatically 
(see Chapter 4). Consequently, during 1990, 1991 and 1992 the strategic focus of the 
company changed from one of growth to one of survival In 1991, it sold its business 
units in Barbados, Kenya, Trinidad and Tobago and New Zealand. In 1992, it took the 
major step of selling its Australian subsidiary to Zurich Insurance in exchange for 
shares in Zurich’s Australian operation (these were later sold back to Zurich in 1995).
Towards the end of 1992, the general insurance market began to recover and GRE 
began to contemplate growth again In 1993, it bought Orion a small healthcare and 
personal lines insurer. It also bought a specialist motor insurer in the USA -  American 
Ambassador.
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In 1994, a direct telephone sales operation. Guardian Direct, was established and a 
further specialist motor insurer in the USA -  National Insurance Corporation - 
acquired 1994 also saw Sid Hopkins retire as chief executive. He was replaced by 
John Robins, who joined GRE from Willis Corroon, the insurance broker
Robins initiated substantial staff reductions and the rationalisation of the company’s 
distribution channels, which continued into 1995. In addition, the company was 
restructured to a divisional form based on geographic areas During 1996, it purchased 
the RAC’s direct insurance business and Legal & General’s commercial lines 
business.
Since the end of our study period, GRE has acquired PPP, a large UK health insurer, 
which was merged with GRE’s existing healthcare operation, established after the 
acquisition of Orion. In 1998, it was targeted for takeover by a number of firms and 
towards the end of the year was forced to put itself up for sale GRE was eventually 
acquired by AX A in 1999.
The Company before 1980 -  Tradition and Co-OPCratipn1
Guardian Royal Exchange was a relatively new entity, being the result of the merger 
of Royal Exchange Assurance and Guardian Assurance in 1968. However, both 
companies had a long history, particularly the larger Royal Exchange Assurance 
(REA)J.
1 T his section draw s on a company history o f  REA written by Barry Supple and published in 1970 It 
should be noted that it was commissioned by the com pany and the forward is by L ord  Kindcrslcy. the 
then chairman o f  Guardian Royal Exchange
2 Royal Exchange was the fifth largest insurer in (he UK in 1968
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REA and London Assurance were created in 1720 by Royal Charter to write marine 
insurance. The charter prevented other companies or partnerships from selling marine 
insurance, and so gave the two new companies a virtual monopoly. Individual brokers 
were however still able to operate through Lloyds and other coffee-houses (see 
Chapter 4). The charter also gave REA permission to enter the fire and life assurance 
markets It entered the fire insurance market quickly in 1721, prompted by growing 
debts and the slump in the stock market following the collapse of the South Sea 
Company. Life assurance was not written until the 1790s.
By the mid 1750s REA along with the Sun Fire Office and the Phoenix dominated the 
fire insurance market. While competition was initially fierce between these firms, 
after 1775 co-operation became the norm as the firms acted together to set rates and 
drive new and smaller firms out of the market Competition increased in the early 19lh 
Century as a wave o f new insurers emerged This new group included Guardian 
Assurance (1821).
REA was dismissive of the innovations made by these new entrants The introduction 
of more aggressive marketing, including the use of advertising was even seen as being 
distasteful (Supple 1970). New product types were also initially rejected, for example 
‘with profits’ life insurance policies were not adopted until 1841, some 20 years after 
their adoption by firms such as Norwich Union. This pattern of caution and 
conservatism is a feature of REA’s history since the beginning of the 19th Century. In 
1890 the Post Magazine described REA as being “unconscious of its strength, or un-
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ambitious to the extent that caution and timidity have been the ruling principles of its 
actions” (Post Magazine 1890/Supple 1970).
Despite the re-emergence of close co-operation among insurers and the establishment 
of the tariff system (see Chapter 4), by the 1890s it had become impossible to ignore 
the degree to which the company was lagging behind its competitors. For instance, its 
lack of commitment to overseas business meant that even “the veritable Sun Fire 
Office” (Supple 1970) had moved ahead. Changes in management in the 1890s 
brought a more enterprising period. It moved aggressively into overseas markets and 
saw rapid growth, particularly with the advent of accident insurance Supple (1970) 
suggests that while the period 1890 to 1914 was characterised by change and 
modernisation, in the context of the industry these changes merely made up for lost 
ground
While late to join the wave of amalgamations in the early 20lh Century, REA did 
acquire National Provincial, a plate glass insurer, in 1909 and through its acquisition 
of Car and General (1917) and Motor Union (1928) built a strong position in motor 
insurance However, there was little integration of these new acquisitions, or indeed 
co-ordination of the existing marine, general and life departments In 1929 REA 
finally appointed a general manager, one of the last insurers to do so. However, the 
first general manager died within 20 months of his appointment and his successor 
‘lacked the character and expertise’ (Supple 1970) to provide strong leadership Even 
after the creation of the role of general manager, final authority remained with the 
‘court of directors’. Supple (1970) suggests that REA had to wait until after the 
Second World War before powerful management authority was exerted.
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Throughout the inter-war period, the company continued to emphasise stability and 
continuity and resist innovation (Supple 1970). For example, it was not until 1936 that 
REA began to mechanise its accounting system.
The post Second World War boom brought growth but also recognition that REA had 
again fallen behind its competitors. The appointments of Phelps as general manager in 
1946 and of Walters (1954 -  1960) as his successor were significant during this time 
as they drove through the introduction of much needed co-ordination and control 
mechanisms However, while their efforts created the pre-requisites for change, the 
company had yet to change significantly (Supple 1970).
In an attempt to regain lost ground, the Atlas was acquired in 1959 However, while 
this merger made REA the sixth largest insurer in the UK, the gap between it and the 
largest five continued to widen during the 1960s The Atlas acquisition increased the 
pressure for change and Roberts (general manager from 1961 to 1966) was able to 
implement a greater degree of modernisation Supple (1970) is, however, critical of 
the innovativeness of the company in this period, suggesting that the change that 
occurred was a reaction to external pressures rather than the result of being proactive
The amalgamation with Guardian Assurance in 1968 was a significant departure from 
the past for REA Although REA was the larger party. Guardian Royal Exchange was 
seen more as the merger of equals than as an acquisition Supple (1970) suggests that 
while the merger was the most significant structural change in the history o f REA it 
did not immediately produce far reaching change However, the influx of Guardian
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managers and staff, with different traditions and practices did trigger a more 
enterprising culture in the merged group.
The history of Guardian contrasts sharply with that of REA. Formed in 1821, it was 
one of many new insurers to challenge the dominance of the older firms such as REA 
and the Sun Fire Office, with innovations such as ‘with profits’ life insurance policies. 
This greater innovativeness and flexibility - in comparison to REA - continued 
through into the 20* Century - Guardian was one of the first non-specialist insurers to 
enter the accident insurance market (1897) and was an early mover in the 
amalgamations of the early 1900s and 1950s.
The difference in cultures between REA and Guardian did cause problems for their 
integration Even in 1999, immediately prior to AXA taking over the combined group 
one of our GRE interviewees stated that many staff still saw themselves as “either 
REA or Guardian people”. However, under the strong leadership of Wilkinson, the 
combined group’s first managing director3, and his successor Bigland, integration was 
achieved and conflict suppressed4
During the decade following the merger GRE saw a significant improvement in its 
performance and in the 1970s it ranked alongside Willis Faber as the UK stock 
market’s favourite insurance share (ABN AMRO Hoare Govett 1997). In 1978, 
Bigland retired as managing director although remained on the board Peter Dugdale 
succeeded him as managing director.
J The position o f general m anager was re-titled managing director and for the first time, a current 
executive jo ined  the “court o f  directors” .
4 O ne o f our GRE interviewees who jo ined the company during B igland 's tenure described him as a 
highly successful autocrat w ho controlled everything that went on in the company
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The Duedale Era
The 1980s for GRE was a period of stability and, in the opinion of several o f our 
interviewees, stagnation. The stock market’s opinion o f  the company plummeted such 
that by 1990 GRE was seen as the weakest of the UK’s composite insurers. There 
developed a ‘lingering suspicion’ within the city that the company’s fall was due to 
poor management (ABN AMRO Hoare Govett 1997). This view was also held by 
many of our interviewees, who expressed considerable annoyance that its poor image 
continued to persist in the 1990s, despite the presence of a new senior management 
team.
Our interviewees are critical of the lack of strategic change that occurred in the 1980s 
One executive director, then a senior manager in the investment division and from 
1990 investment director, believes that this lack of change and initiative ultimately led 
to GRE being taken over in 1999. He suggests that throughout the 1990s GRE was 
constantly trying to make up for the lack of progress in the 1980s Another 
interviewee, then a senior manager within the UK division and from 1990 an 
executive director, agrees believing that the “group did not do enough in the 1980s’
The majority of the 1980s was characterised by organic growth as the individual 
divisions attempted to expand their businesses For example, GRE’s life operation 
focused its attention on the sale of life insurance policies to back endowment 
mortgages. Through low premium rates and a tie up with the Nationwide Building 
Society, this business rapidly expanded However, the slump in the UK property
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market and rising interest rates had a highly detrimental impact - significantly 
reducing the demand for mortgage related life insurance and increasing the default 
rate on existing policies. The focus on mortgage related business also meant that GRE 
missed the opportunities presented by the boom in demand for personal pension 
policies after 19865.
One of our interviewees suggests that the reliance on organic growth was not a 
deliberate strategy He suggests that within GRE it was widely believed that the 
“company could not get big enough by organic growth” alone and the only way it 
would achieve the size required was through acquisition However, he indicates that 
while the chief executive accepted this need “he turned down any deal that came up” 
This interviewee suggests that this unwillingness to pursue acquisitions was also 
present lower down the organisation Potential opportunities would “just be knocked 
on the head within the corporate finance department” and never came to the attention 
o f  the executive.
Another executive director also suggests GRE did not pursue acquisitions to the extent 
that it should have done and consequently “opportunities were missed” He suggests 
this was due to a reluctance “to do anything that would be unfriendly towards another 
player”. Hence, “a hostile acquisition was not on the agenda” He describes his 
frustration at having worked on several possible acquisitions only to see them 
dropped.
5 Interview with an executive director
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Another executive, who joined GRE at the end of this period, argues that the company 
“lost an awful lot o f momentum in the 1980s”. He suggests that the organisation “had 
some very difficult decisions to make in the late 80s and failed to confront them”.
The passive environment of the 1970s and early 1980s coupled with the unwillingness 
to make acquisitions had allowed GRE to acquire a substantial level of surplus 
capital6 By the late 1980s, the company was coming under considerable pressure 
from institutional shareholders to make use of this surplus. It responded by initiating a 
series of overseas purchases. In 1989, it bought PMPA, the largest motor insurer in 
Ireland and three small life and non-life insurance companies in Italy. The Italian 
purchases were conducted in association with Italy’s second largest bank. Banco de 
San Paolo di Torino The company also started to put in place an acquisition in Spain7 *
However, in 1990 this initiative was dropped
The availability of surplus funds also persuaded the company to build its share of the 
UK motor insurance market by dropping premium rates. In 1989, total premiums for 
motor insurance grew although claims levels also increased substantially* A few of 
our GRE interviewees believe that this “dash for growth” was unintentional They 
suggest that the company failed to control the rates its sales agents were quoting 
Premium levels were lower than they should have been and this attracted a lot of new 
business that was high risk The severe slump in general insurance underwriting 
results in 1990/91 as the insurance cycle bottomed out meant that the initiative, 
whether deliberate or not was ill timed9
6 Interview with an executive director
1 Interviews w ith two senior m anagers
“ G RE Annual Review 1989
9 Interviews with two executive directors
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Management and Leadership
During most of the 1980s GRE was structured into 3 divisions -  UK, International and 
Investment The UK division was responsible for UK general insurance and life 
insurance worldwide. A general manager who was also a main board director headed 
each of these divisions -  Sid Hopkins, UK; Michael Harris, International; and Norman 
Shepherd, Investment and Finance These three executive directors and Peter Dugdale, 
the chief executive, had spent their entire careers with the company or prior to 1968, 
REA or Guardian According to one executive director, who until the AXA take-over 
had also spent his career with GRE, this was common throughout the company, 
particularly at senior levels as “promotions tended to come from within”. Several of 
our interviewees suggest that staff were also unlikely to move outside their division10
Several of our interviewees suggest that the divisions were highly autonomous One 
suggested that this was not a deliberate policy, but the result of competition between 
the staff in each business He also suggested that this was due to absence of challenge 
between managers, commenting that the attitude was one of “this is my area and it is 
nothing to do with you -  so go away”. He went on to say that “if you did find or 
thought something wasn’t right, raising it wasn’t welcomed and could be career 
limiting” Consequently, issues were “not pushed as hard as they should have been’’11.
10 Interviews with three executive directors
11 A point also made by another executive director
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One of our interviewees believed that the independence o f the businesses was more 
political in origin He likens the senior executive to “feuding barons” whom the chief 
executive was unable to control. He argues that “as a result, there was a complete 
power vacuum”. Yet as the principle of non-interference was institutionalised, there 
was very little open conflict within the organisation. Indeed, all our interviewees 
remarked on the friendly almost family or paternalistic atmosphere in the company.
The culture of non-interference was enhanced by the hierarchical nature of the 
organisation12. One director suggested that communication within the company was 
dominated by vertical channels and hence the only way to influence what was 
happening in another division would be via your executive director and then through 
the board Consequently, “there were no cross routes that were easily accessible”
Despite the presence of a highly formal hierarchical structure, there were very few 
formal control processes11 Management control relied on direct supervision It was 
suggested this was a throw back to the Bigland era and was not addressed until the 
arrival of James Morley, as finance director, in 1990. “Everything went up to Bigland 
and he made all the decisions, so there actually were no systems”. One senior 
executive commented on his surprise at the lack of financial systems when he joined 
GRE He commented that “it was a considerable shock, I mean one of the interesting 
things about coming [to GREJ was that I would learn and expand my skills base, but it 
was rather the opposite”. He goes on to state that “when [hej walked through the door 
[he] went back 15 years in management science”.
12 Separale dining rooms for slalT. managers and senior executive w ere not abandoned until the arrival 
o f  John Robin as CEO  in 1994.
11 Interviews with three senior executives
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Contact with Other Insurers
Close contact with other UK insurers continued during the 1980s both via personal 
contact and through the ABI, the Usual Friends and other industry associations (see 
Chapter 4). GRE managers closely monitored the activities of other composite 
insurers, particularly Commercial Union, Sun Alliance, Royal Insurance and by 1990 
General Accident. The main focus of this interest was on competing products and 
pricing and it was not unusual for a senior executive to complain to his opposite 
number in one of the other firms about premium levels offered to a specific customer.
The management of GRE at the time saw the company as being on a par with the 
other insurers They did not believe they could learn anything from them14 Many 
“genuinely believed that everything GRE did was done in the best possible way and 
that there was nothing that could be learnt from anyone else”15. One of our 
interviewees suggests that this feeling also extended to specialist areas It was 
indicated that the mistakes made during the acquisition of the Italian insurers during 
1989 would not have occurred if GRE had not been so arrogant and had brought in 
outside investment bankers
Strategic Planning
Until the end of the 1980s, GRE’s strategy had been “fairly adhoc”16 Although the 
business continued to remain profitable, some of the company’s managers were
H Interviews with four senior executives
15 Interview w ith an executive director
16 Interview with a senior manager
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concerned about the overall lack of strategic activity during the 1980s. They felt the 
company was not maximising its opportunities and was falling behind its competitors
In 1988, Sid Hopkins was made deputy chief executive and it was announced that he 
would be Peter Dugdale’s successor as chief executive. Hopkins was sceptical of the 
value added by some of the overseas operations and o f GRE’s head office17 He 
commissioned Spicer and Oppenhiem, an external consulting firm, to undertake a 
review of the direction the company was going in and the structures currently in place. 
A joint GRE/Spicer and Oppenhiem team was created which then set about reviewing 
the strategies and operation of the UK and overseas businesses Against a background 
of continued financial strength, the team presented a set of general recommendations 
to a group conference at the end of 1989 - to expand the life insurance business and to 
“grow [its general insurance operations] in the UK, North America and Europe”18. 
Financial targets for each operation were also proposed In addition, as a result of the 
review, a permanent centralised strategy team was created
Two of our interviewees were part of this strategy team They both expressed concern 
over the review. One suggested that the “process that was gone through [in the 
review] was simplistic and did not work in practice It was typical consulting type 
stuff based on two by two Boston matrices”. However, he believed some value was 
gained - “we didn’t have a history of being strong in that area so for most people it 
was revolutionary So it was a good start just to get you thinking about the issues” 
The other was more critical of the “reluctance to consider disposals or to be 
sufficiently ruthless about prioritisation”.
17 Interview with a  sen ior manager
11 Interviews with two senior managers
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Events overtook further development of the strategy as in 1990 GRE’s performance 
crashed and thoughts of growth were shelved
The Hopkins Era
1990 was a year of change among GRE’s executive directors. In May, Sid Hopkins 
replaced Peter Dugdale as chief executive. Dugdale, however, stayed on the board as a 
non-executive director. The two other executive directors, Michael Harris and Norman 
Shepherd, both retired. Caroline Burton replaced Norman Shepherd as head of 
investment. Jim McDonough became head of international and John Sinclair took over 
the UK division Although, these new executive directors had spent their entire careers 
with GRE, indeed within their own divisions, they felt frustration over the lack of 
change that had occurred in the 1980s19
Earlier in the year, James Morley joined the company as its first finance director The 
disastrous Italian acquisitions20 and the strategic review had prompted concerns over 
the lack of financial control systems This led to an insistence by the board that the 
finance function be split off from the investment division and that an external finance 
director be brought in21. Morley had previously been finance director of Avis Europe 
and before that with Arthur Anderson.
19 Interviews with two executive directors
20 One interviewee indicated that GRE lost a million pounds for every month that it owned its Italian 
subsidiaries. He described the Italian acquisitions as a  spectacular folly w hich GRE tried to run with a 
charm ing man but w ho d idn 't speak a word o f  Italian.
21 Interview with three executive directors
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Industry performance dramatically dipped with the insurance cycle in 1990 (see 
Chapter 4), however, because of its drive for growth in the late 1980s, GRE was in a 
poor position to weather this slump. After a record performance in 1989, the company 
suddenly reported its first ever loss in 1990. Some of our interviewees indicate that the 
seriousness of the company’s financial position was a surprise to many senior 
managers. One interviewee suggested that it was only through the changes that James 
Morley had implemented in the finance function that the true extent of the situation 
was realised. Morley discovered a “£60 to £100 million hole in the reserves”22 and 
“was able to demonstrate to the board that unless things were done GRE was 
technically in deep trouble”23. It was no longer a question of where to grow but one of 
survival.
Management and Leadership
As we have seen, the Hopkins era was characterised by the emergence of a new group 
of senior managers Driven by their frustration at the lack o f  progress made in the 
1980s they tried to make the firm more strategically active. These efforts were 
hampered by considerable inertia among other senior managers and within the 
organisation as a whole The freedom to take initiatives was also restricted by the dire 
position of the company in the early 1990s. However, these financial problems were 
also a factor in forcing through unpopular decisions and in gaining acceptance that 
change was required.
22 Interview with an executive director
23 Interview with an executive director
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Our interviewees indicate that some of the executive directors - John Sinclair, 
Caroline Burton and especially James Morley - believed that change was over due 
Other senior managers, while accepting that change was needed were less inclined to 
initiate that change Several of our interviewees suggest that these conflicting views 
slowed decision-making. One of our interviewees went further suggesting that if there 
was conflict on an issue it would not be raised or would be put off indefinitely. One 
executive commented that within his “previous company decisions would take hours 
but at GRE they would take weeks even months” . Others indicate that attempts to 
reach compromise meant that an overall strategic direction did not emerge. Instead, 
the focus was on individual strategic initiatives in reaction to external pressures24
Another director was “surprised at the quality of the people” within GRE when he 
arrived, commenting that he “found a lot of very able people particularly in their 
technical expertise”. He suggested, however, that while many o f the people were 
willing to embrace change “they lacked a vision of where the company wanted to go ’ 
A second interviewee agreed suggesting that there was no vision of where the 
business was going or [of what] things to change”. While a third director saw the lack 
of an overarching vision as a big problem. He likened it to skippering a sailing boat in 
a strong wind where if you have a goal, “you can make sure you are always tacking 
towards it [but] if you haven’t you will end up being swept off the map”
Following Morley’s appointment, the number of people being appointed from outside 
the company and the insurance industry began to increase Within the finance 
department, this inflow reached significant proportions However, with the exception
24 Interview s with four senior executives.
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of the new direct operation, this flow was not dramatic elsewhere in the company. One 
director believed that these new appointments had less influence than many of his 
colleagues’ claim. He argued that the “organisation is brilliant at neutralising change 
agents” and indicated that he “saw four or five people recruited in from outside [to 
stimulate change] go native within a month -  change agents would be turned round 
into people who felt they had to protect the existing organisation”. Three of our 
interviewees suggested that this ability to neutralise change agents was a result of the 
“family culture” that existed within GRE at the time. They suggested that agents of 
change “came in and found the good parts of that culture extremely attractive but were 
unable to sort out the good parts from the weaknesses and [hence end up] defending 
the whole thing”25.
One of these interviewees also suggested that change was “stifled by a bureaucratic 
way of doing business” While a senior manager argued that the level of formal 
bureaucracy increased dramatically during the first half of the 1990s. This increase 
was partly due to implementation of new financial control systems In addition, the 
UK head office wished to increase the level of centralised control To this end it 
increased reporting requirements and began to set financial targets for each business 
centrally. Two senior executives suggested that this move to increase centralisation 
caused some tension between the UK headquarters and a number of the overseas 
subsidiaries The “overseas managers saw themselves as chief executives of their 
businesses and did not welcome interference from London”26.
25 Interview w ith an executive director
26 Interview with a senior manager
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Contact with other insurers
The high level o f contact between GRE’s managers and those of the other UK insurers 
continued into the early 1990s. GRE also continued to “encourage its staff to partake 
in industry trade and professional bodies and to represent the business”. The company 
saw itself “as a major player in the industry and felt it should take its fair share of 
working for the industry”.
One interviewee who joined GRE during this period described the contacts with other 
insurers as “endless, it just goes on and on -  numerous meetings and technical 
committees”. Others suggested that while the contact with other insurers remained 
high the increasing competitiveness of the market meant that people were becoming 
more guarded about what information they passed on to their opposite numbers.
The company continued to view the other UK composites as its main competitors, i.e 
General Accident, Commercial Union, Sun Alliance and Royal Insurance. These four 
insurers would be watched closely although there was no formal competitor 
monitoring and appraisal system
Strategic Action
GRE extricated itself from the problematic Italian subsidiaries in 1991 and withdrew 
from a range o f overseas markets including Barbados, Kenya, Trinidad and Tobago 
and New Zealand Several of our interviewees indicated that James Morley drove
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through these moves. One commented that “anything that Morley found that wasn’t 
nailed down was sold”.
With poor financial performance continuing in 199127, Sid Hopkins instructed the 
Strategy unit, now led by John King, to review the options available to the company 
King produced a report at the end of 1991 detailing a ‘Survival and Recovery 
Strategy’. This appraisal was an attempt to identify core businesses and assess the 
minimum required size of overseas subsidiaries. The review cast doubts on the long 
term viability of the Canadian, New Zealand and Australian businesses Disposal of 
the company’s Swiss reinsurance subsidiary was also recommended as it was felt it 
was too high a risk for a company o f GRE’s size28
Two of our interviewees suggested the sequence of withdrawals in 1991 caused some 
tension among the executive One of these executives recalls that while there was a 
general acceptance of the survival and recovery report, there was opposition to 
actually carrying it out. There was particularly strong resistance to the 
recommendation that the Australian subsidiary be sold
Sid Hopkins was keen to find consensus among the executive over Australia and John 
King was sent out to investigate the subsidiary’s low profitability29 He discovered 
that despite high sales, policies were being under priced This apparent lack of 
management control convinced the executive that they should get out of Australia. 
One director indicated “it was a case that [the company] was hurting everywhere and
21 If the  com pany's performance had not improved in 1993 GRE would have dropped below the 
statutory m inim um  solvency required for an insurer.
a  It is unclear if  the sale o f  the New Z ealand subsidiary was the result o f this review or James M otley's 
urging.
29 Jam es Morlcy also visited the Australian subsidiary at this time to investigate the same issue
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simply the management distraction of trying to sort out Australia would have probably 
killed the group”.
All o f our interviewees, including those who had not at that stage joined the company, 
commented on the shock that this decision caused. One director explained that 
Australia had been in the group for over 150 years and was the first big divestment 
GRE had ever made, and hence no one thought it would actually be done. Another 
interviewee agreed, suggesting that most people thought “Australia was part of GRE 
culture” and “well yes they have produced all these documents and say they are going 
to do these things but none of it actually happens”.
Disagreement among the executive was not limited to the decision to pull out of 
Australia. One executive director indicated there was a fair amount of debate about the 
disposal process. He explained that despite the lessons o f the Italian venture “[He] and 
James [Morley] had to bang the table and say this time it has to be done properly and 
with proper advisors”. He continued that “it was only because the two of us together 
insisted, a mixture of an outsider and a trusted insider who could together be deemed 
technical experts in this area, that things were done differently”.
In 1992, the Australian subsidiary was sold to Zurich Insurance, for a stake in their 
Australian operation. In 1995, GRE completed its withdrawal by selling this stake 
back to Zurich
The performance of the industry began to improve in 1992 with the upturn in the 
insurance cycle (see Chapter 4) With this revival in fortunes, the board began to push
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the executive to agree a new direction for the company and John King was detailed to 
develop a new strategic plan. During 1993, King arranged a series of “away days” for 
the executive directors in the company flat in West London10. An executive described 
each of these meetings as a “full and open discussion, which continued until 
agreement was reached on each stage”.
The strategy that emerged was to “build on our core markets in the UK, Germany and 
the USA by building a wider range of products”30 1. At the same time it was the 
intention to maximise the profits stemming from Ireland and South Africa in both of 
which GRE had a high market share although in comparatively small markets The 
company’s Canadian operation was again targeted for disposal Some of our 
interviewees were critical of this review, seeing the result more as an eclectic list of 
proposed initiatives than a corporate strategy32.
An attendee at these reviews was critical o f the speed at which the group acted to 
implement the new strategy He suggested that there was a lack o f “strong will to 
drive through [initiatives], especially disposals” Despite pressure from John Sinclair 
and James Morley to move quickly there was considerable resistance from other 
senior managers.
30 An executive suggests in total between 6 and 8 m eetings were held
11 Interview  w ith a senior manager
32 Interview s with three executive directors.
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Two of our interviewees doubt that there was a clear strategy behind the moves that 
GRE made between 1992 and 1994. They suggested that the setting up of Guardian 
Direct (a telephone sales operation) in 1994 had been inevitable since 1990, but it had 
been delayed by the company’s poor performance, and that the acquisition of Orion, a 
personal lines and healthcare insurer, in 1993 was “opportunistic” Two other 
interviewees, however, suggest that the UK division had been intending to move into 
healthcare ever since 1990. On his appointment as head of UK, Sinclair had instigated 
a review o f the UK market and this had identified healthcare as a growth area 
Concerned that it would take 3 years to develop its own capability, GRE approached 
PPP and BUPA33 to distribute their products. Neither was interested in this 
arrangement and GRE had switched its attention to Orion However, with negotiations 
well advanced, Orion was put up for sale by ING, its Dutch parent company After 
initial approaches to acquire only Orion’s healthcare operation were rejected, GRE 
acquired both the healthcare and personal lines businesses
One executive director indicated that despite a very low price being agreed, clearing 
the Orion deal through GRE’s executive and board required a “disproportionate 
amount of work” He suggested this was a result of the problems encountered in Italy
"  The two largest UK healthcare insurance providers in the UK
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Guardian Direct
GRE’s decision to launch Guardian Direct had its origins in the 1980s. Direct Line 
had launched its innovative telephone sales operation in 1985 (see Chapter 4). 
Initially, the UK’s largest insurers, including GRE, did not take the new entrant 
seriously Whilst “it was seen to be an interesting experiment” there was a feeling of 
“you wait till they have to deal with all the claims [then they will run into problems] - 
until people really get involved with insurance they really do not realise how difficult 
it is”34. A senior manager explained that the insurers could not see “how they could 
service claims without a branch network -  you had to have face to face contact”. 
Although Direct Line began to thrive in the late 1980s, the traditional insurers were 
still unwilling to accept the new approach could be successful and began to suggest 
that the company was not managing its reserves properly35. They also claimed that 
Direct Line was “cherry picking” low risk policyholders. GRE and the other 
traditional insurers were also afraid that if they followed Direct Line they would 
alienate their brokers, who at the time they saw as their main customers3'’
Within GRE, the strategic planning group first suggested that the company should 
establish its own direct operation in 1989/1990 However, this proposal met 
considerable resistance from the UK division who were “afraid of upsetting their 
existing business”37. One executive commented that “it was another case of good 
intentions and slow execution”.
M Interview wilh a  Prudential executive director A senior GRE manager made a similar comment 
concerning G R E 's initial response 
”  Interviews w ith three senior executives 
Interviews w ilh Four senior executives 
17 Interview with a senior m anager
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By the early 1990s, the viability of direct telephone distribution was incontrovertible 
A number of GRE’s traditional competitors such as General Accident and Royal 
Insurance were beginning to set up their own direct operations. In 1991/1992, John 
Sinclair, recognising both that the move into direct was inevitable and that there 
would be considerable opposition to such a move, began to plan the establishment of a 
“green field direct operation”38. Eventually, GRE “built up the courage” to launch the 
direct operation. The move was sanctioned during the series of executive away days 
and put to the board in 1993. In 1994 GRE became one o f the “last of the major UK 
insurers to put in place a direct operation”39
While GRE was one of the last large UK insurers to set up a direct operation, when it 
eventually made its move it was by all accounts well planned. John Sinclair had seen 
the problems experienced by others in their use of existing staff, working practices 
and systems He believed the “key to success was a different culture” Consequently, a 
new location was chosen and a non-insurance senior executive recruited to head the 
new venture This new executive, Ray Pearce, had come from marketing in American 
Express before being involved in setting up the Mortgage Corporation, a direct 
telephone mortgage provider
With Sinclair’s encouragement, Pearce was able to ignore existing GRE rules and 
procedures and establish a highly independent operation New management and staff 
were recruited and a new set of working practices and customer service terms
“  Interviews with three senior executives 
<v Interview with two senior managers
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established. The start up was highly successful and by the end of 1998 GRE was the 
third largest direct insurer in the UK40
The Succession o f John Robins
Sid Hopkins retired in June 1994 after 46 years of service with GRE and Royal 
Exchange. His successor was John Robins who joined from Willis Corroon, the 
insurance broker, where he had been since 1984. Previously, Robins had worked in a 
diverse range o f industries having been group finance director of Fitch Lovell, chief 
executive of Bally (UK) and managing director of SNS Communications.
One executive director suggested that both James Morley and John Sinclair saw 
themselves as serious candidates to take over from Hopkins However, according to 
other executive directors there was concern over their age Both were in their mid to 
late forties and there was the prospect that if either became CEO they would be in the 
position for at least 10 years Mindful of the lack of progress made in the 1980s, the 
board felt this was too long a period. It was therefore decided to “get someone in who 
was in their mid fifties for a five year slog and then give a chance to an internal 
candidate”. Another interviewee, however, suggested that the general belief around 
the company was that “the board would not decide between the two [internal 
candidates] because they didn’t want to offend either and so the easiest [route] was to 
get an external replacement”. He went on to add that “knowing [the board] that is 
probably the most likely explanation” *
*  Recently doubt was cast on the risk profile o f  this business suggesting that the success was the result 
o f  under-pricing o f  prem ium  prices rather than the quality o f  the operation.
264
Chapter 7 Case Study Analysis -  GRE
An executive director suggested that the board’s decision to go outside the company 
to appoint a new CEO was also the result of seeing the positive impact other outsiders, 
such as James Morley, had had in stimulating change.
The Robins Era
The Robins era was one of considerable change particularly in leadership style and 
among the company’s top management. At the end of 1994 John King, the head of 
strategy left and in May 1995 Jim McDonough retired as head of international and as 
a director. McDonough had been with the company for 40 years.
In 1995, the group was restructured into six strategic business units: UK and Ireland, 
Americas, South Africa, Asia, Continental Europe and Investment The heads o f each 
of these divisions all reported to John Robins. John Sinclair remained head o f the UK 
division and Caroline Burton head of investment Volker Bremkamp, previously 
managing director of GRE’s German subsidiary became head of the European 
division and Victor Yerrill, previously managing director of GRE -  USA, became 
head o f the Americas division Both Yerrill and Bremkamp were also appointed to 
GRE’s main board The heads of the Asia and South African divisions were not made 
main board directors
This new structure gave the operating divisions more autonomy and meant that the 
way in which the corporate centre worked with the operating units had to be 
reconsidered. The increased autonomy reduced the requirement for head office 
functions and staff at the centre were cut by a third
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One of our interviewees suggested that the restructuring, together with both the 
changes in management style and an increase in the external recruitment of staff had a 
radical affect on staff. He suggested that this “quickly changed the culture within the 
corporate centre” although in the process John Robins gained an “enormously bad 
reputation within the organisation”.
The changes implemented by Robins cut through many of the traditional norms and 
procedures. However, while reporting systems were made more concise the level of 
formality increased The annual budgeting process was supplemented by quarterly 
reviews -  business management reviews (BMRs). Standardised packs were provided 
to each business unit that forced them to report progress in a uniform manner. These 
packs would then be reviewed at meetings between the unit’s management and the 
corporate centre, which Robins would attend. One interviewee who attended some of 
these meetings indicated that “the management teams were put through a pretty hard 
time and told that they were not doing enough”.
Management Style and Leadership
All of our interviewees indicated that the appointment of John Robins as chief 
executive had a significant influence on GRE. Many saw him as being a catalyst for 
change. One executive director suggested that “change was needed, more than we had 
realised and [Robins] set about doing it. .. it was like a breath of fresh air, he was 
looking at things and driving them through” Three other interviewees all agreed that
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one of the main effects Robins had on the organisation was to dramatically speed up 
decision making and change
An executive director indicated that unlike some previous chief executives “who 
preferred not to know bad news, [Robins] would never pretend a problem didn’t 
exist”. He was also prepared to drive through unpopular decisions While another 
admired the way Robins drove through the overseas disposals he had been suggesting 
since 1991 against considerable opposition and inertia41. A third highlighted how 
Robins would “very publicly nail stakes in the ground say that we would do this by 
then, and having told the board we are going to do it, it had to be done”. He suggested 
that this would “keep the pace [of change] up and was a way to prevent decisions 
being deferred”
Robins is described as a more aggressive and domineering character than his 
predecessors - one who expected others to follow his direction once he has made a 
decision. It was suggested that public challenge to his ideas was discouraged. 
However, most of our interviews revealed that privately he is open to persuasion and 
willing to change his mind
Contact with Other Insurers
The close contacts between GRE and the other UK insurers continued under Robins. 
In fact, with his recent background in insurance broking Robins already had close 
relationships with many of the other firms However, the new chief executive was
41 Despite Robins being the reason that th is executive left GRE at the end of 1994.
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“keen to make sure that GRE was not over supportive and putting up more than their 
fair share”42 of resources.
The influx of new people from outside the industry did reduce the degree to which the 
company was involved in the traditional industry and professional bodies. Many of 
these people preferred to develop contacts with their opposite numbers in the wider 
financial services field or the City.
Reviewing Group Strategy
On his appointment as CEO, Robins instigated a six month review of the company’s 
strategy The review looked at both the geographic spread of the business and at its 
product lines and made recommendations as to which areas should be targeted (e g. 
the USA) and which should be exited (e g Canada) In addition, an attempt was made 
to introduce more focus into the strategy This focus was achieved by establishing a 
set o f objectives which were then used to assess existing businesses and guide future 
initiatives43. A senior manager suggested that this “radically changed the way they 
looked at things, such that instead of trying to do everything for everybody it became 
we will only do things that are sensible to do - this is what we are and this is what we 
are going to do”.
One executive director who was part of the review team described the three basic 
goals that were established “Objective number one, the overriding objective, was to 
produce a return to the shareholders superior to that of the UK
' Interview with an executive director 
°  Interview with an executive director
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market” “Secondly GRE is a decentralised operation, not a global business, and it 
was the responsibility of each business unit to manage its own affairs” and reflect 
different local circumstances and business needs44. However, the group was to operate 
with one capital base with the centre allocating or withholding funds depending on 
profitability45. According to this interviewee “the third objective was [that GRE] will 
only participate in markets where [it] can have an impact on that market”. It was 
believed that to have an impact GRE needed to be one of the top three in that 
market46 However, there was considerable debate as to how the market or segment of 
a market should be defined. Another executive director commented that they “wished 
to be in regional niches where [they] could be in the first three [but] never defined 
what was actually meant by niche”. In his view the company was never able to clearly 
express its goals because a definition was never agreed
A third executive director had a similar opinion, suggesting that there was not a 
“clearly articulated strategy that was understood by everybody -  the manager in the 
pub was not able to explain what it was”. While a fourth was more critical 
commenting that “it was all very lovely on paper, but it was garbage when you looked 
at it".
Two of our interviewees were less concerned about the lack of definition, believing 
that the setting of objectives helped to make the company far more proactive than it 
had been in the past Tony Wyatt identified a number of strategic initiatives which 
were guided by the three objectives. The company sold its Canadian subsidiary in
44 Internal report on  G RE’s strategy produced following the 1994 review
45 Internal report on G RE’s strategy produced following the 1994 review and GRE strategy statement 
published on G R E 's  internet site. Also interview  with ano ther senior manager
46 Interview w ith  a  senior manager
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1996 because of its small share of the market and despite being profitable It adopted a 
policy of niche expansion in the USA47 More recently, and after the end of our study 
period, GRE also bought PPP, the healthcare insurance provider, to become number 
two in the UK heathcare market.
One executive director was less convinced that GRE’s actions were so deliberate. He 
suggested that what the strategic review did was to “eliminate what [GRE] was not 
going to do” and then allow enough flexibility so that “you can take advantage of 
opportunities as they present themselves”. He pointed to the acquisition of Legal & 
General’s commercial lines business and the RAC’s direct insurance business as 
examples of this flexibility.
The biggest criticism made of the strategy developed during 1994 was that it assumed 
that GRE would be able to survive as an independent entity Several of our 
interviewees believed that the company should have started looking for an alliance 
with an international partner at that time. The merger of Royal Insurance and Sun 
Alliance in 1996 forced GRE to look at the implications of consolidation within the 
industry James Morley set up a study. Project Simon, to look at the options available 
The merger of Commercial Union and General Accident in 1998 confirmed to many 
that the company could not remain independent. Although talks with a number of 
insurers were initiated, they came to nothing - partly reflecting GRE’s poor image 
among institutional investors In 1998 GRE essentially put itself up for sale48 and was 
acquired by AXA. Several of our interviewees suggested that the take over of GRE 
was unavoidable. They believe that the lack of progress that occurred in the 1980s
47 O ur mapping study suggests that this policy actually started during the last year o f  Sid Hopkins'
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combined with delays resulting from the slump in performance in the early 1990s 
meant there was just too much ground to be made up during Robins’ tenure
Summary
As in the Prudential case study there were varying degrees of continuity and change in 
the managerial and contextual aspects of GRE throughout the 1980s and 1990s Like 
the Prudential case material there were a number of strong themes that ran through our 
interviews with GRE managers Three of these themes showed little change during 
much of the study period -  a history of conservatism and co-operation, a lack of 
questioning of what the firm did or how it did things and a low level of challenge and 
debate among the company’s senior staff. A fourth theme saw considerable change 
over our study period -  the locus and manner of strategic decision-making
As our discussion shows, GRE had a long history of conservatism. Change was 
generally only instigated when its management realised that the company was being 
left behind by its competitors. This continued into the 1980s and 1990s.
The company also had a long history of close co-operation with the other UK insurers. 
Its managers continued to have close relationships with their industry peers and had a 
strong presence in the various trade and professional associations and groupings 
within the industry throughout the 1980s and 1990s4>
tenure as CEO.
'* The Sunday T im es 29“' November 1998
*  Our interviews suggest that John Robins even fell tltal the com pany was com m itting more than  its 
fair share o f personnel time to such groupings.
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, GRE clearly saw itself as a composite insurance 
company, with a performance on a par with most of the UK’s other large insurers. 
Certainly during the 1980s, many o f its managers believed the it was at least as good 
as its competitors However, during the 1990s the senior management began to admire 
the performance of General Accident and Commercial Union, and began to realise the 
company had fallen behind
In the 1980s, many of the senior managers believed strongly that GRE’s practices and 
processes were impeccable, even when (as the rejection of the use of investment 
bankers on the failed Italian acquisition showed) it came to expertise that not usually 
associated with insurers. The new cadre of managers who succeeded to senior 
positions in 1990, particularly the finance director, newly appointed from outside the 
industry, were more critical of the company’s capabilities and more willing to 
question the way in which it did business. However, their attempts to initiate change 
were frustrated by the slump in the insurance market in the early 1990s, by the 
unwillingness among other senior managers to make substantive changes and by the 
high level of inertia throughout the organisation as a whole. The barriers to change 
began to breakdown as the flow of outsiders into senior management positions 
increased, particularly after 1994, and with the arrival of a new and forceful chief 
executive.
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However, the concept of the company as an independent composite insurer was not 
seriously questioned50 until the mergers of Royal Insurance and Sun Alliance in 1996 
and Commercial Union and General Accident in 1998 (see Chapter 4 and 5). As a 
result, our interviewees suggested that the company succumbed to an unwelcome 
takeover and did not have having time to find a friendlier partner. This failure to 
question ‘what the company was’ and ‘what it should be’, was also behind the lack of 
a coherent and guiding vision for the company. While sporadic efforts were made to 
develop long term goals and guidelines, particularly during the Robins era, these 
efforts were still on going at the time of the AXA takeover.
Our case material indicates that during the 1980s GRE was highly segmented (Kanter 
1985) Each division was highly autonomous and there was a culture, among senior 
managers, of non- interference in another’s territory One division rarely challenged 
the strategic proposals or activities of another. This lack of challenge was exacerbated 
by the hierarchical nature of the organisation, which meant there were few channels 
for communication between divisions. The only way to influence another division was 
at executive director level.
Things began to change following the arrival of a finance director from outside the 
industry in 1990 and the promotion of a new group of executive directors However, 
there was still some resistance in some quarters, most notably within some of the 
overseas subsidiaries. There was also a tendency among some of the executive to 
defer discussion of controversial issues. Under John Robins, any opposition to
In the early 1990s Jam es Morlcy did al one point question the retention o f  G R E 's life insurance 
operation however he received little support from other senior managers.
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challenge or unwillingness to “grasp the nettle” was largely pushed aside - although 
some of interviewees suggest that challenging the ideas and decisions of the new CEO 
could be difficult.
There were significant variations during the 1980s and 1990s in the way decision­
making processes operated in the company. Prior tol980, the hierarchical nature of the 
firm meant that decisions were passed up the organisation for consideration or were 
avoided. Under Dugdale’s predecessor, this often meant to the CEO. During the 1980s 
the point of decision tended to be the divisional directors While there were formal 
procedures in place for obtaining approvals, the company lacked centralised strategic 
planning and appraisal systems After 1990, the new finance director began to put in 
place annual reviews of plans and budgets and a capital investment appraisal system 
These new systems ran alongside existing controls and had the effect of significantly 
increasing the level of bureaucracy. Over the course of the 1990s, the older systems 
were rationalised, hence reducing the level o f  formality of strategic decision-making.
The changes in strategic control systems also had an effect on the degree to which 
decisions were centralised After 1990, the involvement of the corporate centre in the 
decisions of the divisions and especially the overseas subsidiaries increased. Formal 
plans had to be submitted to the corporate centre, which were then analysed and 
assessed The effect was to reduce the autonomy of the company’s business units, 
which in some cases caused considerable conflict. However, the restructuring of the 
company in 1995 into divisional form based on geographic regions resulted in fewer
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decisions being taken by the corporate centre, although formal strategic control 
systems remained in place.
Like Prudential, our case study material for GRE indicates a range of themes that 
relate to the initiation and implementation of new strategies by the firm. Again these 
themes involve both the ability and capacity of managers and the context in which 
they operate In Chapter 6 we identified a range of factors we suspected would 
influence strategic agility -  a legacy of innovative behaviour, the way in which 
strategic decisions are made, the contact between members of an industry group and 
the characteristics o f managers. From our discussion of the GRE case study, it is again 
clear that these factors were significant components of the themes we identified 
However, in order to determine the relevance o f these factors to the strategic agility of 
the two firms we must take two further steps Firstly, we need to explore what existing 
literature has had to say on the influence o f such factors and secondly we need to 
directly compare the findings o f our two cases and focus more clearly on which 
factors influence strategic agility. These steps will be the focus of our next chapter.
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Chapter 8
Strategic Agility and Receptive Contexts
Introduction
In the last two chapters, we have described the findings of our case studies o f 
consistent early and late adopters of strategy In both cases, a number of themes were 
apparent in our data which highlighted a range of managerial and contextual factors 
related to the adoption of new strategies. These themes included the effect of new 
managers coming in from outside the industry, the firms relationship with its industry 
peers, the nature of the strategic decision-making process and the characteristics and 
interaction of the top management team
In this chapter, we will first review the innovation, institutional and contextual 
literatures to see the range of factors which may help to explain the strategic agility o f 
firms We will then describe the findings of the comparative analysis of the two case 
studies and identify the extent to which factors identified in these literatures explain 
the relative strategic agility of Prudential and GRE.
This chapter contains five sections. After this introduction, we will review the 
innovation, institutional and contextual literatures and show how these literatures may 
be used in the understanding of strategic agility Section three describes the findings 
of the comparative case analysis We detail four main factors that show significant 
differences between our two case study companies and were identified as having a 
influence on strategic agility. We also discuss the interdependence of these four
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factors In section four we argue that these four factors present dilemmas to managers 
in their efforts to increase strategic agility. The final section offers a short summary of 
Chapter 8.
Organisational Influences on Strategic Agility
Research on the Adoption of Innovations
The dominant perspective in the innovation literature proposes that firms will make a 
rational and independent choice as to which innovations to adopt, guided by a clear 
and certain view of the situation faced and the advantages provided by the innovation 
(Rogers 1983 and Abrahamson 1991). Abrahamson (1991) describes this approach as 
the efficiency choice model of innovation. He argues that an innovation may be 
adopted or discarded across a group of companies when the innovation addresses a 
similar performance gap in each company. The innovation will diffuse through a 
group rather than being adopted simultaneously (Rogers 1983).
The speed at which a company will adopt an innovation will be determined by the 
characteristics of the innovation and a number of contextual factors (see Mohr 1969, 
Zaltman et al 1973, Brown 1981 and Kimberley and Evanisko 1981). The internal 
contextual factors can be grouped into those that refer to the characteristics of the 
individual members of the organisation and those that refer to the character of the 
organisation
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The Influence o f the Characteristics o f Individuals on Innovativeness
Much o f the innovation literature argues for the impact of the characteristics or traits 
of individual senior managers on an organisation’s innovativeness (Mohr 1969, 
Kimberley and Evanisko 1981 and Wolfe 1994) This view of innovation assumes that 
certain individuals have personal qualities that predispose them to innovative 
behaviour (Slappendel 1996). Similar assumptions are found in the wider body of 
literature that addresses the influence o f senior managers on firm performance 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, Smith et al 1994, Glick et al 1993 and Pfeffer 1983).
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that an individual’s values and cognitive 
frameworks will determine their innovativeness and receptivity to change Values are 
defined as an individual’s broad tendencies to prefer certain states over others 
(Hofstede 1980) Personal values are conceptions of what the individual aspires to, 
while social values relate to what he or she finds desirable in others or in a social 
system, e g a company Cognitive frameworks or maps refer to the cognitive limits 
and biases that influence decision-making An individual’s cognitive framework will 
determine whether and how new stimuli will be noticed, encoded and acted upon 
(Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996) The concepts of values and cognitive frameworks 
are closely linked - an individual will cognitively screen and interpret information to 
suit their values
Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest that an individual’s values and cognitive 
framework are shaped by personal and professional experiences and highlight a range 
of ‘observable experiences’ such as age, tenure and formal education. The
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‘cosmopolitanism’ of individual senior managers - the degree to which managers have 
contact with people outside the firm or industry or the diversity of a manager’s 
experiences - is also widely highlighted by the innovation literature (Mohr 1969, 
Kimberley and Evanisko 1981, Rogers 1983 and Robertson and Wind 1983). The 
level of education attained and cosmopolitanism are consistently referred to as having 
a positive influence on innovativeness. However, the findings for the influence of job 
tenure are mixed Some writers assert that longevity in a job or company increases the 
individual’s legitimacy within the organisation and knowledge of how to influence the 
internal systems and politics in order to achieve a desired outcome (Rogers 1983 and 
Rogers and Shoemaker 1971). Others argue that new senior managers will bring fresh 
perspectives and views and are hence more receptive to innovation and change 
(Kimberley and Evanisko 1981 and Damanpour 1991).
Organisational sociologists warn o f  the dangers of reductionism inherent in 
identifying personality traits as determining organisational behaviour (Perrow 1970 
and Kimberley 1981). In addition, as Balbridge and Burnham (1975) show, a person’s 
organisational role and position may overshadow their individual traits (Slappendel 
1996) However, the research findings consistency indicate that individual attributes 
such education, age and cosmopolitanism cannot be ignored (Kimberley and Evanisko 
1981).
March and Simon (1958) and Weick (1995) argue that the effect of these cognitive 
limits and biases is to limit or bound rationality in decision-making. They indicate that 
these limits influence both what information is comprehended and how it is acted on 
However, where the innovation literature has adopted the concept of bounded
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rationality, it relates only to information search and sensemaking among individuals 
Hence, the literature recognises that the innovations considered for adoption will be 
restricted due to the limited scope of information search activities and the cognitively 
bound nature of the interpretation of that information However, the decision to adopt 
an innovation and the implementation of that innovation are then seen as being highly 
rational (Van de Ven 1986 and Slappendel 1996).
March and Simon (1958) argue that cognitive limits and biases exist at several levels 
of analysis -  individual, political and organisational However, the innovation 
literature has tended to concentrate on the influence that the traits of individual leaders 
have upon the innovativeness of an organisation. Slappendel (1996) indicates that this 
has been overdone and that innovation researchers should pay more attention to the 
beliefs and values of the senior management team as a whole rather than those of 
individuals. Hage and Dewer (1973) and Bantel and Jackson (1989) show that the 
values and composition of the dominant coalition or elite management group within 
an organisation have more influence upon its innovativeness than the values of 
individual executive directors or members of staff
As Slappendel (1996) implies, research that focuses on the influence of the firm’s top 
management team upon innovation is limited However, a more extensive body of 
findings is provided by research on the influence that top management teams have 
upon organisational performance (eg. Hambrick and Mason 1984, Hamel and 
Prahalad 1994, Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996 and O’Reilly et al 1993). As with the 
work on the innovativeness of individuals, researchers have concentrated on the traits
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and characteristics of senior managers, although it is the aggregate and degree of 
heterogeneity of those characteristics that is the focus.
Personal traits such as age, company and industry tenure, education and functional 
background are considered (see Bantel and Jackson 1989, Simons 1995). Low average 
ages, short periods of tenure and high educational levels are found to correspond to a 
high receptivity to innovation and change within the organisation and a willingness to 
take risks (Wiersema and Bantel 1992).
The small group of studies that relates directly to innovation indicate that 
heterogeneity or diversity of personal traits positively influences innovation and 
creativity (Bantel and Jackson 1989). However, within the wider performance 
literature the findings are mixed (Smith et al 1994 and Miller et al 1998). Glick et al 
(1993) and O’Reilly et al (1993) argue that such inconsistency is not surprising as 
diversity within the top management team can generate contradictory effects On the 
one hand it can increase conflict and inhibit the emergence of a strong culture, good 
communication and cohesion. On the other hand, it can stimulate change and 
creativity, improve environmental scanning and generate more informed decision­
making.
Several researchers have attempted to resolve this contradiction Priem (1990) 
advances a curvilinear relationship between diversity and performance, with extremes 
of homogeneity or heterogeneity being detrimental to performance Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven (1990) and Glick et al (1993) propose a contingency model where the 
degree of turbulence in the firm’s environment determines the appropriate level of
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diversity. They find empirically that in a turbulent environment a higher level of 
diversity among the top management team has a positive influence on firm 
performance. Other writers (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996, Simons 1995 and Smith 
et al 1994) have highlighted the importance of group dynamics and processes in 
enabling the positive effects of top management team diversity, an issue we will return 
to later in this chapter.
The Influence o f the Characteristics o f Organisations on Innovativeness
The influence of organisational variables on the innovativeness of an organisation has 
received considerable attention. Mohr (1969) suggests that the emphasis of this work 
has been subtly different from the emphasis of the research that addresses the 
influence of individual members of the organisation. The research on the influence of 
the individual member o f an organisation has tended to concentrate on their creativity 
or inventiveness Studies on the influence of organisational variables tend to exclude 
creativity and focus instead on the firm’s adoptiveness o f something ‘non-traditional’ 
whether it was invented within the firm or elsewhere However, it is unclear where 
individual creativity ends and adoption begins, or when the modification and adoption 
of an idea or innovation originating elsewhere becomes an invention in itself.
The most frequently investigated organisational determinants of innovativeness 
include the degrees of centralisation and formalisation o f the organisation’s decision­
making processes (Mohr 1969, Kimberley and Evanisko 1981 and Damanpour 1991) 
The impact of these attributes on the speed of adoption o f an innovation is however 
determined by a number of moderating variables -  type of organisation, type of
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innovation and stage of innovation. Damanpour (1991) in a meta analysis of previous 
innovation studies demonstrates that organisational form is the primary contingent 
variable, with type and stage of innovation as the intermediate variables
Bringing together earlier empirical work that takes an organisational level view, 
Damanpour (1991) indicates negative relationships between innovativeness and the 
degrees of formalisation and centralisation, a finding that supports Roger’s (1983) 
classic work on innovation diffusion. However, Damanpour’s research also shows that 
the implementation stage o f the innovation process requires a higher degree of 
formalisation and centralisation than the initiation phase Indeed a considerable body 
of literature (e g Zaltman et al 1973) indicates that increased formalisation and 
centralisation enhance innovation implementation.
Van de Ven (1993) and Eisenhardt and Tabrizi (1995) point out that at any point in 
time an organisation is likely to be in the process of adopting several innovations, 
each at a different stage of initiation and implementation The organisation’s 
innovativeness will depend on its ability to address the different requirements of each 
phase of adoption simultaneously. Thus, while decreases in formalisation and 
centralisation may increase innovativeness in the initiation phase, there will be a point 
at which this relaxation of control will disrupt implementation This suggests that both 
high levels of formalisation and centralisation and excessive levels of decentralisation 
and adhocracy will reduce innovativeness.
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Summary
The innovation literature thus provides a number of predictions about the emergence 
and diffusion of common business strategies Common strategies will occur when 
there is an obvious opportunity or threat to which there is an equally obvious 
response Each company’s strategic agility will be determined by a variety o f 
organisational and individual factors, which include the characteristics and diversity 
of the firm’s top management team and the degree of centralisation and formalisation 
of decision making. Early adopters will be those firms that are able to balance the 
competing demands of strategy initiation and implementation
Diffusion models of innovation have their detractors. Pettigrew et al (1992) argue that 
diffusion models tend to assume that the benefits and methods of implementing the 
innovation are clear and non-contentious While such situations may occur with 
technical innovations, in the majority of cases of strategy innovation the pay off 
matrix is unlikely to be so clear cut (see Spender 1993). Increasing levels o f 
uncertainty will emphasise the effect of institutional influences (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983 and Abrahamson 1991). If an innovation has no clear advantages or 
disadvantages an organisation will seek to legitimise its actions by adopting or 
retaining practices that fit prevailing social norms
The Institutional and Contextual Perspectives
Institutionalism provides a less rational picture of how strategy types appear and are 
diffused within an industry. This body of literature emphasises the role of mimetic
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behaviour in explaining patterns o f innovation in an industry (DiMaggio and Powell 
1983). The institutional perspective provides a mechanism by which an innovation can 
diffuse through an industry group when there is no clear necessity or obvious 
advantage for its adoption Opinion leaders are envisaged adopting or abandoning a 
particular initiative that is then consciously or unconsciously copied by others 
(Abrahamson 1991, Haveman 1993 and Greve 1995). As increasing numbers of 
organisations which are ‘structurally equivalent4, i.e. undertake similar activities and 
approaches, adopt the initiative it becomes increasingly institutionalised (Burt 1987 
and Djelic and Ainamo 1999). This increases the pressure to conform, leading 
additional firms to adopt the initiative
In assessing the speed with which a firm adopts a new initiative, two issues must be 
addressed Firstly, what determines the threshold level at which old institutional 
pressures are overcome and a new approach adopted? Secondly, which organisations 
will act as opinion leaders within an industry group?
The threshold level will reflect the degree to which an organisation is embedded 
within the dominant macroculture or institutional field operating in its environment 
Strang and Meyer (1994), Abrahamson and Fombrun (1994) and DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) argue that embeddedness is determined by a number of interrelated 
factors These include the degree to which the organisation is connected within its 
institutional field, its perceived similarity to other members of this field and the 
diversity/complexity of its activities. Drivers of these factors will include similarity of 
education and career background of key decision-makers and the degree to which they 
participate in trade and professional associations (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
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Greenwood and Hining’s (1996) discussion of the interplay of intra-organisational 
dynamics allows a deeper insight into factors explaining the embeddedness of a firm 
in its industry. They state that change initiatives are more likely to be adopted where 
there are internally competing patterns of values and a fluctuating balance of power 
between sets of actors within the dominant coalition. A variety of interpretative mind­
sets, whether stemming from different professional or career backgrounds, will disrupt 
the influence of a single institution field. A changing balance o f power between value 
sets, perhaps arising from the appointment of a new chief executive, will allow new 
ideas and approaches to gain favour
Greenwood and Hinings’ (1996) model provides a way in which new types of 
initiatives can overcome resistive normative and cognitive pressures However, for the 
initiative then to diffuse through an industry, the first mover must also be an ‘opinion 
leader or fashion setter’ (Haveman 1993 and Abrahamson 1991).
Haveman’s (1993) empirical study of savings and loans companies in the US is one of 
the few to address this issue In attempting to isolate which organisations are the 
leaders, she finds that ‘large organisations are especially strong role models for other 
large organisations’ She also contends that those organisations perceived as being 
profitable serve as role models for all organisations These findings imply that the 
most profitable organisations within a group will appear to be the early adopters, no 
matter what the nature of the strategy being adopted The above average performance 
of Prudential and General Accident and their identification as early adopters in 
Chapter 5 provides some support for this notion However, what is not clear is
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whether they are early adopters because of their performance, or whether their 
performance was the result of being early adopters -  the innovation literature 
(Damanpour 1991) and the work o f Lieberman and Montgomery (1988 and 1999) and 
Kerin et al (1992) would suggest the latter
At its core, the institutional perspective provides a model of adoption that is socially 
deterministic However, more recent literature in this area has begun to recognise a 
role for managerial action Oliver (1991) puts forward a number of strategies that 
management can pursue in response to institutional pressures Greenwood and 
Hinings (1996) argue that in addition to the dynamics of the dominant coalition, the 
adopting organisation must also possess a capacity to implement the change This 
view, for which there is growing support, signals a role for both management agency 
and structuralism, a duality that is at the heart of the work of Giddens (1979) and of 
contextualism (Pettigrew 1985, 1990).
The focus of the contextualists is on the interplay between internal and external 
factors on the birth, evolution and development of strategies within firms (Pettigrew 
and Whipp 1991). In this view o f innovation, managers are seen as being capable of 
mobilising aspects of the inner and outer context in order to reconfigure the pattern of 
attachment to different strategic alternatives Such dynamics are revealed through an 
exploration of the links between the context, content and process of strategy over long 
periods of time (Pettigrew 1985). Strategies will be adopted as a result of key 
individuals recognising opportunities or threats in the company's environment and 
convincing others in the controlling dominant coalition o f the accuracy of the 
interpretation and appropriateness of the proposed response Implementation of the
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strategy rests with the ability of the dominant coalition to mobilise the required 
resources
The ability o f the firm to adopt a new strategy will be bounded by the context of the 
firm including the external environment, and the quality of internal attributes such as 
leadership skills and human resources (Pettigrew and Whipp 1991). In the event of a 
change in the environment, the organisation which first perceives and interprets this 
change, and then mobilises the appropriate resource will be the quickest to respond
A similar contextual perspective is provided by a co-evolutionary view of 
organisations (Baum 1996, McKelvey 1997 and Lewin et al 1999). This view 
describes organisations, their populations and their contexts as co-evolving as a result 
of the interplay of managerial actions, institutional influences and environmental 
phenomena (Van den Bosch et al 1999)
Lewin et al (1999) use March’s (1991 and 1995) idea of organisational adaptation to 
link their co-evolutionary view to innovation and organisational learning. March 
(1991) describes organisational adaptation in terms of a dichotomy between 
exploration of new possibilities and the exploitation of old certainties. Exploration is 
associated with innovation and experimentation, while exploitation involves the 
refinement and elaboration of existing ideas Levinthal and March (1993) argue that 
the long term survival of an organisation depends upon it ‘engaging in enough 
exploitation to ensure the organisation’s current viability and in enough exploration to 
ensure its future viability’ They argue that there must be a balance between 
exploration and exploitation to ensure its survival
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Lewin et al (1999) argue that firms tend to favour exploitation, as it will produce short 
term improvements in performance However, over time the advantages provided by a 
history of such over-emphasis will decay In contrast, they assert that firms that have a 
legacy of higher rates of exploration will continue to be more innovative and be more 
likely to generate above average returns.
While the concept of exploration and exploitation is intuitively attractive, it is not 
without its problems. In particular, it raises questions concerning the identification of 
innovation, i.e to what extent must a new practice be new and to whom must it be 
new before it is an innovation and therefore an explorative move As Schumpeter 
(1934) pointed out innovations are always some combination of the new and the old
Pettigrew (1999) argues that the concepts of exploration and exploitation have failed 
to address key questions regarding the 'micro processes of choice and change as firms 
struggle to exploit and forget their histories and invent their futures’ Researchers 
adopting the co-evolutionary view have also tended to ignore these issues, 
concentrating instead on populations of firms and the relationship between 
exploration/exploitation and firm performance (see Frese and Theuvsen 1997 and 
Hunter et al 1996)
An exception is provided by Van den Bosch et al (1999) where co-evolution and the 
exploration/exploitation dichotomy is linked to a firm’s capacity to evaluate and 
utilise 'outside knowledge’ Drawing on Cohen and l.evinthal’s (1990) concept ot 
absorptive capacity’, they define three dimensions of knowledge absorption
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efficiency, scope and flexibility. Efficiency refers to how firms identify, assimilate 
and exploit knowledge Scope is the breadth o f the knowledge the firm draws upon 
and flexibility refers to the extent to which the firm can access additional knowledge 
and reconfigure its existing knowledge. Van den Bosch et al (1999) link efficiency of 
knowledge absorption with exploitation and scope and flexibility in absorption with 
exploration. They argue that in a stable environment organisations need to concentrate 
on improving the efficiency of knowledge absorption, while in a turbulent 
environment they must increase the scope and flexibility of their absorptive capacity
Overview of the Organisational and Individual Influences on Strategic Agility
Our review of the literature indicated that research on innovation, institutionalism and 
contextualism offer explanations of the development of patterns of strategy in an 
industry and what determines which firms are early and late adopters
The innovation literature offers three hypothesis relevant to our study Firstly, the 
efficiency choice view (Abrahamson 1991) o f diffusion affirms that for a strategy to 
be adopted by all members of an industry group there must be a clear opportunity or 
threat and the benefits of that new strategy must be equally obvious Secondly, the 
demographics of the top management team will partly determine the company’s 
receptivity to new initiatives Early adopters will be those firms with a high level of 
diversity in the traits and characteristics o f their senior managers Finally, the 
innovation literature indicates that a number of internal organisational factors will 
influence the strategic agility of the firm Initiating and implementing innovations
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place conflicting demands on the organisation in terms of the appropriate degree of 
centralisation and formality (Van de Ven 1993 and Eisenhardt and Tabrizi 1995). 
Early adopters will be those firms able to accommodate these conflicting 
requirements
An institutional perspective also provides additional hypotheses to explain the 
diffusion of strategy through an industry. Haveman (1993) argues that members of an 
industry group will tend to imitate, either consciously or unconsciously, the actions of 
the largest or most profitable firms in that group The speed at which firms will adopt 
new initiatives, and therefore whether they will be an early or a late adopter, will be 
influenced by the degree to which they are embedded within the prevailing 
institutional field or industry macroculture (Abrahamson and Fombrun 1994, 
Greenwood and Hinings 1996 and Oliver 1991). The degree to which embeddedness 
varies between organisations depends on a variety of factors These include the 
connectedness of the organisation to other members of the industry group, the extent 
to which the firm perceives itself to be similar to other organisations in the industry 
and the homogeneity of management within the firm (Strang and Meyer 1994 and 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) suggest that an organisation is more likely to adopt 
new ideas and abandon institutionalised practices if among the firm’s dominant 
coalition there are competing mindsets or values, a dissatisfaction with the current 
strategic direction and performance and fluctuations in the balance of power between 
interest groups in the firm While such factors may allow new approaches to become 
accepted within the organisation, management must possess the ability to implement 
change if the firm’s behaviour is to alter
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The contextual view goes further in recognising the role played by management 
capability. This literature (Pettigrew and Whipp 1991 and Pettigrew et al 1992) 
indicates that whether a firm is an early or late adopter will partly be determined by its 
management’s ability to sense and interpret signals from the environment and then 
initiate an appropriate response The ability of management to assess its environment 
and the range of possible actions it can take will be shaped by the environment in 
which it operates, including its institutional context. However, such delimiting factors 
on change may be overcome by managerial action directed to build more receptive 
contexts for change (Pettigrew et al 1992).
A contextualist perspective is also taken by researchers adopting a co-evolutionary 
view (Baum 1996, McKelvey 1997 and Lewin et al 1999) The focus of this work has 
been on March’s (1991 and 1995) concept of exploration and exploitation and its link 
to firm performance. However, it does imply two determinants of strategic agility. 
Firstly, firms with a history or legacy of innovation are likely to continue to be 
innovative (Lewin et al 1999) Secondly, the ability of firms to absorb knowledge 
concerning their context will influence their adoptiveness In a turbulent environment, 
those firms which have a wide knowledge base and can quickly assimilate new 
knowledge or reassess existing knowledge will be more responsive (Van den Bosch et 
al 1999)
Table 8 I summarises some of the factors that the innovation diffusion, institutional 
and contcxtualist perspectives suggest will influence the adoption of common business 
strategies across an industry group
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Perspective Driver of Common 
Strategy
Determinants of 
Adoptivcncss
Identity of Early 
Adopter
Innovation
Adoption
O bvious opportunity o r 
threat to  w hich there is 
an equally obvious 
response.
Organisational and 
individual attributes, 
including TM T 
dem ographics and 
diversity, and degree 
o f  form alisation 
and centralisation.
Diversity am ong top 
m anagem ent team. 
Balances organisational 
dem ands o f  initiation 
and implementation.
Institutionalism N orm ative and 
cognitive mechanisms 
in uncertain 
environm ents.
Degree o f
em beddedness in the 
dom inant macroculturc 
o r institutional field  
C onnectedness and 
perceived similarity. 
Presence o f  competing 
value sets and changing 
balances o f  power.
Relatively low level o f  
em beddedness and 
position as opinion 
leader. Opinion leader 
perceived as 
successful/ profitable.
Contextualism
/ Co-evolution
O ptions bounded by 
o rgan isa tion 's context.
M anagerial ability to 
scan and interpret the 
environm ent and 
m obilise resources to 
enact change.
History o f  exploration 
and high absorptive 
capacity.
O rganisation most 
proficient in 
interpreting and 
responding to change 
in the environment.
Table 8.1 -  Adoption of Common Strategy Content -  Summary of the Literature
Cross Case Analysis
In Chapter 6 we highlighted a number of organisational level factors that we thought 
could be related to the strategic agility of a firm. Our analysis centred on four sets of 
factors -  the way in which strategic decisions were made and implemented, the 
influence of the firm’s interaction with other companies in its industry, the 
composition and interaction of the firm’s top management team, and the impact of 
individual managers It was clear from our discussion of the case studies that these 
factors were important components o f the main themes identified in the case study 
material Our review o f the innovation, institutional and contextual literatures has
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shown that they influenced both the speed of adoption of innovations and firm 
performance We also used this literature to predict which organisational level factors 
would influence strategic agility. We will now begin to focus on particular factors 
and, by comparing the two case studies, identify those that influence strategic agility.
Our comparative analysis was an ongoing process of identifying those differences or 
contrasts between the two case study companies that related to strategic agility. We 
were helped by the fact that there were variations in agility over time in both o f the 
two companies (see Chapter 5). This meant that by comparing the cases we were able 
to identify factors that influenced strategic agility. We could then check that they were 
significant by using them to explain the variations over time
As our inductive analysis continued, four interlinked factors began to emerge which 
seemed to explain the relative strategic agility of Prudential and GRE These four 
factors were well supported in the innovation, institutional and contextual literature 
and strongly evidenced by our interviews As they emerged, we began to explore them 
with our interviewees and found that their hypothesised relationship with strategic 
agility received strong support The four factors were ‘degree of formalisation and 
centralisation of strategic decision-making’, ‘embeddedness within the industry 
macroculture’, the ‘internal dynamics and individual characteristics of the dominant 
coalition’ and capacity for action’
We will examine each of these four factors in depth using the contrasts between our 
two case studies and the variations through time in each case to show how they 
emerged and how they are linked to the literature
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Degree of Formalisation and Centralisation of Strategic Decision-Making
The first factor that emerged in our analysis, which showed significant variation both 
between our two companies and over time, was the degree of formalisation and 
centralisation of their strategic decision-making From our review of the innovation 
literature (Damanpour 1991), we would expect that the more formal and centralised 
the strategic decision-making is within the organisation, the less strategically agile the 
firm. However, if decision-making becomes too informal or too decentralised, we 
would expect the implementation of strategies to suffer
Our interviewees were highly consistent in how they described the degree of 
formalisation and centralisation that existed in each organisation and how it varied 
over time Figures 8 1 and 8 2 demonstrate both the differences between the two 
companies and the differences between three time-periods These time periods were 
1981 to 1990, 1990 to 1995 and 1995 to 1996 for Prudential and 1981- 1990, 1990 to 
1994 and 1994 to 1996 for GRE
These figures were produced by coding the interview transcripts according to the 
answers they provided to two questions, the responses to which would indicate the 
degree of formalisation and centralisation For example, one of the questions was 
‘Was strategic decision-making formalised?’. Four responses were possible, ‘yes’, 
‘no’, ‘it changed during the period/it varied across the organisation’ or ‘there was no 
relevant data for this period’ An independent inter-coder reliability check gave a 
reliability score of between 86% and 90%‘. Each response was then shown on the 
figures with shading to show if it indicates a high or low level of strategic agility -
1 The reliability score was calculated by the independent re-coding of three interview transcripts for the 
sets o f question relating to all four factors identified by th is study as influencing strategic agility. The 
rc-coding was then com pared to the original coding and a percentage score calculated
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black shading is used to indicate an increase, hatched shading that it changed or varied 
across the company, no shading with text only, a reduction, and no text and no 
shading that there was no relevant data Hence, if an interview indicated that decision­
making was highly formalised, as the interview with ML of Prudential did, then a 
‘Yes’ would be coded As the predictions made by our literature review suggested that 
a highly formalised decision-making process would be expected to reduce strategic 
agility, a ‘Yes’ response would imply a reduced level of agility -  and so when 
constructing Figure 8.1 the text response without shading would be entered against 
this question for the interview with ‘ML’.
Prudential
Figure 8 1 shows how the degree of formalisation and centralisation in Prudential 
varied during the 1980s and 1990s A low level is apparent for both in the 1980s 
during Corby’s tenure as CEO. Under Newmarch, formality and centralisation 
increased dramatically Although, there is less data for the period when Davis was 
CEO, the level of formalisation and centralisation appeared to have reduced This 
pattern is strongly supported by the comments of our interviewees, which are detailed 
in the forthcoming paragraphs
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The restructuring of the company from a functional to a divisional form in 1984 and 
the appointment of divisional directors were identified by several of our interviewees 
as having a key influence on both the number of new strategic initiatives and the 
speed with which they were adopted. The restructuring increased the extent to which 
strategic decisions were decentralised and meant that each division was in competition 
for resources As one Prudential executive director commented “instead of the CEO 
just looking at things centrally, you then had five people each looking at their own 
area and so you’d get five sets of ideas being generated and being pushed through”
The impact of the restructuring was made all the greater by the informality o f the 
decision-making process As another executive director commented “under Corby 
there was a freedom for individuals to go and decide to do something”. The lack of 
formalisation of strategic decision-making and control is clearly illustrated by the 
acquisition of Jackson Life in the USA, where the international director “made up the 
procedure as he went along”.
The level of formalisation was to increase dramatically however in the early 1990s 
following Newmarch’s appointment as CEO As one executive explained “Newmarch 
wanted a control structure that would impress by its quality and not its size -  but it 
just got bigger and bigger and it got bogged down”. Several of our interviewees 
shared this view and believed that the control mechanisms introduced stifled the 
emergence of new ideas and initiatives One executive director said, “procedure 
became a nightmare” and another that it was a case of “paralysis by analysis”
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The increase in formalisation and the more rigorous analysis of proposals that came in 
with it also meant an increase in the level of centralisation. Strategic proposals 
generated by the divisions had to be submitted to the finance department for analysis 
and then to the CEO for approval He also wanted to be involved in the day to day 
operations of the divisions. For example, one executive described how the CEO would 
express his opinion of lower level managers, on occasions forcing their dismissal.
Several of our interviewees indicated that the level of formalisation and centralisation 
began to be relaxed towards the end of Newmarch’s tenure They felt that he became 
increasingly disenchanted with the amount of his time he had to devote to the system 
As one director commented “he eventually got tired o f carrying huge bundles of 
papers with him to read and approve”. It was also felt that the growth of the control 
structure began to subside with the departure of Michael Lawrence, the finance 
director, as Newmarch had relied on Lawrence for its delivery Finally, Newmarch 
was becoming increasingly caught up in his row with the industry regulator and it 
became untenable for him to be deeply involved in the analysis and approval of every 
initiative
During Davis’ tenure as CEO the level of centralisation and formalisation decreased 
again Davis was less concerned about being involved in everything and was willing 
to delegate more responsibility to his executive directors In addition, decision-making 
became less procedural It became more of an iterative process of taking soundings 
and finding consensus -  as one executive commented it was a case of “talking to a lot 
of people in a sort of political process and doing what the majority think” The 
purchase of Scottish Amicable demonstrates this greater flexibility The process
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followed in this acquisition had much in common with that of Jackson Life in 1986. 
Board approval ‘in principle’ was obtained to acquire a UK life insurer with 
guidelines being set as to the type of company that was to be sought and the level of 
price to be paid Prudential’s management then had a free hand to go out, find a 
suitable target, and negotiate a deal
Guardian Royal Fjcchange
Figure 8.2 demonstrates that the patterns of change in the degrees of formalisation and 
centralisation of strategic decision-making within GRE are less obvious than they 
were in Prudential. Our interviews showed that, prior to 1990, GRE was hierarchical 
and tradition bound. Issues were referred up the command chain for a decision or were 
ignored In the 1970s, “everything went up to [the CEO] and he made all the 
decisions”. His successor, who was chief executive during the 1980s, was less 
inclined to take decisions. Consequently, there was a degree of decentralisation in that 
decisions tended to be taken by the divisional heads
During the 1980s there was a notable absence of effective strategic control systems 
such as budget reviews and strategy and capital expenditure appraisal However, 
formal administrative procedures were extensive. One executive director likened the 
system to treacle, stating that “there was the big risk that you would get caught in the 
treacle and not be able to move”, even if people wanted to do things they “just got 
stifled by the bureaucracy”
After 1990, the company began to adopt standard strategic control systems such as 
capital expenditure appraisals and annual budgeting and planning reviews. However,
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the old bureaucracy remained in place. As one executive complained -  “you ended up 
with two bureaucracies, you still had the old one, which a lot of people thought was 
important, and then you had the new one being put in”. The effect was to greatly 
increase the level of formalisation of decision-making
The moves to introduce formal strategic control systems also meant an increase in 
centralisation, which impacted particularly on the overseas subsidiaries The “overseas 
managers saw themselves as chief executives of their own businesses” and objected 
strongly to the new procedures which diminished their autonomy There was 
considerable tension between the subsidiaries and the corporate centre, to the extent 
that on one occasion, as one of our interviewees described, senior managers had to 
“visit” an overseas subsidiary in order to force the adoption of the new system. The 
overseas manager’s concern was that with more centralisation there was less 
flexibility to respond to local conditions.
During the period that Robins was CEO (1994 onwards) many of the new strategic 
control systems became more formalised, e g annual budgeting and planning had to 
be conducted on pre-prepared forms. However, the level o f bureaucracy overall was 
cut Summarising the level of formality over the 1990s, one senior manager described 
how the company “had gone through a hump, [it increased] to a quite hefty level of 
formality and then came back to a compromise position where there was some 
formality and some flexibility”. During the early 1990s “there was more paper coming 
into the centre than there were trees, with a 100 page document required to justify the 
strategy of each business unit”, while under Robins the information required could be 
presented in less than ten pages
302
Chapter 8 -  Strategic Agility and Receptive Contexts
The reduced level of formality increased the authority of the business unit managers 
and hence increased decentralisation In 1995, a divisional structure based on 
geographic areas was adopted. With regional managers reporting directly to the CEO, 
rather than via the international group director, their authority was further increased
Several of our interviewees argued that with the reduction of formalisation the speed 
of decision-making improved One executive director also felt that it allowed the 
company to be more opportunistic and react to opportunities as they occurred
Strategic Agility and Degree o f Formalisation and Centralisation
Our discussion of the variations over time of the degrees of formalisation and 
centralisation in our two case study companies clearly indicates that they influenced 
the speed and ability of each company to initiate or react to change The individual 
effect of either centralisation or formalisation was difficult to establish, as in our two 
case studies a change in one resulted in a change in the other
In the 1980s, the highly informal approach to decision-making in Prudential, 
combined with the increased level of decentralisation that followed the restructuring 
of 1984, both encouraged the initiation of new strategic initiatives and enabled them to 
be implemented quickly Hence, strategic agility was enhanced The dramatic increase 
in formalisation (and with it increased centralisation) in the early 1990s “stifled new 
ideas” and in some cases slowed action This reduced strategic agility After 1993
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however, and particularly following the appointment o f Davis as CEO in 1995, the 
relaxation in the level of formality again had a positive influence on agility.
By comparison, during the 1980s GRE was described as being highly bureaucratic and 
hierarchical. Decision-making was heavily formalised and centralised and as a result 
the intrepreneurship (Pinchot 1985) which was observable in Prudential during the 
same period, was suppressed. The effect was to reduce the number of initiatives that 
were proposed and to slow any decision to implement them. As a result, during the 
1980s the level of GRE’s strategic agility was far lower than Prudential’s. The 
overlaying of an additional set of strategic controls in the early 1990s further 
increased the “treacle” and increased the negative influence on strategic agility
Under Robins the reduction in formalisation and centralisation increased the 
autonomy of business managers and with it their freedom to act and be flexible. The 
speed of strategic decision-making increased partly because of the reduced 
formalisation and partly as the corporate centre was taking fewer decisions 
Consequently strategic agility was positively influenced
Our identification of the degree of formalisation and centralisation as a factor that 
influences strategic agility finds strong support in the innovation literature 
(Damanpour 1991 and Kimberley and Evanisko 1981). However, this literature also 
indicates that this contextual factor could lead to a loss of control over the 
implementation of a new strategic initiative
304
Chapter 8  -  Strategic Agility and Receptive Contexts
Our Prudential case study provides evidence of this negative effect of a low level of 
formalisation and centralisation. In the 1980s Prudential moved rapidly to establish its 
estate agency chain, and was the first mover not just among the UK insurers but also 
among the wider financial services sector However, the company lost control of the 
implementation of this new strategy and failed to consider fully the viability of a 
nation-wide chain of agents or the potential of cross selling insurance products.
Newmarch’s enthusiasm for procedure and rigorous analysis was strongly influenced 
by this failure. However, it is apparent that his efforts went too far So, while 
initiatives such as the exit from the estate agency business were well planned and 
implemented, the initiation of new ideas was stifled We will return to the dilemma 
that the conflicting advantages of high and low levels of formality and centralisation 
pose later in this chapter
Embeddedness in the Industry Macroculture
The second factor we identified from our cross case analysis as influencing strategic 
agility was the extent to which the firm is embedded in the industry macroculture 
This factor reflects the influence of institutional pressures upon the organisation and 
upon the speed with which it can adopt new strategies From our review of the 
institutional literature (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Oliver 1992 and Abrahamson and 
Fombrun 1994) we would expect a high degree of embeddedness to reduce a firm’s 
strategic agility
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Our inductive analysis indicates three factors that explain the extent of institutional 
embeddedness -  how the firm perceives its performance relative to other firms in its 
industry; the perceived similarity/dissimilarity to other firms in the industry; and the 
degree of connectedness to other firms in the industry.
How these three factors influence the degree to which a firm is embedded within the 
industry macroculture and therefore the degree to which it is subject to institutional 
pressures is described by the institutional literature (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 
Greenwood and Hinings 1996 and Haveman 1993). The degree of connectedness 
refers to interpersonal contact between executives within our sample of nine UK 
insurers Frequent interaction reinforces industry norms and values and stimulates 
awareness o f any new practices that have become institutionalised (Strang and Soule 
1998 and DiMaggio and Powell 1983). The more managers perceive their firm to be 
similar or structurally equivalent to others in their industry group the more likely they 
are to accept the prevailing norms and values that have become institutionalised 
within that group (Greenwood and Hinings 1996 and Strang and Soule 1998). 
Similarly, if its management perceives the performance of a company to be on a par 
with that of others in an industry group, its membership o f that group and the 
appropriateness of existing institutionalised practices is reinforced (Strang and Soule 
1998).
Our interviewees were consistent in their descriptions of the extent to which each of 
these three factors was present. Figure 8.3 and 8.4 demonstrate the level of 
embeddedness of the two companies during the 1980s and 1990s and the consistency 
of the support given by our interviewees’ responses In both cases, they show a high
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level of continuity in the level of embeddedness throughout the study period The 
figures were generated following the same method used to construct Figures 8 1 and
8.2, i.e. by coding the transcript for each interview according to the response it 
provided to questions indicative of the three factors we had identified as determining 
the degree of embeddedness2
Prudential
Figure 8 3 and our interview data demonstrate that the level of embeddedness of 
Prudential in the macroculture of the insurance industry was declining in the 1980s 
and remained at a low level during the 1990s. As one executive explained “ten years 
ago (the early 1980s) we would have seen our competitors as the UK insurance firms, 
but increasingly it became the banks and major building societies”. In the 1980s while 
contact with other UK insurers remained high, the senior managers of Prudential were 
ceasing to perceive the company as an insurer These managers also believed that the 
company was out performing its rival insurers by a considerable margin, for example 
a director commented “in the traditional insurance field Prudential was the leader and 
the others tended to follow”
'  Four responses were allow ed -  ‘yes’, ‘no’, ‘it changcd/il was varied across the organisation' o r ‘there 
was no relevant data fo r that period’ Responses were shaded in figures 8.3 and 8 4 according to 
whether they related to  a  high level o f  agility (black shading), that it changed or varied across the firm 
(grey shading), a low level o f  strategic agility (no shading with text) or that there was no data (no 
shading or text). If the interview w ith one o f  our interviewees indicated a ‘y es’ answ er that indicated a 
high level o f  agility a  black bar would be show n on the figure against the appropriate question and 
under the interviewees initials. An inter-coder reliability check gave a  reliability score between 86% 
and 90%.
307
Ch
ap
te
r 8
 -
 S
tra
te
gi
c A
gi
lit
y 
an
d R
ec
ep
tiv
e 
Co
nt
ex
ts
Fi
gu
re
 8
.3
 -
 E
m
be
dd
ed
ne
ss
 in
 th
e 
In
du
st
ry
 M
ac
ro
cu
ltu
re
 -
 P
ru
de
nt
ia
l
C
ha
pt
er
 8
 -
 S
tra
te
gi
c A
gi
lit
y 
an
d R
ec
ep
tiv
e 
Co
nt
ex
ts
Fi
gu
re
 8
.4
 -
 E
m
be
dd
ed
ne
ss
 in
 th
e 
In
du
st
ry
 M
ac
ro
cu
ltu
re
 - 
G
R
E
Chapter 8 -  Strategic Agility and Receptive Contexts
By the 1990s, the prevailing view was that Prudential had become a medium to long 
term savings company and was no longer an insurance firm. Contact with other 
insurers had been drastically cut or was delegated to lower level managers -  
“Newmarch was very much ‘keep your distance from the other insurers’ and so we 
tended not to involve our senior staff in ABI or other industry activities”. In addition, 
while the performance and management skill of General Accident and Commercial 
Union were applauded, many of the Prudential managers were “highly sceptical” of 
the performance and management of the other UK insurers. As one senior manager 
described “a lot of Prudential people were dismissive of what the other insurers were 
doing, even going back into the Corby period”
Guardian Royal Exchange
In contrast to Prudential and as Figure 8.4 shows, GRE was highly embedded within 
the macroculture of the industry. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, GRE’s managers 
saw the company as a composite insurer and as having a high level of similarity to the 
other insurers in our sample. They had considerable contact with their peers in the 
industry both at a personal level and through industry groupings, such as the ABI (see 
Chapter 4) As one GRE director commented “they spent all their time meeting [their 
peers] at all these rubber chicken dinners at various levels”, while another commented 
“there is endless contact [with the other insurers], and it still happens, numerous 
meetings, all kinds of committees, technical exchanges it just goes on and on!” 
Towards the end of our study period the high level of involvement in industry bodies
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even prompted John Robins to express concern that the company was contributing 
more than its fair share of resources.
During the 1980s, GRE’s managers believed that its performance was on a par with, if 
not better than that o f the other UK insurers One of our interviewees indicated that 
among the executive directors at the time some “absolutely and genuinely believed 
that everything that GRE did was done in the best possible way and there was nothing 
we could learn from anyone else”. However, during the 1990s, this self-belief began 
to fade and many in the company began to admit their respect for Commercial Union 
and General Accident However, despite the poor opinions of industry analysts and the 
press, there was still a belief among most of our interviewees that the company’s 
performance was on a par with that of most other UK insurers.
Strategic Agility and Embeddedness within the Industry Macroculture
Our discussion has illustrated the contrast between the two case study companies in 
terms of three factors - the degree to which managers perceived their company to be 
similar to other UK insurers, the level to which they were connected to their peers in 
the industry and how they perceived the performance of the firm relative to that of 
others Taken together these factors imply that during our study Guardian Royal 
Exchange was more deeply embedded in the insurance industry macroculture, whilst 
Prudential was increasingly rejecting it.
The institutional literature describes how the extent to which a firm is embedded in the 
industry macroculture will influence its strategic agility. Over time, and as more firms 
adopt a particular type or pattern of strategy, that type or pattern of strategy will
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become increasingly institutionalised within the industry group. Normative and 
cognitive pressures (Scott 1995) will act against the adoption o f new strategies which 
might replace or modify the institutionalised pattern. Consequently, to initiate or be an 
early adopter of a new strategy a firm must either be able to ignore the pressures to 
conform or be less influenced by those pressures than others in the industry The more 
the managers of a firm are embedded within the macroculture of their industry the 
greater will be the pressure upon them to conform (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). 
Hence, the strategic agility o f a firm will be influenced by the degree to which it is 
embedded in the industry macroculture.
Given the nature of the influence of embeddedness in the industry macroculture it is 
unlikely that individual managers would be aware of its effect. However, comments 
by two of our interviewees indicate that institutional pressures did indeed influence 
the adoption of new strategies One executive director o f GRE highlighted the 
“enormously blinkered thinking” stemming from executives spending their entire 
careers within the industry He argued that as a result his colleagues had been 
unwilling to consider any radical changes to the strategies pursued by the company 
One ex-chief executive believed that the frequent gatherings of senior managers 
promoted a “self congratulatory and self reinforcing culture” which resisted change.
These comments and our discussion indicate that because of its high level of 
embeddedness in the industry macroculture GRE faced considerable institutional 
pressure to conform This in turn had a negative effect upon its strategic agility In the 
case of Prudential, the increasing distancing of itself from the other UK insurers meant
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that institutional pressures upon it to conform to the norms of the insurance industry 
were much weaker As a result, they had little affect upon its strategic agility.
Dynamics and Individual Characteristics of the Dominant Coalition
The third factor that we identified as influencing strategic agility was the ‘dynamics 
and individual characteristics of the dominant coalition’. This factor reflects the 
composition and internal interaction of the top management team We will deal with it 
in two parts We will first explore the differences in the demographics of our two case 
study firms and we will then examine the way in which each team worked together
Demographics o f the Top Management Team
To investigate the influence of senior manager characteristics, statistics were obtained 
from our interviews and from company reports These statistics were then used to 
build profiles of the executive directors in each company at three points in time — 
1991, 1993 and 1995 In order to obtain representative figures for each top 
management team at each point in time, the statistics for individual directors were 
averaged and standard deviations calculated (see Table 8 2 and Figure 8.5). Following 
the innovation and top management team literature, three sets of statistics were 
analysed — age, tenure and career background. Tenure was subdivided into tenure in 
current role, tenure with the company and tenure within the insurance industry. Career 
background was coded in terms of experience within the traditional insurance role -
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e g actuarial and underwriting - experience in investment roles, and experience within 
non-traditional insurance roles - e g. financial management, management of non 
insurance companies. To aid comparison the statistics for GRE were normalised to 
those for Prudential and those for 1993 and 1995 to 1991 (See Figure 8.6).
As Figure 8 6 shows, with the exception of the age profile of the two groups, there 
were notable differences between the demographics of the executive directors of 
Prudential and GRE The average tenure of executive directors in that role was higher 
in Prudential than in GRE - however while the normalised values seemed significant, 
in real terms (see Figure 8.5) the difference was small In each company, the values 
for average industry and company tenure were similar, indicating that executive 
directors either spent their entire careers with one company or joined the company 
from outside the insurance industry. However, as Figures 8.5 and 8.6 show there were 
significant differences between the two companies. The average industry and 
company tenure of GRE executives was over 40% higher than the average for 
Prudential executives
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Mean Average 1991 1993 1995
Age Prudential 52 8 54.0 54.7 49.7
GRE 50.4 49.2 51.2 50.7
Role Tenure Prudential 4.4 5 0 6 0 2.2
GRE 2.8 1.8 3 8 2.7
Company Tenure Prudential 15.7 18 2 20.3 8.5
GRE 23.5 24.4 26.4 19.7
Industry Tenure Prudential 16.5 19.0 20.5 to o
GRE 23.5 24.4 26.4 19.7
Years Experience Prudential 7.8 6.6 9.2 7.5
(Insurance Roles)3 GRE 19.7 20.8 22.4 16.0
Years Experience Prudential 12.5 18.4 14.0 5.2
(Investment Roles) GRE 3 8 4.0 3.7 3 8
Years Experience Prudential 10.3 8.6 8 8 13.5
(Other Roles)4 GRE 63 4.2 4.6 10 0
Standard Deviation Average 1991 1993 1995
Age Prudential 3 9 4 8 8.3
GRE - 8.5 8.5 4.5
Role Tenure Prudential _ 2.8 3.3 2.3
GRE - 0 0 2.6
Company Tenure Prudential - 169 15.1 9.7
GRE - 16 3 16 3 13 4
Industry Tenure Prudential _ 160 14 4 8.7
GRE “ 164 164 11.3
Table 8.2 -Demographics of Executive Directors (Mean and Standard Deviation)
3 Years experience (Insurance) refers to the number o f years working in a  traditional insurance role e g. 
actuarial, underw riting o r  sales.
4 Years experience (o ther roles) refers to the number o f  years working in roles such as financial 
management, m anagem ent o f  non insurance firms
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Figure 8.6 - Top Management Team Demographics -  Prudential and GRE
(Normalised)
'  In the first part o f  the figure the values for GRE are normalised to  those for Prudential (i.e. Prudential 
= 100%). In the second and third parts o f the figure the values for 1993 and 1995 arc normalised to 
those for 1991 (i.e. 1991 = 100%)
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Figures 8.5 and 8.6 demonstrate that the backgrounds of the top management teams of 
each company differed considerably. In GRE, the top level of management was 
dominated by executives with backgrounds in traditional insurance industry roles, e g 
actuarial or underwriting. In contrast, in Prudential, senior executives were fairly 
evenly distributed between those with traditional insurance backgrounds and those 
from other disciplines.
Our statistical analysis of the demographics of the top management teams also shows 
interesting variations over time. In Prudential, the backgrounds of the executive 
directors changed considerably between 1990 and 1995. In 1990, executives with 
backgrounds in investment management were in the majority However, over the early 
1990s this majority declined and there began to be a more even balance in 
backgrounds After 1995, those with a background in non-traditional disciplines were 
in the ascendancy The growing number of executives with a background from outside 
the industry is also shown in the reduction in the average length of company tenure 
between 1993 and 1995 In GRE, executive directors with backgrounds in traditional 
insurance roles predominate throughout the study period - although after the 
appointment of a new CEO in 1994 there was a marked increase in the number of 
outsiders
The contrast between the demographics of Prudential’s top management team and 
those of the GRE team was highlighted by our interviewees - as was the impact that 
new arrivals had in stimulating change Prudential started to appoint senior managers 
from outside both the company and the industry in the late 1970s and executive
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directors from the early 1980s. As one Prudential executive commented about his own 
appointment in 1977 “It was a conscious decision by Corby to bring people in, he was 
looking to stimulate change and didn’t want to import the same traditions that they 
always had. From that point onwards there was an increasing flow of people from 
outside the organisation”. GRE, on the other hand, did not seek to bring in people 
from outside until 1990 and it was not until 1994 that the number of appointments 
became significant6
In Prudential, the influx of new executives from non-insurance backgrounds brought 
with them alternative ideas and cognitive frameworks of how organisations should 
operate and how they should view their environment These views supplemented the 
more traditional views already present in the organisation Consequently, there was a 
greater cognitive diversity influencing strategic decision-making in the company.
The diversity of backgrounds also meant that no one set of norms and values 
dominated and consequently pressure for conformity was reduced Therefore, 
Prudential not only generated a wider range of ideas than GRE it was also more likely 
to pursue them
For alternative ideas to influence decision-making and the adoption of new strategies, 
the organisation must first allow such ideas to be expressed and then the decision 
makers must be willing to modify their own views We will therefore turn our 
attention to the dynamics of the dominant coalition
6 Interview w ith a GRE executive director.
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Dynamics o f the Dominant Coalition
Our inductive analysis indicates that four factors characterise the dynamics of the 
dominant coalition or top management team -  the presence of competing mental 
models, dissatisfaction with the status quo within the firm, the presence o f power 
shifts within the firm; and the nature of interaction between members of the dominant 
coalition. Both the innovation and institutional literatures suggest that the presence of 
competing mental models, dissatisfaction with the status quo and power shifts within 
the firm will be positively related to strategic agility (Bantel and Jackson 1989 and 
Greenwood and Hinings 1996). In addition, we would expect openness to challenge 
and to modifying ones own views to have a positive effect on strategic agility.
Again, our interviewees described each of these four factors with considerable 
consistency Figures 8 7 and 8 8 illustrate this consistency and show how the 
dynamics of the dominant coalitions in Prudential and GRE differed and varied over 
time As before, these figures were generated by coding the transcript for each 
interview according to the response it provided to questions that were indicative of the 
four factors that we had found characterised the dynamics of the dominant coalition7
As Figure 8 7 shows, during the 1980s there were competing views o f what the 
organisation was and interpretations of the environment it faced among Prudential’s 
top management team. Our interviews distinguished four groupings o f senior
Four responses were allowed -  ‘yes’, ‘no ’, ‘it changed/il w as varied across the o rganisation ' or there 
was no relevant data ' Responses were shaded in figures 8.7 and 8 8 according to w hether they were 
expected to relate to a  high level o f  agility (black shading), that it changed or varied ac ross the firm 
(grey shading), related to a low level o f  strategic agility (no shading with text) or no data (n o  shading or 
text) The appropriate shading and response is shown on the figure against the appropriate question and 
under the in terv iew ee's in itials An inter-coder reliability check gave a reliability score betw een  86% 
and 90%.
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managers who tended to hold slightly differing views -  actuaries, investment staff, 
insurance staff and the new executives.
There is strong evidence o f a power shift within Prudential during the 1980s 
Historically, actuaries and other insurance professionals had populated the senior 
ranks of Prudential. In the 1980s, those with an investment background or who had 
come in from outside the industry began to predominate (also see Figures 8 5 and 8 6). 
This shifted power away from the actuaries One executive director commented “it 
moved from being dominated by actuaries to a situation where the chief actuary [was 
not a director and] reported to the finance director” Another described how “each 
time someone came in from outside the actuaries got pushed back further into their 
specialisation”. As a result, alternative views and ideas came to the fore.
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Our interviewees also indicated that there was dissatisfaction with the status quo (see 
Figure 8 7) Most apparent from our interviews was the dissatisfaction that Mick 
Newmarch (then head of the investment division) had with the lack of rigour in 
strategic decision-making. He was particularly critical of the decision to enter estate 
agency. As one o f our interviewees commented, “Newmarch was spitting bullets as to 
how the process lacked rigour and how it was stupid”. He also believed that Prudential 
under Corby should be changing faster than it was Interestingly, several of our 
interviewees stated that prior to becoming CEO, Newmarch did not trail an agenda, 
instead he “trailed dissatisfaction”
However, despite the presence of competing views and open dissatisfaction there was 
mutual respect among the members of the top management team and this promoted an 
environment in which challenge was accepted. Although such challenge could get 
vehement, it did not get personal or political
The willingness to debate and challenge views continued into the 1990s However, 
Newmarch’s more forceful and dominating character did reduce challenge in the 
strategic development process. As one senior manager commented, when comparing 
this period to the 1980s, “the one thing that Corby was willing to do which Newmarch 
would never do was to tolerate someone as awkward as Newmarch”. In addition and 
as clearly shown by Figure 8 7, the number of competing views that were being put 
forward also fell. Several executives felt uneasy about raising issues in the new 
aggressive and confrontational environment -  “with Newmarch he got the views of 
those people who were prepared to argue but heard nothing from those who 
wouldn’t”.
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Several of our interviewees believed that the new aggressive style of interaction 
combined with the increasing inflow of new managers dissipated the atmosphere of 
mutual trust that had existed among the top management team and increased conflict 
This conflict came to a head over the strategy review conducted between 1990 and 
1992. As a result, the senior managers of Prudential took part in several team building 
exercises and agreed new rules of behaviour8. Our interviews indicate that 
relationships between members of the top management team improved subsequently9
The pattern during Davis’ tenure as CEO as shown by Figure 8 7 is less clear 
However, our interview data shows that the new CEO was more willing to seek out 
the opinions of a wider group of senior managers and would allow himself to be 
influenced by these soundings
Turning our attention to GRE, the comparison with Prudential in the 1980s is dramatic 
(see Figure 8 8). As our interviewees indicate, prior to 1990 the mindset of GRE’s top 
management group was fairly homogeneous in terms of their views of the company 
and its environment. Executives stuck very much to their own function or division and 
there was little peer discussion or challenge One group director commented that 
challenge was not welcome and could damage your career prospects
As Figure 8.8 shows, a diversity of views only began to appear during the 1990s. 
Outside appointments and the promotion of a younger generation of managers to 
senior levels resulted in a greater openness to alternative views However, as many of 
our interviewees remarked, there remained a “tremendous resistance to criticism” with *
* Interviews w ith three executive directors o f  Prudential
1 Although several o f  our interviewees indicated that one executive was unable to follow the new rules 
and was forced to leave.
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various executives “maintaining defensive walls around their activities”. The 
appointment of a new CEO in 1994, himself originally from outside the industry, 
shifted the balance of power to those demanding change
Dynamics and Demographics o f the Dominant Coalition and Strategic Agility
Our discussion of the demographics and dynamics of the top management teams in 
Prudential and GRE has revealed significant differences between the two companies 
and considerable variation over time. In Prudential, the appointment of senior 
managers from outside the firm began in the 1970s and this, together with the internal 
promotion of executives with investment backgrounds, increased the diversity of 
views and cognitive mindsets among the top management team. In addition, and again 
linking to our previous factor -  embeddedness in the industry macroculture -  the 
inflow of managers with non traditional backgrounds reduced the degree to which the 
company was influenced by institutional pressures. The inflow of senior managers 
from outside the industry continued throughout our study period
In contrast, in GRE the flow of outsiders into senior positions started in 1990, and 
only became significant after 1994. As a result, the top management team in the 1980s 
was highly homogeneous in its background and in how they saw the company and its 
environment. This homogeneity increased the degree to which the company was 
embedded in the industry macroculture
326
Chapter 8 -  Strategic Agility and Receptive Contexts
Our literature review indicates that turbulence within an individual’s environment, and 
the uncertainty associated with it, will force the individual to rely on whatever 
heuristics for noticing and understanding (cognitive frameworks) they have used 
successfully in the past (Weick 1995 and Scott 1995). Such cognitive frameworks 
categorise data, assign understanding, hide data and fill in missing data (Starbuck and 
Milliken 1988) Individuals from different backgrounds and with different experiences 
will have differing cognitive frameworks that guide their ‘sensemaking’ (Weick 1995 
and Hambrick and Mason 1994)
As Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) and Glick et al (1993) argue, the presence of 
diversity of cognitive frameworks which generate a variety of interpretations of the 
firm and its environment is essential in a turbulent environment. It allows both a 
deeper understanding of the patterns of change that are occurring and a faster 
realisation of the most appropriate action to take or develop. So, in the hyperturbulent 
environment that developed in the 1980s and 1990s in the UK insurance industry 
Prudential was better able to understand the new environment and act more quickly 
than GRE
There is some evidence that if the interaction between managers becomes 
confrontational, increased diversity can be disruptive This point is well illustrated by 
the situation in Prudential in the early 1990s. The combination of a breakdown in the 
mutual respect among senior mangers and an increasingly confrontational style of 
interaction erupted into conflict around the strategic review This episode suggests that 
a diversity of views may cause disruption and generate conflict if there is not a 
cohesive culture in place to ensure good relationships
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However, the presence of alternative views and mindsets will not influence the 
strategic agility of a firm unless the dynamics of the top management team allow those 
views to be expressed and to influence decision-making
The framework proposed by Greenwood and Hinings (1996) is insightful in assessing 
the internal dynamics exposed by our interviews The presence of competing sets of 
values, an openness to alternative views, and shifting balances of power can facilitate 
radical change We would therefore expect Prudential to have been more willing to 
embrace change than GRE The reduction in openness in Prudential after 1990 did 
lead to a reduced ability to change The increasing presence of alternative views and 
the shifting balance of power in GRE was followed by an increase in strategic agility 
towards the end of the study period
Capacity for Action
There were conflicting signals emerging from the environment within the UK 
insurance industry in the 1980s and 1990s As many of the interviewees remarked, the 
insurance cycle and improving investment performance masked the underlying 
performance weakness of many of the firms in our sample Given the highly protected 
and tradition-bound history of the industry, the twin shocks of substantive 
management changes and the appearance of new industry entrants with radically 
different business recipes were necessary to prompt the less strategically agile firms 
into action (Spender 1989).
With competitive pressures increasing, most of the insurance companies cut costs to 
improve efficiency and then looked for new markets from which to recoup their lost
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revenue. Thus, the pattern observed in the mapping phase of this study was of strong 
industry moves for consolidating and internationalising
Our interviewees placed considerable importance on the role of management agency 
in explaining why some firms were able to recognise and respond to market changes 
more quickly than others This capacity of management to act is our final factor
Three components are proposed as influencing the capacity for action of a firm First, 
the willingness of the management team to question its view of the environment and 
the firm Secondly, the degree to which it possesses a bias for action and thirdly the 
presence of a vision of the future In each case, this study indicates a positive 
relationship between each of these components and strategic agility
As with the other factors identified by this study, our interviews provided highly 
consistent insights into the components of a firm’s capacity for action and 
demonstrated significant differences between the two case study firms Figures 8 7 
and 8 8 demonstrate this consistency and show how the capacity for action of 
Prudential and GRE differed and varied over time1“ 10
10 Figures 8 9 and 8 10 were generated by coding the  transcripts for each interview according to the 
response it provided to a range o f  questions that w ere indicative o f  the  three com ponents o f  capacity for 
action. Four responses were allowed -  "yes’,’ no ’, ‘it changcd/it was varied across the organisation or 
there was no relevant data ' Response were shaded in figures 8.9 and 8.10 according to whether they 
related to a h igh  level o f  agility (black shading), that it changed or varied across the firm  (grey 
shading), related to a low level o f  strategic agility (n o  shading with text) or no data (no shading or text). 
The appropriate shading and response is shown on the  figure against the appropriate question and under 
the interview ee’s initials. An inter-coder reliability check  gave a score o f  betw een 86%  and 90%
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In Prudential, there was a high level of capacity for action throughout the study 
period One aspect that may have had a negative influence was the firm’s hesitancy to 
make significant acquisitions in the early 1990s as argued by some of our 
interviewees. In contrast, our GRE interviewees indicate that there was a low capacity 
for action in the 1980s (see Figure 8.10). The level began to increase in the early 
1990s and after 1994 moved more into line with that of Prudential.
Our interviews also clearly demonstrate the contrast between the two companies in the 
three components that we identified.
Willingness to Question the Nature o f the Firm and its Sector
In the 1980s and 1990s, Prudential’s executive team recognised that the environment 
was changing and they were willing to question not only how they did things but also 
what they did. Senior management were “willing to discuss the underlying problems, 
and although it was uncomfortable to face up to reality”. As a result of this 
questioning, the view that Prudential was a savings company and not an insurer 
emerged This willingness to “ask difficult questions” was allied to a willingness to 
act. The abandoning o f ‘door to door’ premium collection, a practice that significantly 
contributed to Prudential becoming the UK’s largest insurer, is illustrative
The importance of a willingness to question both the nature of the firm and its 
environment in explaining relative firm agility is identified in the contextual 
(Pettigrew and Whipp 1991) and co-evolutional (McKelvey 1997 and Lewin et al 
1999) literatures Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and van den Bosch et al (1999) argue 
that those firms that are able to absorb signals from beyond the periphery of the firm
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successfully will tend to be more proactive. Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) highlight the 
importance of continually re-interpreting the firm’s environment They assert that 
management must have the ability to mobilise the resources and the energy to deliver 
successful change Volberda (1998) links such absorptive capacity with the need for 
higher level learning This implies that management, having detected a change in the 
environment, must be prepared to question and change not only how it does things but 
also what it does Our interviews show that Prudential was willing and able to do that
Vision o f the Future
A growing body of the strategic management literature (Bennis and Namus 1985, 
Campbell and Yeung 1991 and Hamel and Prahalad 1994) has promoted the 
importance of the existence of a strategic vision or intent to guide the actions of a 
firm. A company’s vision has been variously described as the ‘general direction of the 
organisation’ (Campbell and Yeung 1991), a ‘mental image of the future state of the 
organisation’ (Bennis and Namus 1985) or ‘a guiding idea or goal’ (Mintzberg et al 
1998) While there may be debate about the definition, most of these authors agree 
that a vision is critical to give a company direction and to guide the effort and build 
the enthusiasm of its members - although there has been criticism over the often vague 
and faddish way the concept has been adopted by firms.
Boisot (1995) argues that an overall vision of the future is particularly valuable during 
periods of environmental turbulence. He suggests that it helps provide unity and 
coherence to a firm’s actions while still allowing initiative and flexibility. Volberda 
(1998) also highlights the importance of developing a vision of the future, indicating
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that it allows the firm to be in a position to exploit future temporary advantages 
D’Aveni (1994) has a similar view and describes how vision is developed through 
‘strategic sooth-saying’ He argues that a firm’s vision should reflect its intentions to 
disrupt existing and future competitive positions through predictions of market and 
technological trends
Pettigrew and Whipp (1991) also raise the concept of vision, using the term ‘strategic 
intent’ They argue that while a realistic vision of the future of the firm and its 
environment are important, firms often fail to link this to action.
It is clear from our interviews that within Prudential there was a clear vision of what 
the company needed to become Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, there was a definite 
aim to seek new distribution channels and to “de-risk the business” i.e. to focus on 
investment products rather than insurance By the 1990s, the goal of Prudential was to 
be a savings and loan company rather than an insurer This guiding vision directed the 
proactive strategic actions the firm took during this period, including its move into 
estate agency, its shift in focus to South East Asia, the withdrawal from commercial 
general insurance and its decision to enter banking.
In contrast, our GRE interviewees indicate that they never managed to develop a 
vision of what the company should be until the Robins era. Even then, some of the 
executive directors argue that a vision was still not clearly stated. They argue that as a 
result there was little focus to the actions that were taken and time was wasted looking 
at inappropriate proposals. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the lack of an agreed
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strategic direction meant that the company adopted a reactive stance to change in the 
industry.
Our interviews signal that the presence of an agreed vision of the future stimulates a 
company to take a more proactive stance to new strategic initiatives Firms lacking a 
coherent vision will be more reactive and will therefore tend to be slower at adopting 
new initiatives.
Bias fo r Action
All of our interviewees highlight that some senior managers were more willing than 
others to act, or in the terms of many 'grasp the nettle’ The 'bias for action’ of the 
chief executive was particularly noted as having a major impact on the speed and 
willingness of the organisation to initiate new strategies
During the 1980s, the senior management team of Prudential believed the company 
had to change This belief was not the result of external pressure but of a general wish 
to improve the company. As one of our interviewees commented -  "what pressure? - 
there wasn’t any immediate pressure, you strove to improve because that was the thing 
to do”. There was a feeling that in the long term the company would have to change 
and that such change should happen sooner rather than later, while it could be 
supported by the cash flow from existing businesses.
All but one o f our interviewees indicate that this willingness to change among the 
senior managers was complemented by a chief executive “who was willing to see
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change implemented” Indeed, three of our interviewees who continued to be part of 
the senior management team into the 1990s argued that the initiatives that Corby 
drove through established the path of change that was then followed during the tenure 
of Mick Newmarch.
Many of our interviewees indicate a similar bias for action on the part of Newmarch 
when he became chief executive. However, several suggest a more cautious attitude to 
large deals or culturally significant actions In particular one interviewee highlights an 
unwillingness to proceed with potential acquisitions, e g the acquisition of two UK 
building societies Another Prudential manager describes a reluctance to abandon 
industrial life assurance completely, although this did finally occur. Despite these 
possible qualifications, Newmarch did implement a significant amount of change In 
particular he drove through Prudential’s embarrassing exit from estate agency and 
promoted the company’s expansion in South East Asia In both cases. Prudential was 
willing to take action before the other UK insurers, and in the case of the estate 
agency business before other financial services companies This bias for action 
appears to have continued under Newmarch’s successor, as evidenced by the 
establishment of a novel internet banking operation and the sale of Prudential’s 
reinsurance operation.
Many of our interviewees, including a manager who had spent time working for both 
our case study companies, believed that one of the reasons why Prudential was able to 
take action quickly was due to the high quality of its staff. “At Prudential there were 
always pockets of excellence all around the place -  actuaries, there were always 
excellent actuaries, trainers, there were always excellent trainers etc.”
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The ability to drive through change was circumscribed by resistance from the 
company’s sales force. Prior to the 1980s, Prudential had been dependent on this form 
of distribution and hence the sales force had considerable power Aware of this barrier 
to change, the company had sought to isolate it from its ventures into new distribution 
channels During the 1980s, through the introduction of new staff and legal action 
Prudential began to implement changes to the sales force In the 1990s the rate of 
change increased dramatically such that by the time the company withdrew from 
industrial business in 1994, most of its field sales force had been re-tasked
The emphasis our interviewees placed on the importance o f ‘doing’ is seldom found 
within the strategic management literature However, it is a common feature of the 
findings of research that has attempted to isolate the characteristics of ‘excellent’ 
companies (Peters and Waterman 1982, Grinyer et al 1988, and Collins and Porras 
1995) Peters and Waterman (1982) suggest that one of the most important 
characteristics of excellent companies is ‘an action orientation or a bias for getting 
things done’. They detail how such companies counter tendencies for conformity and 
inertia stemming from bureaucracy and institutional pressures As such their 
discussion overlaps with the first and second factors identified by our study and 
reinforces the interdependence of all four
Grinyer et al (1988) also highlight the importance of a ‘positive bias for action’ among 
top management in successful turnaround companies, or ‘sharpbenders’ as they term 
them Reflecting the comment made by many of our interviewees, Grinyer et al 
describe managers ‘energetically pursuing effective change which sometimes involved
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hard decisions, or nettle-grasping’. A bias for action together with both a clear vision 
of the future and a strong management team will stimulate innovative behaviour 
throughout the organisation. However, Grinyer et al (1988) are keen to distance their 
concept of an action orientation from the 'cultural variety referred to within the 
American literature on excellence’. A bias for action is 'straightforward enthusiasm, 
commitment, determination to succeed and courage Vigorous action is necessary to 
achieve change and is not achieved by people who flinch from the harshest decisions 
or at taking risks’.
It is this view of bias for action that resonates most closely with the picture presented 
by our interviewees As evidenced by their entry and exit from estate agency and the 
abandonment of industrial life insurance, it is clear that Prudential’s management were 
willing to take harsh decisions and take risks.
One simple lesson that Grinyer et al (1988) feel can be learnt from their study is to 
‘try it’, and keep what works, while quickly abandoning what doesn’t Pettigrew and 
Whipp (1991) and Collins and Porras (1996) offer similar advice. As Collins and 
Porras (1996) argue, sustained financial performance is often the result of 
'opportunistic experimentation and purposeful accidents’. This link between company 
performance and experimentation is also found in recent literature on innovation (Van 
de Ven 1993 and Brown and Eisenhardt 1998). Increasing the number o f initiatives 
increases the probability of a successful innovation Experimentation is not however at 
the expense of developing the existing business In March’s (1991 and 1995) 
terminology, companies must balance 'exploration and exploitation initiatives’
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Our case study indicates that throughout its history Prudential had been willing to 
experiment. Indeed, this legacy of exploration appears to have generated a culture 
among senior management that was open to strategic innovation, particularly in the 
1980s. However, it is also clear that in doing so, it did not neglect the demands of its 
current activities. During the 1980s while it was exploring new distribution channels, 
it was still keen to enhance its industrial business operation Between 1980 and 1987 
new industrial business premiums grew by 33% The disastrous move into estate 
agency is also illustrative and demonstrates the company’s willingness to experiment 
Its problems only emerged because Prudential did not wait for the results o f the initial 
experiment before expanding. GRE did not have a similar willingness to take risks and 
experiment instead a more cautious and conservative approach was adopted. In GRE 
exploitative moves were the norm
The emergence of a successful innovation is not just a matter of chance. The 
organisation must be capable of initiating and exploiting the innovations that arise In 
other words, there must be a receptive context in which ideas can emerge and gain 
acceptance Van de Ven (1993) makes this same point by quoting Louis Pasteur’s 
famous adage -  “chance favours the prepared mind”. As our study clearly shows, the 
early adoption of strategy depends on an organisation possessing both the capacity to 
take action and an internal context that supports that activity It therefore provides 
considerable support for the notion promoted by the contextualist literature (Giddens 
1979 and Pettigrew and Whipp 1991) that successful change is the result of the 
interplay between context and action We will return to this issue later in this chapter
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Comparison of Strategic Aeilitv between Prudential and GRE
Our analysis has identified four factors that influence strategic agility - ‘degree of 
formalisation and centralisation of strategic decision-making’; ‘embeddedness within 
the industry macroculture’; the ‘internal dynamics and individual characteristics of the 
dominant coalition’; and ‘capacity for action’ Our discussion of these factors revealed 
significant differences between Prudential and GRE. In addition to revealing the 
contrasts thrown up by comments of our interviewees, our coding o f the interview 
transcripts also demonstrated the consistency our findings We can obtain a more 
holistic view of the differences between the two companies by combining the figures 
generated by our coding (see Figure 8.11). As with the figures for each factor, black 
shading indicates the presence of factors positively related to the development of 
strategic agility in each o f the two firms".
The figure clearly shows that based on these four factors. Prudential was significantly 
more strategically agile than GRE, particularly during the 1980s and early 1990s The 
amount of black shading in the figure also shows that Prudential was slightly less agile 
in the early 1990s than it was in the 1980s, while the low level of data on the final two 
years makes comment about the final period difficult
For GRE, the figure shows that improvements in the four factors began to occur in the 
early 1990s although it was not until after 1994 that these improvements had a notable 
influence on strategic agility
11 Hatched shading show s th a t Ihc interview described the situation changing or as being different 
across the company. Text only show s that the response related to a low level o f  strategic agility and the 
blank areas indicate that there w as no relevant data
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Prudential - Pre 1990
MN BC TF ML RA BM OK JS  LP-F K B  P SG
Prudential - 1990- 1995
Prudential - 1995 - 1996
GRE - Pre 1990
CB TW PM SG MA JM RP JS  JK
GRE- 1994 - 1996
TH TW PM 3C  MA IM RP JS  JK
Figure 8.11 -  Comparison of Prudential and GRE
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So how closely does the pattern of strategic agility derived from our four factors 
match that observed from our mapping and analysis work? Figure 8.12 displays the 
results of our time varying cross correlation analysis over the period 1990 to 1995 (see 
Chapter 5). In the diagram, the zero line on the vertical axis represents the average for 
the group of the nine companies in our sample. The lines for each company show the 
average lag in introducing a new strategy compared to the industry average (a positive 
value shows the company was on average ahead of the average by a certain number of 
months). The three values for each company represent the average across a four year 
window which is moved in one year steps through the data
Y e a r
Note: The mean lag is obtained by calculating the average o f  the cross-correlation function obtained for 
each company during the three overlapping time periods indicated, i.c. 1990 to 199!?. 1991 to 1994  and 
1992 to 1995"
Figure 8.12 -  Variations in Strategic Agility
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The figure shows Prudential’s strategic agility was consistently above average, but fell 
in the early 1990s before increasing rapidly towards the end of the study period 
GRE’s agility was consistently low It fell in the early 1990s before increasing 
towards the end of the study period
On the basis of our interviewees comments and our coding of the interview transcripts 
we can make an assessment of the strategic agility of each of our two firms at three 
points in time - the end of the 1980s, 1993 and the end of our study period Although 
these points closely match the three points in our time varying cross correlation 
analysis, it is impossible to make an exact match The data points in the cross 
correlation analysis represent averages over a four year time period, while the 
interpretations from our case study analysis are generated from characterising the 
different periods delineated by the tenures of various chief executives
Figures 8 13 and 8 14 illustrate how we used our case analysis to generate hypotheses 
for the level of strategic agility of each company Our analysis allows us to assess 
each company on each of the factors and sub-factors identified at each of the three 
points in time. Where this assessment would indicate a positive influence on strategic 
agility, it is highlighted with shading Taken together these assessments provide an 
interpretation of the overall level of strategic agility for each point in time.
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Factor 1989 1993 199$
Expected  Strategic Agility
Capac ity  for Action
Willing to Question nature of firm/environment 
Vision of the Future 
Bias for Action
Dynam ics/Dem ograph. o f Dom inant Coalition
Demographics of the Top Management Team 
Presence of Competing Mental Models 
Dissatisfaction with the Status Quo 
Presence of Power Shift within the Firm 
Interaction among the Top Management Team
E m b e d d e d n e ss  in the Industry  Macroculture
Perceived Similarity to other firms in Industry 
Connectedness to other firms in Industry 
Perceived Performance Relative to Others Firms
D egree  o f Form alisation and Centralisation
Degree of Formalisation 
Degree of Centralisation
Figure 8.13 -  Summary of Factors -  Prudential11
Factor
Capacity  for Action
Willing to Question nature of firm/environment. 
Vision of the Future 
Bias for Action
Dynam ics/Dem ograph. o f Dom inant Coalition
Demographics of the Top Management Team Homogeneous Homogeneous More Diverse
Presence of Competing Mental Models No
Dissatisfaction with the Status Quo No Emerging Emerging
Presence of Power Shift within the Firm No Emerging
Interaction among the Top Management Team Little Challenge Little Challenge More Open
E m b e d d e d n e ss  in the Industry  Macroculture
Perceived Similarity to other firms in Industry 
Connectedness to other firms in Industry 
Perceived Performance Relative to Others Firms
High
High
On a Par
High
High
On a Par
High
High
On a Par
Degree  o f Form alisation and Centralisation
Degree of Formalisation 
Degree of Centralisation
High
High
Higher
Higher
Medium
Medium
Expected  Strategic Agility Low Low Low / Medium
1989
No
No
No
1993
No
No
Emerging
1995
Yes/No 
Ei
Figure 8.14 -  Summary of Factors - GRE 12
12 Shaded areas indicate where the response would have a positive influence on strategic agility
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For Prudential, this interpretation indicates that the strategic agility of the company 
was high in 1989 It fell in the early 1990s before increasing again towards the end of 
our study. In GRE, strategic agility was low in 1989, remained low in the early 1990s 
before beginning to increase after 1994
The relative levels of strategic agility o f the two companies and the variations in 
agility over time show a strong correlation with the results of our time varying cross 
correlation analysis. In particular, the patterns from our interview data for 1993 and 
1996 show a very close match to the observed levels of strategic agility from our 
quantitative mapping and analysis. The levels for the beginning of the 1990s, 
however, do show some differences For Prudential, our case study analysis indicated 
a very high level of agility, higher even than that for the company at the end of the 
study However, our cross correlation analysis indicates a more moderate level of 
agility We can explain this difference by remembering that the first value in our time 
varying cross correlation analysis is actually the average of the period 1990 to 1993, 
and so it will be heavily influenced by the regime of the early 1990s Hence, the value 
for the beginning of the study period is likely to be much higher than that shown by 
our quantitative analysis
With GRE, the anomaly is the relatively high level of agility indicated by the cross 
correlation analysis for the period 1990 through to 1993, which is higher than the 
observed values for later in the period. An explanation for this mismatch can be found 
in the cross correlation analysis method. The values for strategic agility shown in 
Figure 8 12 are relative to the other firms in the sample group Hence, while in
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absolute terms the agility of GRE may have remained constant or even slightly 
improved, if the average agility of the sample increased more quickly, the relative 
level for GRE would fall As we saw in Chapter 5, some firms were able to respond 
quickly to the changes in the UK insurance industry in the 1980s However, GRE only 
started to look at new strategic initiatives in 1989/1990 The slump in the general 
insurance market between 1990 and 1993 interrupted these nascent efforts. 
Consequently the firms which had introduced change prior to the slump will have 
moved ahead, whilst others will have stood still As a result, the average agility of the 
sample will have increased, and so the relative value for those that had stood still will 
have declined.
Strategic Aeilitv and Receptive Contexts
Thus far, we have considered the four factors identified by our analysis independently 
of each other However, these four factors are strongly interrelated The four factors 
can be divided into two groups, those that refer to the ability and capability of 
managers and those that describe contextual features Without a capacity to act, 
managers will be unable to make strategic changes. Similarly, if the context in which 
managers operate is incompatible with the generation and implementation of new 
ideas, then strategic change will be slowed or even blocked.
Both our case studies clearly demonstrate that the three contextual factors -  ‘the 
degree of formalisation and centralisation of strategic decision-making’, 
embeddedness within the industry macroculture’ and the ‘internal dynamics and
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individual characteristics of the dominant coalition’ -  are also highly interdependent 
and mutually reinforcing
This notion of interrelated factors creating a context that is receptive to change is 
introduced by Pettigrew et al (1992) in their study of the National Health Service in 
the UK. They caution that the factors that contribute to such a context should not be 
taken as a ‘shopping list of discrete factors but are highly inter-correlated which when 
taken together may raise energy levels around change’.
Both our case studies provide evidence of the interdependence o f our three contextual 
factors on influencing strategic agility. In GRE in the early 1990s, the dynamics of the 
dominant coalition improved considerably. In addition, the firm also saw an 
increasing capacity for action However, similar changes were not seen in the other 
contextual factors. As we have seen, these changes had little effect, and agility 
continued to decline relative to the other UK insurers in our sample It was not until 
the ‘bias for action’ increased further (following the arrival o f a new chief executive) 
and the ‘degree of formalisation and centralisation’ began to be addressed that 
strategic agility began to increase.
In Prudential, during the early 1990s, the degree of formalisation and centralisation 
increased dramatically and the dynamics of the dominant coalition became more 
confrontational. As a result, the strategic agility of the company declined, despite the 
fact that the capacity of management to take action remained relatively high and the 
degree of embeddedness in the industry macroculture fell
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The cause o f  the interrelationship of these factors is clear if we consider how they 
influence the process of initiating and adopting new strategies The innovation and top 
management team literature (Kimberly and Evanisko 1981, Glick et al 1993 and 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990) indicate that the more diverse the top management 
team the greater the cognitive diversity This will potentially increase the range of 
information that will be considered by the organisation and deepen its understanding 
of a particular problem or opportunity (Glick et al 1993). There will be a greater 
likelihood o f  new ideas and interpretations of the firm and its environment emerging 
However, the influence of this diversity of views will be curtailed unless the internal 
context o f the firm is receptive. A high degree of embeddedness within an industry 
macroculture will increase the influence of institutional pressures to conform and the 
likelihood that organisation will reject new ideas A high degree of formalisation and 
centralisation will limit the number of managers who will be able to influence the 
strategic decisions of the organisation Equally, if the dynamics of the top 
management team do not enable alternative views to be expressed or considered, they 
will not influence strategic decision-making
Consider the situation where all three factors are unreceptive to new strategies 
Changing any one of these factors (say the degree of formalisation) but not the others 
will not increase the strategic agility of the company -  a high level of embeddedness 
will still restrict the range of ideas being generated and the unreceptive dynamics of 
the top management team will prevent team members influencing strategic decision­
making. It is only when all three are aligned that the firm will be able to effectively 
generate new ideas and incorporate these in decision-making
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The notion that it is the interaction of bundles of factors that influences organisational 
change and performance has only recently begun to enter the management literature. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1990 and 1995) describe such factors as complementarities 
They show that organisational performance depends on having all such factors aligned 
rather than on focusing on individual components Whittington et al (1999) build on 
the concept of complementarities and apply it to organisational design High 
performing firms are shown to be those which implement system wide changes rather 
than individual factor changes. Whittington et al (1999) highlight the importance of 
human resource practices, decentralisation and communication within a company, 
issues that match two of the factors identified by this study -  ‘degree of formalisation 
and centralisation of strategic decision making’ and ‘dynamics and individual 
characteristics of the dominant coalition’.
Volberda (1998) proposes a model of the flexible organisation that includes a number 
of organisational design factors His findings appear to overlap with the results of this 
study. Five factors are identified by Volberda (1998) -  dynamic control, broad and 
deep knowledge base, high absorptive capacity, broad managerial mindsets and much 
experimentation and lastly higher level learning All five factors are required to create 
flexibility ‘Dynamic control’ is contrasted with the static controls exemplified by 
operating manuals, directives, policies and procedures that prescribe standardised 
behaviour. ‘A broad knowledge base’ is described as being the product of having a 
management team with varied backgrounds and the ability to exploit this variety. 
‘Absorptive capacity’ refers to an ability to recognise the need for change by 
interpreting signals from beyond the periphery of the firm Managerial 
experimentation and broad managerial mindsets’ and ‘high levels of learning’ are self­
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explanatory. The parallels with our study are self-evident although Volberda (1998) is 
less explicit about the role of management action and institutional influences
Some Contextual Dilemmas
Our case studies provide evidence that each o f the contextual factors we have 
identified represents a dilemma for management As we have seen, the degree of 
formalisation and centralisation not only has an influence on the initiation of new 
strategies, it also influences their implementation Prudential’s move into estate 
agency in the late 1980s provides an example o f an innovative strategic move that was 
in part facilitated by the low level of formalisation However, the lack of formal plans 
and procedures was a significant cause of the failure to control its implementation. In 
the 1990s, the increased level of formalisation was instrumental in curtailing the 
number of new initiatives that were attempted These examples indicate that 
management must find a degree of formalisation and centralisation that caters for the 
conflicting requirements of the initiation of strategy and its implementation.
We have also discussed the possible adverse effects of too much diversity among the 
senior management team. Without some common ground on which to build 
communication and cohesion (Priem 1990) conflict may result As we saw in 
Prudential, conflict and ill feeling among the senior executives did increase in the 
early 1990s, requiring the whole team to reassess its behaviour However, a major 
theme of our finding is that diversity among the top management team stimulates 
strategic agility. This would suggest that there is again a dilemma to be resolved
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Our third contextual factor, ‘embeddedness within the industry macroculture’, also 
presents a potential dilemma for management As our study has shown, a low level of 
embeddedness stimulates strategic agility. The higher the degree of embeddedness the 
stronger will be the influence o f institutional pressures to conform to industry norms 
As we have seen, Prudential distanced itself from other insurers and industry bodies 
and by the 1990s had ceased to see itself as an insurer This made the company more 
willing to consider and adopt new approaches However, contact and a willingness to 
work with industry groupings does have its advantages. It provides the opportunity to 
gain competitor knowledge (Smith et al 1992), helps ensure consistency in pay 
negotiations with industry-wide unions and more effective lobbying of governments 
on common issues Two of our interviewees argued that Prudential distanced itself too 
much from the other insurers They point to the disagreements that the company had 
with the industry regulator - where it was only going to win if it got the support of the 
other insurers - as an example Its cause may have been better served if it had used a 
less confrontational approach and gone through well-established industry bodies 
Ultimately, this episode led to the departure of Prudential’s CEO and possibly to 
greater publicity being given to subsequent pension mis-selling investigations than 
would otherwise have been the case
The existence of management dilemmas stemming from the conflicting requirements 
of different parts of the strategy making process is also recognised by Brown and 
Eisenhardt (1998) and Volberda (1998)
In his discussion of the flexible firm, Volberda (1998) indicates that if efforts to 
promote autonomy and relax the control systems (whether formal or cultural) go too
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far the organisation may collapse into chaos Following Kanter (1988), Volberda 
argues that flexibility requires an organisational structure and culture that allows 
change while at the same time preserves the organisation.
On the basis of their case study investigations of a number of US computer 
companies, Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) propose that in hyperturbulent environments 
organisations need to position themselves on the edge of chaos They assert that while 
there is a tendency for organisations to drift either towards a stable bureaucratic form 
or into chaos, there is, between these two states, a viable equilibrium position ‘on the 
edge’ Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) argue that occupying this ‘edge’ position requires 
managers to resolve four dilemmas -  adaptive innovation v.’s consistent execution; 
collaborative synergies v.’s individual success; exploit the old v,’s explore the new; 
and commit to a future v.’s being flexible for the future
The first of these quandaries (‘adaptive innovation v,’s consistent execution’) shows 
some similarity to one of the dilemmas raised by our own study (the ‘degree o f 
centralisation and formalisation’). To resolve this dilemma. Brown and Eisenhardt 
(1998) propose that management should foster a culture of frequent change and 
improvisation in the context of a few strict rules and constant real time 
communication within and across the organisation Our study provides some support 
for this advice -  in Prudential in the 1980s there was a culture that promoted change, 
however the control regime was, in some cases, inadequate to address the 
implementation o f strategy In addition, communication between the estate agency 
division and the rest of the organisation was not as open as in other parts o f 
Prudential During the early 1990s, rules and procedures began to dominate and the
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intrepreneurial culture that had existed in the 1980s was suppressed. In Brown and 
Eisenhardt’s (1998) terrns the company drifted towards the ‘bureaucratic trap’.
However, Brown and Eisenhardt’s (1998) assertion that there are equilibrium 
positions at the edge of chaos suggests that such states are stable and unchanging We 
would argue that this view is flawed, and indeed the ease with which Prudential 
shifted from having too little control to having too much without falling into an 
intermediate equilibrium position suggests that the edge of chaos is far more 
precarious than Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) envisage From our perspective, finding 
the right blend of each of our three contextual factors is an on going ‘balancing act’ on 
an edge that is continually in motion.
Recently March (1999) has made a similar point, describing the idea of balance as a 
cruel concept He argues that finding the optimum mix is difficult if not impossible for 
two reasons Firstly, what is perceived as the optimum balance will vary from 
organisations to organisations and from individual to individual and will vary over 
time Secondly, actions and their outcomes will be ‘distributed across space and time 
and will be connected to each other in intricate ways’ The outcomes of a particular 
action will not occur instantaneously but will be spread over time and ‘fuse’ with 
those of earlier or later actions.
Given these problems what advice does our study offer for managers attempting to 
resolve the contextual dilemmas we have identified? Here we must be cautious and 
stress the limitations of our study. Our insights into the three contextual factors are 
derived from our investigation of only two companies, neither of which fully achieved
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the optimum degree of any of these factors -  although Prudential was substantially 
closer to accomplishing this than GRE. However, by identifying these dilemmas the 
study does alert managers to the risks of attempting to increase strategic agility by 
adjusting any or all of the contextual factors. Any over adjustment may well frustrate 
the attempt For this reason and because the appropriate balance point will be 
constantly changing managers should continually monitor the impact of each factor 
and seek to compensate for unwanted consequences.
Summary
In Chapter 5 we identified Prudential as a consistent early adopter of new strategic 
initiatives Guardian Royal Exchange was shown to be consistently more cautious 
This chapter has investigated the reasons for the differences in strategic agility by 
comparing our two case study companies
Three streams of literature (innovation, institutional and contextual) informed our 
comparative analysis of the case studies providing guidance on what factors might 
influence strategic agility. Our inductive analysis supported by a content analysis o f 
the interview transcripts revealed that four highly inter-related factors had had a 
significant effect on the speed at which the firms had adopted new strategies Each of 
these determinants was well supported within the literature
Management's ability to recognise change in the environment, question its current 
strategy and effectively implement new initiatives was a significant factor In this 
process, a bias for action among the top management team (including the chief
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executive) and a widely held vision of what the company will be in the future are 
essential To be successful this ability to act must operate within a receptive context. 
The receptiveness of the firm’s internal context is influenced by our other three factors 
-  the degree of formalisation and centralisation in strategic decision-making, the 
degree of embeddedness within the industry macroculture and the dynamics and 
individual characteristics of the dominant coalition.
Each of these contextual factors presents a dilemma for management Too much 
diversity among senior management dilutes the experience and knowledge of industry 
specialisms. Too much decentralisation and informality reduces the ability o f the firm 
to implement strategic initiatives. Excessive isolation from industry peers closes off a 
potential source of competitive information. Finally, debate and challenge may 
descend into fragmentation and political strife
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion
Introduction
In Chapter 2 we described our two main criticisms of the principle schools of research 
on strategy content -  the adoption of a highly static view based on the notion of stable 
equilibria and the concentration on a single level of analysis. Cross sectional methods 
have dominated research in this area and variations in phenomena over time have been 
largely ignored We argue that as a result, research on strategy content has failed to 
progress as fast as research which addresses the process and context of strategy If we 
recognise the dynamic and multilevel character of the content of strategy then it is 
possible to raise a number of important questions concerning the emergence, 
development and demise of strategy over time and the factors that influence such 
patterns This study took up the challenge to explore these dynamic issues of strategy 
content.
Over the course o f the last five chapters we have addressed different levels of analysis 
— the macro and competitive environment (Chapter 4), industry level patterns of 
strategy content (Chapter 5) and firm level micro process and contexts (Chapters 6,7 
and 8). In each chapter we have stressed the interrelated nature of these levels of 
analysis. In this final chapter we return to our research questions and pull together the 
results of our mapping study and the case study findings We will also discuss the 
contributions that this research has made to the study of strategy Finally, we describe 
the limitations o f our work and suggest recommendations for further work, both to
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address these limitations and to exploit the utility of the research method developed 
during this study
Key Issues Raised in this Study
This thesis reports empirical findings into patterns of strategic development in nine 
companies in the UK insurance industry In contrast to other work on strategy content 
(Ansoff 1987 and Porter 1980) we took a dynamic view, more akin to developments 
within the strategy process literature (Mintzberg 1978, Pettigrew 1985). This 
perspective raised a number of important issues regarding the emergence and 
development of strategy content within an industry group, which have not been 
addressed within the strategy literature Recognition of this gap in the literature 
prompted the development of our three research questions:
1. Do common strategies emerge and diffuse through an industry over time?
2. Are there consistent early and late adopters of common strategies or does the 
order of adoption depend on the nature of the strategy?
3. Why are certain firms consistent early or late adopters of common strategies? 
What factors influence a firm’s strategic agility?
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Before investigating these questions we had to address three critical methodological 
issues Firstly the data collection had to be both longitudinal and cross sectional 
Secondly, temporal information within the data collected had to be retained 
throughout the analysis. Thirdly, we needed to investigate phenomena at both an 
industry level and within the firm and therefore needed to use multiple research 
methods In addition, in order to determine the character of early and late adopters 
rather than the nature o f the strategy adopted, several strategy types had to be 
investigated simultaneously. A combination of the quantity and quality of our time 
series secondary data, the use of the cross-correlation time series analysis and the use 
of the comparative case study analysis method addressed these methodological issues
In Chapter 4, we explored the macro and competitive environments within which the 
UK insurers operated during the 1980s and 1990s. We demonstrated how this 
environment had changed from being highly protective and collaborative, even 
munificent, to being hypercompetitive (D’Aveni 1994). However, some firms coped 
better than others with this new environment Prudential, General Accident and 
Commercial Union improved their performance, particularly within the more valuable 
long term insurance segment of the market
In hypercompetitive environments successful firms are those which are consistently 
ahead of their competitors in introducing new strategies and innovations (D’Aveni 
1994 and Jacobson 1992) Their actions continually disrupt the competitive structure 
of the market forcing others to make the same types of move It was therefore 
anticipated that those firms that saw performance improvements in the 1990s would 
be consistent early adopters of strategies
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The study showed that within our sample two types of initiative emerged as common 
strategies (see Chapter 5). These two types of strategy initiative involved moves to 
consolidate in the UK and internationalise in South East Asia. In both cases, a delay of 
between 2 and 3 years was detected between the first and last adopters within our 
sample group of companies In both strategy types, Prudential was the first mover, 
although the order in which the other firms followed varied between the two strategy 
types. Across all the strategy types considered, seven in total, the cross-correlation 
analysis showed that during the study period Prudential and General Accident were 
consistent early adopters and Guardian Royal Exchange and Eagle Star were 
consistently more cautious Commercial Union pursued a pattern of strategy initiatives 
that differed considerably from that for the other companies studied Consequently, 
the results for this company were not statistically significant
These patterns clearly suggest that the firms that performed best in the first half of the 
1990s were those which were consistently early adopters of strategy, while those that 
were significant late adopters were less successful. However, significant relationships 
were not detected between these patterns and firm size or the availability of slack 
resources
In Chapter 6, 7 and 8 we turned our attention to our third research question -  why are 
certain firms consistent early or late adopters? In essence, what factors will determine 
the strategic agility o f a firm, i.e. the speed with which it adopts new strategies? Our 
comparative case study analysis of Prudential and Guardian Royal Exchange 
identified four interrelated factors as influencing the strategic agility o f a firm -
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‘degree of formalisation and centralisation of decision-making’, ‘embeddedness 
within the industry macroculture’, the ‘internal dynamics and individual 
characteristics of the dominant coalition’ and ‘capacity for action’ The first three of 
these factors reflect the internal context in which management action (our fourth 
theme) takes place. A high level of strategic agility requires both a management team 
with the ability to implement change and a receptive context in which to do it
The degree of formalisation and centralisation of strategic decision-making refers to 
the extent to which the actions of the firm are governed by formal rules and 
procedures and the extent to which they are determined centrally at the top of the 
organisation. The more centrally and formally the organisation is controlled the more 
its actions are determined by a small number of senior managers Consequently, the 
extent to which alternative ideas and interpretations of the organisation and its 
environment can emerge and influence decision-making is reduced This factor is 
strongly supported in the literature on innovation (Damanpour 1991 and Rogers 
1983).
Embeddedness in the industry macroculture refers to the extent to which the firm 
adheres to the institutionalised norms and values of the industry group in which it 
operates. Three sub-factors were shown to influence the degree o f embeddedness -  the 
extent to which the firm perceives itself to be similar to its peer companies, the degree 
to which it is connected to the other firms and the extent to which the managers of the 
firm perceives its performance to be similar to that of the other companies. Firms 
which are highly embedded within the industry macroculture are less inclined to reject 
institutionalised types of activity and pursue new strategies ahead of their peers.
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However, as other firms increasingly adopt a new strategy type these companies are 
more likely to follow suit.
The internal dynamics and characteristics o f the dominant coalition refer to the 
diversity of the top management team and the interaction within this group. A 
diversity of career background and tenure within the industry promotes a range of 
cognitive mindsets and values among the top management team Whether such views 
will influence strategic decision-making will depend on whether there is openness to 
challenge and/or fluidity in the structure and balance of power at the top of the 
organisation. The greater the diversity of values and mindsets there is among the top 
management team, the wider the range there will be of alternative interpretations of 
the state of the company and its environment. The adoption of a new strategy requires 
a reassessment of the firm and its environment and the mobilisation o f the resources 
for implementation. This process is stimulated by a willingness to accept challenge to 
existing views or changes in the balance of power through which alternative views can 
influence strategic decision-making
Capacity for action refers to the ability of the chief executive and his management 
team to recognise the need or desirability of strategic change and to drive through that 
change Three factors were identified by our study as contributing to this ability -  a 
willingness to question the nature of the firm and its environment, a vision of the 
future and a bias for action among the management team Managers must be willing 
and able to reinterpret their view of the firm’s environment as they absorb new signals 
and to question not only how the firm does things but also what it does In addition, 
they must possess a vision of what they want the company to be in the future which
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acts as a general guide to the company, but does not constrain the approaches used to 
achieve it. One of our interviewees used the simile of steering a sailing boat in a 
strong wind - suggesting that if you haven’t got a goal to tack towards you will be 
swept off the chart. Finally both the chief executive and the senior management team 
must possess a bias for action, or in the terms used by many of our interviewees ‘be 
prepared to grasp the nettle’
Our study indicates that the three contextual themes pose a series of dilemmas, and the 
agility of the firm will depend on managers finding appropriate solutions to these 
while at the same time maintaining an ability to act. First, managers must cater for the 
concurrent and differing needs of strategy invention and implementation in regard to 
the degree of centralisation and formality of decision-making adopted The second 
dilemma is what is the appropriate level of embeddedness within the industry 
macroculture that will allow managers to be aware of professional and industry 
developments, but not to an extent that cognitive and normative pressures stifle 
innovative action?
Thirdly, the need for industry experts with wide experience in their field must be 
balanced with the need for the fresh insight and knowledge that outsiders bring The 
dilemma here is to promote cultural and political variety whilst avoiding the negative 
consequences that can arise from fragmentation and political strife
Our findings demonstrate that none of the factors identified on its own promotes 
strategic agility, it is the combination of management ability to take action and the 
presence of a receptive internal context that allows some firms to cope with
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hypercompetitive environments better than others. The management literature has 
made much of the debate between determinism and strategic choice i .e. is it context or 
management choice that determines the actions of a firm (Hannan and Freeman 1984 
and Child 1972)? Our study supports Pettigrew’s (1990) notion that it is not a question 
of management action or context but the combination o f context and action that leads 
to success.
Strategic Agility
During this study we have developed the term ‘strategic agility’ to refer to the speed 
with which firms adopt new strategies However, in the light of our case study 
findings it is apparent that there is more to strategic agility than this simple definition 
suggests The term ‘strategic agility’ has previously been applied to operations 
management (Roth 1996) where it refers to the capability of a firm to produce the 
‘right products at the right place at the right time at the right price’ Here we use the 
term to apply to a wider frame of reference and to reflect the ability of the firm to 
adjust its strategy quickly to exploit changes in its environment or in its own 
capabilities Central to this concept is that management proactively introduces new 
strategies. The firm does not simply flex to match external change
Reflecting our argument about context and action, we see a subtle difference between 
agility and flexibility, although both enable a firm to adopt new strategies quickly. 
Strategically agile firms do not just respond quickly to change in the environment, 
they also proactively influence that environment and force others to match their 
moves. The Oxford Dictionary demonstrates this subtle difference - flexibility is
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defined as the ‘ability to bend without breaking, to be pliable’. Applied to a firm this 
implies that change is the result of the flexing to fit the external environment In 
contrast, the definition of agility - ‘quick moving, nimble and active’ -  describes a far 
less passive view of the role of mangers -  they are influenced but also initiate change 
both within the firm and within their environment
Contributions of this Research
This research makes a number of contributions to the study of strategy content and to 
the wider field of management research These are mainly methodological and 
empirical, but this research also contributes to theoretical debate in a number of areas
Methodological Contributions
A particular strength of this study is the longitudinal methodology we developed to 
investigate our research questions The complementary strengths o f our mapping and 
analysis technique and the comparative case study method allowed us to investigate 
phenomena at a range of analytical levels -  macro environmental conditions, patterns 
at an industry level and the micro processes and contexts of the firm
The comparative case study methodology has become increasingly accepted within 
management science However, our mapping and analysis technique is a highly 
original contribution -  especially the cross correlation analysis. Our study has shown 
how this valuable tool, derived from the fields of economics, signal processing and
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biology, can be adapted for use with dichotomous data and applied to compare time 
series of strategic initiatives or other management changes. It has a particular strength 
in that it retains the temporal component of data
There is considerable scope for the application of the technique in other areas of 
strategy and management research when two or more time series are to be compared 
but where there is a time lag between associated phenomena. It would provide a way 
of comparing time series of strategic and structural changes to determine the direction 
of influence or of comparing managers stated strategic intentions, i.e. intended 
strategy (Mintzberg 1978) with the pattern of strategy that is implemented, i.e. 
emergent strategy Initially steps were undertaken to research these two issues (see 
Pettigrew and Webb 1996) but they were abandoned in favour of the subject of this 
thesis. However, these efforts demonstrated the utility of the cross correlation method
Empirical Contributions
We have already discussed the empirical evidence this study provides for the diffusion 
of strategies through industry groups, the existence of consistent early and late 
adopters of strategy and for some of the factors that influence strategic agility 
Consequently, this research has addressed recent calls by a number of researchers for 
empirical investigation of early and late adopters of strategy (e g Lieberman and 
Montgomery 1998, O’Neill et al 1998 and Porter 1991) (see Chapter 2) However, our 
research has also provided empirical evidence which can contribute to two long 
running debates within the strategic management literature -  that of continuous
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change v. stability/punctuated change and environmental determinism v. strategic 
choice
The study has provided evidence that strategy content is in a state of continuous 
change rather than of stable equilibrium positions, punctuated by quantum and sudden 
change. As one of our ontological assumptions for this study was that change was 
ongoing it could be argued that our findings would therefore depict strategy content as 
constantly changing However, one of the strengths of longitudinal research methods 
is that they are able to detect stability, or the absence o f change, as well as change 
(Tuma and Hannan 1984). We would therefore argue that our approach would have 
been equally successful at detecting stability or punctuated change during the study 
period if it had been there to detect.
Our study also contributes empirical evidence about the debate between 
environmental determinism and strategic choice. The deterministic view assumes that 
environmental pressures, which can be economic, social or technological in nature, 
dictate the strategies of organisations Independent management action is either 
impossible or ineffectual This perspective is most clearly seen in the environmental 
school of strategy (Mintzberg et al 1998) and among population ecologists (Hannan 
and Freeman 1977) In contrast, the strategic choice view (Child 1972) assigns 
primacy to management agency (tempered by political processes) in selecting and 
implementing strategy. Our findings suggest that these polar positions are unrealistic. 
We would argue that reality is a llision of management agency and the constraints and 
pressures imposed by the internal and external contexts in which the firm operates
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Recently Child (1997) revisited his concept of strategic choice, bringing it into line 
with the contextual view proposed by Pettigrew (1985) and Pettigrew and Whipp 
(1991). In this re-conceptualisation, he criticises the polarisation of voluntarism and 
determinism in organisational analysis and suggests that management action is a ‘kind 
of bounded autonomy’. Cognitive and material structures that exist within an 
organisation’s environment act to constrain action. However, within these constraints 
there are ‘zones of manoeuvre’ (Clark 2000) within which organisational decision­
making and action can be both proactive and reactive. Over time the actions of 
management will modify the constraining limits.
In this contextualist conceptualisation of strategic choice, Child (1997) argues that the 
organisation’s openness to new information and knowledge and how it is handled are 
critical issues. However, he suggests that organisational researchers have neglected 
them Our study helps to correct this neglect by empirically demonstrating the 
importance of these issues to strategic agility.
Lewin and Volberda (1999) make the same point Using the term co-evolution instead 
of contextualism (Pettigrew 1985) or strategic choice (Child 1997), they indicate that 
studies that investigate the dynamic interplay and evolution of a firm’s contexts and 
processes and management action are rare. Lewin and Volberda (1999) state that only 
a small number of studies have contributed to this area, among which they include the 
study detailed by this thesis.
Finally, this research provides an empirical study of strategy context, content and 
action in the UK insurance industry Surprisingly, this industry has received little
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attention from strategy researchers, despite its size and the considerable changes that 
have occurred over the last 20 years We believe that the industry offers considerable 
scope for research It is a traditional and conservative industry that is being forced to 
adapt to the demands of hypercompetition and, with the recent moves of international 
insurance companies, globalisation Consequently, it provides an opportunity to study 
the impact of these challenges on strategy making and organisational behaviour
In addition, because historically firms within the industry had closed and co-operative 
relationships, institutional pressures were significant It is an industry therefore which 
allows researchers to study the impact of new competitive pressures on industry 
traditions. Several institutional writers (Oliver 1991 and Greenwood and Hining 1996) 
have highlighted the limited attention that has been given to the process of rejecting 
previously institutionalised practices (de-institutionalisation) As we have seen in our 
study this process has been common in the UK insurance industry, and as a result the 
industry also offers considerable potential for studies that address this issue
Theoretical Contributions
At a theoretical level, we have proposed a dynamic view of strategy content that is 
commensurate with developments within the strategy process and context literatures 
(Mintzberg 1978, Pettigrew 1985 and Pettigrew et al 1992). Strategy content is 
envisaged as a stream of initiatives, which alter a firm’s size and market and 
geographic coverage over time. This view is in marked contrast to the notion of
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strategy content as a stable market or resource position (Porter 1980 and Barney 1986) 
which has prevailed within the strategy content literature
As we noted in Chapter 1, the inadequacies of static views of strategy are increasingly 
being recognised even by their creators Notably, Porter (1991) calls for more 
dynamic theories o f strategy, and indeed some of his recent work has adopted 
longitudinal research methods to reveal such dynamics (Porter 1990). In calling for 
such theories Porter (1991) identifies four areas in which research effort is required -  
(1) understanding the balance between environmental determinism and strategic 
choice, (2) understanding the degree of inertia in competitive positions, (3) ‘pushing 
back the chain of causality’ i.e what is the ultimate origin of competitive advantage, 
and (4) developing and crafting empirical methods that allow the dynamic character of 
strategy to be explored Our study has made a contribution to each of these areas We 
have already discussed two of these issues - determinism v.’s strategic choice and the 
methodological development made by this study Our concept of strategic agility 
offers insight into the other two issues raised by Porter (1991) in that it ‘pushes back 
the chain of causality’ of competitive advantage and it improves our understanding of 
the sources of inertia The strategic agility of a firm rather than the strategy type 
pursued (e g differentiating or internationalising) is what influences firm performance 
and is the ‘source of advantage’ In turn, strategic agility is influenced by the 
managerial and contextual factors identified by our study. However, the contextual 
factors can also be a source of inertia. As we have discussed, too much or too little of 
any of these factors will restrict strategic agility, thereby placing the firm at a 
disadvantage relative to its competitors
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This more dynamic way of thinking has allowed us to show how elements of the 
innovation, institutional and contextual literatures are relevant to the adoption of 
strategy In relation to the issues raised by Porter (1991), these literatures provide 
considerable insight into the dynamic nature of strategy and the sources of competitive 
advantage, as well as the sources o f inertia that may inhibit strategic change
The dynamic view of strategy proposed has considerable implications for the future 
study of strategy content and strategic groups (Caves and Porter 1977, McGee and 
Thomas 1986 and Cool and Schendel 1987). Typically, such studies have used cross 
sectional comparisons of the strategies pursued by firms at a single point in time to 
identify determinants of performance. However, if strategy content is in a state of 
continual change such traditional methods must be treated with caution For example, 
in a study of strategic groups, defining the members of the strategic group would 
produce different members at different times. An early or a late adopter of strategic 
initiatives may be erroneously excluded from a group due to the different timing of 
strategies rather than a difference in the type of strategy pursued
Limitations of this Study and Recommendations for Further 
Research
In Chapter 3 we commented extensively on the issue of credibility and the relevance 
of our findings We described the criteria proposed by Hammersley (1992) for judging 
the quality of post positivist research — its ability to generate formal theory; the degree 
to which findings can be generalised or transferred to other settings, the degree to
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which the research is empirically grounded and scientifically credible; and the degree 
to which it is reflexive. We discussed in depth the issues of reflexivity and bias in our 
research and described the efforts we had taken to ensure validity Through the course 
of the thesis we have seen how the findings of this research have been well supported 
by existing literature and well grounded within our empirical data.
However, Hammersley’s criteria also highlight the main limitation of our study Our 
findings are based on the mapping and analysis of nine firms within one industry and 
consequently there must be questions as to the extent to which they are applicable to 
other contexts. Because of the extent to which our findings are supported by elements 
of the innovation, institutional and contextual literatures, some level of 
generalisability can be claimed However, the originality of this work within the 
strategy field does mean that further work in other industry sectors is required before 
we can confidently claim transferability
Limitations may also be raised concerning the use of secondary data in our mapping 
and analysis to identify early and late adopters of strategy However, in this study 
these data were used to identify the strategic initiatives of the firms being studied and 
the time at which these events occurred. No attempt was made to use these data to 
explain the reasoning and processes that lay behind these moves. The limited 
information obtained from the secondary data was carefully verified In most cases the 
information was found in several national newspapers, it was checked against the 
companies’ annual reports and, where it related to our case study companies, 
confirmed with our interviewees. Consequently, we believe that the reliability of this 
data are high We would argue that it will have a higher level of accuracy than many
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traditional primary data collection techniques, such as interviews and questionnaires, 
where the researcher is relying on the subject’s memory and a willingness to respond 
let alone provide accurate data.
While our parsimonious use of the secondary data increased the validity of the 
mapping study findings, it has introduced a more subtle limitation to this study. The 
factors we have identified as influencing strategic agility are based solely on the 
results o f  our case studies of two firms We have not used our database material to 
explore these themes across the other seven firms in our sample. Given the nature of 
this data, we believe that this would have been unwise However, exploring the 
variation in these themes across the industry would provide further confidence in our 
findings and their transferability This then is a second area in which we would 
recommend further work, with either a series of interviews or a questionnaire survey 
being conducted of these other seven firms This study would be targeted to explore 
how the factors we identified varied across the group.
Finally, as we argued in Chapter 3, the time-period we were able to cover in our 
mapping and analysis study was limited to 6 years. The ongoing spate of mergers and 
acquisitions that have occurred within our sample since the end of our study period 
prohibited extension of the study forward in time The start of our study period was 
determined by the coverage of the database systems then available. Since the 
completion of our mapping and analysis phase, online and CD-Rom data sources have 
evolved further As competition grows the cost of using such systems has begun to fall 
and suppliers are striving to extend the data they offer. Hence, in the future 
researchers will be less restricted in the use of this kind of data collection. This
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suggests a final area in which further research could occur -  extending the mapping 
and analytical phase of our study back into the 1980s or even the 1970s. This would 
allow us to more confidently map changes in the agility of our nine firms and ease 
concerns over ‘left or right censoring’ of our data
Conclusion
This study has provided empirical evidence that strategy content is in a state of 
constant flux It has shown that others will imitate strategies that are introduced by 
one firm such that it diffuses through an industry group over time Certain companies 
will be consistent early or late adopters of such strategies, with the speed of adoption 
being influenced by a range of interrelated organisational factors. We have shown that 
the ability of firms to introduce new strategies quickly and proactively depends on the 
capability of managers to recognise and exploit changes in their environment within a 
context that is receptive to such actions The receptivity of the context in which 
managers operate will depend on managers finding appropriate solutions to three 
dilemmas What degree of centralisation and formality of decision-making adopted 
should be adopted? To what extent should the organisation be embedded within the 
industry macroculture? And what level of diversity, openness and fluidity should there 
be among the firms top management team
A strength of our research is the combination of an innovative statistical analysis and 
comparative case study method The methodology developed here has considerable 
utility for other studies within management science The focus on a single industry is 
the thesis’ main limitation. We suggest there is a need for further research of leaders
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and laggards of strategy adoption in other industries to build confidence of the 
transferability of confirm our findings
We introduced Chapter 2 with a quote by Francis Bacon -  “All this is true if time 
stood still”. This statement was made in the early 15th Century as a criticism of those 
who scorned change. In the same essay on innovation, Bacon provides excellent 
advice for companies faced by hypercompetitive environments on the danger of not 
being agile -  “he that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils”
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